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According to Hegel, there are no intrinsic limitations on the extent of human knowledge 
and reason, and one of the prerequisites of overcoming their relative limits is a logic that 
is capable of grasping the intrinsic contradictions in things. Hegel claims that his Logic 
shows that these contradictions are immanently necessary. By means of a close 
reexamination of Hegel’s own texts, I defend this claim against two of his most 
prominent nineteenth century critics, Schelling and Trendelenburg, who hope to 
undermine Hegelian rationalism and defend the more modest Kantian outlook. I also 
show that a school of interpretation that I call intuitionism fails in its attempt to defend 
Hegelian necessity. 
In Part 1, I address Schelling’s claim that Hegel’s Logic cannot be necessary 
because it relies on presuppositions. I also show that the intuitionist interpretation of 
Hegelian necessity is both self-defeating and textually inaccurate. Contrary to Schelling 
and the intuitionists, I argue that Hegelian necessity must be grasped as logical necessity 
in accordance with the principle of non-contradiction, but that the application of this 
principle produces other principles, the principle of contradiction and the principle of the 
unity of opposites, which express its intrinsically limited scope. 
In Part 2, I address Trendelenburg’s claim that Hegel’s Logic cannot be necessary 
because, as himself Hegel insists, it relies on a posteriori knowledge. The intuitionist 
Houlgate, like many other Hegel interpreters, attempts to defend the Logic against the 
vi 
intellectual descendants of Trendelenburg’s criticism by reducing Hegel’s absolute 
idealism to Kantian subjective idealism. I refute this interpretation and show that, 
according to Hegel, Kant’s subjective idealism is grounded in a prejudice against 
contradiction, a prejudice that Trendelenburg shares and on which his criticism of 
Hegelian necessity is based.   
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G. W. F. Hegel had the rare personal good fortune of being alive when his philosophy 
reached the height of its popularity. His lectures at the Berlin University enjoyed 
enormous popularity up until his death in 1831.  
However, by the second half of the nineteenth century, the period following the 
Prussian Reform movement, Hegel’s philosophy had been from toppled its place of 
prominence and something approaching a consensus had developed in the academy that 
his philosophy was misguided and unreasonable and, in a word, false.  
Some scholars have interpreted the decline in its popularity as evidence that the 
discipline of philosophy had finally come to its senses. In their accounts, one reads an 
almost audible sigh of relief that the inexplicable state of hypnosis engendered by the 
foolish Hegelian philosophy was ultimately so short-lived. For instance, Frederick Beiser 
calls the second half of the nineteenth century “the age that cured itself of Fichtean and 
Hegelian jargon” and “realized all too well the great bane of needless technicality and the 
great value of clarity and common sense.”1 However, a shift this profound requires a 
serious explanation. It cannot be chalked up either to the fickleness of philosophers or 
transparently obvious errors at the heart of Hegel’s system. Moreover, such explanations 
are out of all proportion with the character of Hegel’s philosophy itself, which was too 
                                                          
1 Beiser, After Hegel, 7. 
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systematic and thorough to have been a mere fad or to have been refuted so easily. 
Moreover, such explanations also downplay the significance of a political shift in 
nineteenth century Germany that led to the exclusion of Hegelians from academia. 
 By the early 1840s, Hegel’s ambitious rationalist project had become a pole of 
attraction for the criticism of the religious authority on which the state relied for its 
legitimacy. Moreover, Hegel’s great intellectual prestige and influence made it difficult 
for the government to rely on a purely brute force approach to the disciples of the great 
master, so, in 1841, Schelling, Hegel’s former friend, was brought to Berlin and was 
appointed to Hegel’s old chair at the Berlin University for the purpose of attacking 
Hegel’s system, and above all his Logic.2 
This unleashed one of the most important debates in German intellectual history. 
The debate over Hegel’s philosophy that took place in Berlin in the 1840s, shook German 
intellectual life. It was one of those rare moments in the history of philosophy when the 
passions and intellect of leading academics in other fields as well as religious and 
political figures and ordinary citizens were roused and engaged by a philosophy.  
 Schelling had not published a single work since 1804. However, the prestige of 
his philosophy of nature was still enormous, and news of his animosity toward Hegel’s 
philosophy had spread to Berlin. As early as the Erlangen lectures in 1820, Schelling had 
                                                          
2 In this study, I adopt the convention of shortening the title of Hegel’s Science of Logic 
to Logic.  
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criticized Hegel’s philosophy. In his lectures in Munich in the 1830s, Schelling further 
developed these criticisms.  
 Even before Schelling came to Berlin, another Berlin University professor, 
Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, set himself the task of refuting Hegel’s Logic.  
Trendelenburg’s work, Logische Untersuchungen, which has never been translated into 
English in full, has been assigned an important historical role in turning the tide against 
Hegelianism. Beiser credits Trendelenburg rather than Schelling with providing “a 
devastating critique” of Hegel’s dialectic.3 
 Both Schelling and Trendelenburg disputed the grounds on which Hegel based his 
rationalist optimism. Hegel insisted that there was nothing that is in principle unknowable 
by the human mind, and he claimed that his own philosophy provided the key to 
illuminating questions that had vexed philosophers for centuries. This key was his 
dialectical logic, which, he insisted, placed philosophy on a thoroughly scientific footing 
by providing logic with the validation of necessity throughout. Whereas the old logic and 
the old philosophy relied on educated guesswork in adopting their principles, his 
philosophy produced a necessary deduction of its own principles, thereby removing the 
last significant obstacle to the rational cognition and knowledge of the world. 
Consequently, Schelling and Trendelenburg both directed their attacks against Hegelian 
necessity. In their view, Hegel ought to have accepted, with Kant, that human knowledge, 
as opposed to divine knowledge, is finite.  
                                                          
3 Beiser, Late German Idealism, 13. 
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 While Schelling and Trendelenburg are both relatively well-known, the names of 
most of Hegel’s defenders have now been forgotten by all but a few specialists. This can 
perhaps be explained in part by the fact that, although Hegel’s most trenchant critics 
directed their efforts at refutation against Hegel’s Logic, which was generally recognized 
as the heart of Hegel’s philosophy, the defenses offered by the partisans of Hegelianism 
tended to have a more immediately political character and did not, for the most part, 
concern themselves with the more technical aspects of either Schelling and 
Trendelenburg’s criticisms of Hegel’s philosophy itself. 
 It is also worth considering whether, if Schelling and Trendelenburg’s refutations 
of Hegel’s Logic had indeed been so devastating, the Prussian state would have found it 
necessary to combine the theoretical contribution of these two figures with more directly 
repressive measures. One might even suppose that the respectability of these figures, who 
directed their efforts at the refutation of Hegel’s Logic, provided the Prussian state the 
political cover it needed for the eventual exclusion of Hegelians from academia. While 
debates about the significance of Hegel’s philosophy continued outside the universities, it 
lost its influence within the universities themselves.  
Moreover, in a more general sense, those discussions that touch on issues that 
convulse the central nervous system, as it were, of entire cities, entire nations or an entire 
continent cannot fail to be shaped by and play a role in shaping the larger social and 
political context in which they arise and develop. The philosophical assessment of the 
powers of human reason, which had already played such an important role in the French 
Revolution, was one such issue.  
5 
In this introduction, I am not in a position to provide definitive answers about the 
precise confluence of causes of the decline of Hegelianism in the German universities in 
the nineteenth century. And one might even wonder how important it is to answer them at 
all. The Prussian state does not exist today. German philosophy—and the discipline of 
philosophy as a whole—have undergone convulsions and transformations before which 
those distant days in 1830s and 1840s Prussia might appear to pale in significance.  
However, I believe that taking these considerations as a decisive gauge of the 
significance of the debate over Hegel’s Logic initiated by Schelling and Trendelenburg 
would be mistaken. With regard to the decline of Hegelianism, the very fact that there are 
serious questions to be raised about the role of historical circumstances of a not 
immediately philosophical character suggests that it is worth revisiting the philosophical 
merits of Schelling’s and Trendelenburg’s criticisms.  
Moreover, in my view, this issue is of the most pressing contemporary 
significance for philosophical and intellectual life in the twenty-first century. What is at 
stake is not merely the stature of one or another historical figure, but our assessment of 
the powers of human reason itself.  
Although Schelling’s and, to a lesser extent, Trendelenburg’s criticisms of 
Hegel’s Logic have been addressed repeatedly in the literature, to my knowledge, no 
study has taken up the question of Hegelian necessity that is at the heart of these 
criticisms and sought to offer a systematic defense of Hegel’s Logic against them.  
Thus, in the most fundamental sense, the debate with Schelling and 
Trendelenburg over the necessity of Hegel’s Logic is not yet over. It is my hope that in 
6 
the coming years Hegel scholarship will take up the question of Hegelian necessity with 
renewed vigor. The present study is my own contribution to this discussion, hopefully the 
first of many. In it, I offer a defense of the necessity of Hegel’s Logic against Schelling 
and Trendelenburg’s criticisms and show that recent efforts to defend Hegel against some 
of these criticisms have not measured up to the task.  
This study is divided into two parts. Part 1 takes up Schelling’s criticisms of 
Hegelian logical necessity.  
In Chapter 1, I present Schelling’s criticisms. Although there is a definite 
continuity in Schelling’s thought from the Munich lectures to the Berlin lectures, 
Schelling directed his sharpest criticisms against Hegelian necessity in the Munich 
lectures. Consequently, it is on these that I concentrate in Chapter 1. Schelling argues 
that, contrary to what Hegel himself proclaims, his Logic is riddled with presuppositions. 
In Schelling’s view, if Hegel’s Logic is not presuppositionless, then neither can its 
development be necessary, but if its development is not necessary, then neither is it fully 
rational, and therefore rationally comprehensible for human reason.  
In Chapter 2, I take up the defense of Hegel’s Logic by Schelling and other 
opponents of his rationalist project offered by a group of Hegel scholars, whom I term the 
intuitionists. In this chapter, I explain the central tenets of their interpretation, with 
particular emphasis on the version of the interpretation offered by Stephen Houlgate in 
his book The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity.  
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I show that, although Houlgate’s aims are admirable, his defense of Hegelian necessity 
against Schelling’s criticisms ultimately fails, in large part because he fails to provide a 
definition of the latter.  
I also locate the systematic reason for this failure to define Hegelian necessity in 
their position on the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s Logic. The intuitionists believe 
that, because the Logic is supposed to be presuppositionless, its necessity cannot be 
defined at the outset with reference to any principle. I then show that an unfortunate 
consequence of this position is that many of the intuitionists are compelled to rely 
implicitly on intuition in their explanation of the development of Hegel’s Logic. This, 
however, defeats their purpose, since intuition alone cannot provide a reliable safeguard 
against the introduction of presuppositions.  
In Chapter 3, I elaborate my own interpretation of Hegelian necessity on the basis 
of a careful consideration of some of the relevant passages of both Hegel’s Science of 
Logic and his Encyclopedia Logic. As I show there, for Hegel, the principle of non-
contradiction plays a central role in guaranteeing the necessity of his logical deduction. 
Hegel shows that understanding, which he characterizes as the adherence of thinking to 
the law or principle of identity (A = A) and the law or principle of non-contradiction 
(Nothing is both A and not A.), is a necessary side or moment in all theoretical and 
practical activity and in everything true in general.  
Contrary to the supposition of the intuitionists, I argue, for Hegel, it is precisely 
the consistent, rigorous application of the law of non-contradiction that yields 
unavoidable, i.e., necessary, contradictions in the subsequent development of the Logic. 
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This leads to what Hegel calls the “law of contradiction,” according to which “everything 
is contradictory.” This law corresponds to and is immanent in the dialectical moment of 
the concept. In Hegel’s presentation, this law in turn implies another law, which I call the 
law of the unity of opposites, and which corresponds to what Hegel calls the speculative 
moment of the concept.  
According to Hegel, the speculative moment rationally articulates the content that 
is ordinarily only grasped in a confused way by mysticism. Moreover, Hegel insists that 
unless one irrationally adheres to the standpoint of the understanding, which dogmatically 
adheres to the principle of non-contradiction even in the face of the deduction of 
necessary contradictions from the application of this very principle, the speculative 
moment of the concept does not have to remain mysterious. 
In Chapter 4, I defend my interpretation of Hegelian necessity against two of 
Schelling’s criticisms and argue that, unlike intuitionism, my interpretation successfully 
refutes these criticisms. I also argue, in this chapter, that both Schelling’s criticisms and 
the errors of the intutionists in interpreting Hegel stem from the adherence of both to the 
standpoint of the understanding. 
Part 2 then takes up Trendelenburg’s criticisms of Hegelian logical necessity, 
which are closely related to those criticisms offered by Schelling that I had not yet 
addressed in Part 1. In Chapter 5, I present Trendelenburg’s criticisms of Hegelian 
necessity. 
Trendelenburg insists that Hegel’s position on the source of the concepts and 
transitions in his Logic is fundamentally inconsistent. According to Hegel, the Logic is an 
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absolutely necessary, logical deduction, a product of pure thought, but Hegel also claims 
that the Logic presupposes experience in general and the empirical sciences in particular. 
Trendelenburg insists that Hegel ought to choose one or the other. Either his logic is a 
product of pure thought, independent of experience, or else it must be deduced from 
experience. 
According to Trendelenburg Hegel should not have rejected Kant’s absolute 
distinction between a priori knowledge, propositions, and structures of consciousness—
those that belong to consciousness independently of all experience—and the a posteriori 
propositions, knowledge and structures of consciousness—those that it gains only as a 
result of experience. Because he fails to distinguish the two, and, in particular, because he 
fails to realize that the concept of becoming has an irreducibly empirical content, he also 
fails to realize that he fails to deduce this concept in the medium of pure thought. 
In Chapter 6, I once again take up Houlgate’s interpretation. Houlgate argues that 
Hegel’s Logic has a pure a priori development. Like Trendelenburg, Houlgate accepts 
that if Hegel’s Logic depends on knowledge gained from experience, its development 
cannot be necessary. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I present my interpretation of the role of a posteriori 
knowledge in Hegel’s Logic. On the basis of a careful review of the relevant textual 
evidence, I show that my interpretation of Hegel’s position on this question is consistent 
with the interpretation of Hegelian logical necessity I presented in Part 1. My 
interpretation refutes the theoretical basis of both Houlgate’s reductionist attempt to 
defend the presuppositionlessness and necessity of Hegel’s Logic by portraying its entire 
10 
development as exclusively a priori and Trendelenburg’s criticism of the fact that it has 
both a priori and a posteriori moments. I show that whereas both Houlgate and 
Trendelenburg presuppose the correctness of Kant’s absolute distinction, Hegel shows 




Chapter 1: Schelling’s Criticisms of Hegelian Logical Necessity 
A. Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the criticisms of Hegelian necessity advanced by Schelling in his 
lectures in Munich in the 1830s.  
So as not to disperse the attention of the reader in too many directions at once, I 
hold off criticism of Schelling’s criticisms. Looking ahead, in Chapter 2, I present an 
interpretation of Hegel’s Logic, one of whose aims is defense of Hegel against Schelling. 
In Chapter 3, I present my own interpretation of Hegelian necessity, and, in Chapter 4, I 
defend Hegelian necessity on the basis of this interpretation. 
Returning to Schelling, the central theme of his critique is the claim that Hegel’s 
Logic depends on contingently selected presuppositions and therefore does not, as Hegel 
claims, develop in accordance with a necessity immanent in (intrinsic in and productive 
of) concepts themselves. 
However, Schelling himself is not an opponent of presuppositions. Indeed, he 
introduces his critique of Hegel’s philosophy by criticizing Hegel for not presupposing 
fundamental limits on human reason. Of course, this criticism cannot itself be counted as 
any kind of refutation and Schelling does not appear to think it is one either. Rather, 
12 
Schelling’s position on this question indicates why he takes such pains to refute Hegelian 
necessity.  
After presenting this general context of Schelling’s criticisms, I review in detail 
his attempt at a refutation of Hegelian necessity. 
B. Schelling’s Religious Criticisms of Hegel’s Rationalist Project 
According to Schelling, we can think the possible but cannot think the actual, what exists. 
Rather, he claims, we cognize the actual, by which he means that we grasp it only with 
the help of empirical intuition. Schelling insists that thinking ought only to be able to 
grasp what “can” be known, but not what “is known.”4 
Schelling holds that real objects are in their essence external and independent of 
reason, and that they resist reason’s efforts to conquer them. Like Kant, Schelling 
believes that they contain an element that is irreducibly incomprehensible to reason that 
can only be grasped, in a limited way, by means of a faculty of sensation or empirical 
intuition.  
According to Schelling, Hegel failed to respect this distinction between the 
positive (existence) and the negative (logic of the possible). Specifically, Schelling 
complains that Hegel failed to “renounce[e] everything positive” in his articulation of 
logic. Hegel fails to withdraw “to pure thought, to the pure concept” as he claims to do, 
                                                          
4 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 134. 
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Schelling argues, since, for Hegel, “the concept [is] everything” and it leaves “nothing 
outside itself.”5 There is thus nothing from which it can withdraw.  
However, though related, this is not what Schelling finds most troubling about 
Hegel’s Logic. What Schelling finds most troubling is Hegel’s presentation of the 
Absolute Idea in the Science of Logic, where the latter claims that “the method” of the 
logic “is only the movement of the concept itself.”6 This “method,” Hegel elaborates,  
 
is only the movement of the concept itself, but in the sense that the concept is 
everything and its movement is the universal absolute activity. The method is, 
therefore, the infinite power of knowing.7 
 
Schelling notes, moreover, that, according to Hegel, “no object, to the extent to which it 
presents itself as external, distant from reason and independent of reason, can put up any 
resistance” to this power.8 
In other words, everything real has an inner form of motion that can be 
comprehended by the human mind. There is nothing left over in a thing that is 
                                                          
5 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 134. 
6 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 134. 
7 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 134. 
8 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 135. 
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fundamentally incomprehensible. This is the central thesis in Hegel’s philosophy to 
which Schelling objects, and this thesis is objectionable, in Schelling’s view, above all 
because it “leaves nothing left for God other than the movement of the concept, i.e. than 
for Himself to be only the concept.”9  
Schelling admits that one “cannot reproach Hegel with holding the opinion that 
God is just a concept” in the sense that God is merely the subjective possession of the 
conceptual thought of human beings, since, for Hegel, the concept is “the thing itself 
(Sache selbst).”10 For Hegel, Schelling explains, “the true creator is the concept” since 
“with the concept one has the creator and needs no other outside this creator.”11  
The problem with this, in Schelling’s view, is that Hegel’s philosophy  
 
attributes to itself the most objective meaning and, in particular, a wholly 
complete knowledge (Erkenntnis) of God and of divine things—the knowledge 
which Kant denied to philosophy is supposedly achieved by his philosophy.12 
 
Again, Schelling’s distaste for the rationalist ambitions of Hegel’s project, which 
brought the latter into conflict with Kant, cannot be counted as a refutation of any aspect 
                                                          
9 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 135. 
10 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 135. 
11 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 135. 
12 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 135. 
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of Hegel’s Logic. However, it does serve to explain Schelling’s motivation for attempting 
such a refutation, and the central role that Schelling’s attack on the allegedly immanently 
necessary development of Hegel’s Logic plays in this effort. In Schelling’s view, if 
Hegel’s Logic does not develop in an immanently necessary way, if Hegel—despite his 
claims about the immanent necessity of his Logic—had to rely instead on a variety of 
presuppositions, then this failure on Hegel’s part would lend a certain amount of credence 
to the supposition that human reason is irreducibly dependent on a content (or possibly 
even a will) that lies outside of the scope of its own comprehension.  
Thus, Schelling sets out to demonstrate that Hegel’s Logic does not develop in 
accordance with immanent necessity but is instead riddled with presuppositions. These 
presuppositions take the form of (1) a merely adventitious beginning, and (2) an 
unconsciously presupposed aim derived from his previous habits of thought, which 
include (a) unproven logical forms adopted from other philosophers and (b) concepts 
formed with the help of empirical intuition. In Schelling’s view, if presuppositions shape 
the development of the Logic, this refutes Hegel’s claim that this development is 
necessary and thus fully rational, and therefore rationally comprehensible for human 
reason.  
C. Schelling’s Criticism of Hegelian Logical Necessity  
a. The Adventitious Beginning of the Logic 
According to Schelling, Hegel begins his Logic with the thought of pure being for 
reasons that are merely adventitious, i.e., though not entirely arbitrary, certainly not 
necessary. In Schelling’s view, Hegel then has definite reasons for finding “pure being” 
16 
attractive as a beginning, but another philosopher—Schelling, for instance—could easily 
find another alternative beginning attractive for (superior) reasons of his own.  
Schelling explains that in deciding how to begin his philosophy, Hegel was 
influenced by the prior development of German idealism—Fichte’s and also Schelling’s 
own systems—which each sought in their own way to provide philosophy with a 
foundation that was at once both subjective and objective.  
Schelling claims that Hegel wished to “establish the same system overall” as 
Schelling himself, but (misguidedly) sought to do so on the basis of a beginning that was 
(supposedly) not only objective, but “the most objective” of all, i.e. more objective than 
Schelling’s beginning.13 Hegel’s task was then, Schelling claims, to “determin[e] that 
which is most objective as the negation of everything subjective.”14 In Schelling’s view, 
Hegel must have selected pure being as the starting point because it was an idea that is 
devoid of all subjectivity.   
This idea of pure being is not only objective, but also the most general idea that 
there is, the idea from which nothing can be considered in abstraction. As Schelling 
explains, the proof that “pure being” is the “absolutely first thought” is that “nothing 
could exclude itself from this concept if it is thought in its purity and complete 
abstraction.”15  
                                                          
13 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 138. 
14 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 138. 
15 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139. 
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Pure being is, moreover, according to Schelling, “the purest and most immediate 
certainty, or pure certainty itself without further content, that which is presupposed along 
with all certainty.”16 It is not entirely clear whether Schelling attributes this last position 
to Hegel or what he thinks its significance is.  
Schelling notes that this initial thought of being is, according to Hegel, not “an 
arbitrary action.”17 It is instead “the most complete necessity.”18 In Schelling’s view, 
Hegel thinks that because the thought of pure being is absolutely general, it is therefore 
also necessary rather than arbitrary.  
Schelling objects, however, that this beginning is not even “plausible,” at least not 
to everyone.19 He insists that the supposed “necessity” of Hegel’s beginning is nothing 
but a “pretense,” since it is not even possible “to think being in general.”20 We cannot 
think being in general, in Schelling’s view, “because there is no being in general, there is 
no being without a subject.”21 Schelling contends that being is “necessarily at all times 
something determinate, either essential (wesend) being, which returns to the essence 
                                                          
16 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139.  
17 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139.  
18 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139.  
19 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139.  
20 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139.  
21 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139.  
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(Wesen) and is identical with it, or objective (gegenständlich) being.”22 Accordingly, 
Schelling chastises Hegel for “completely ignor[ing]” this distinction.23  
Thus, according to Schelling, Hegel selects pure being as the first thought of the 
Logic because he thinks it this is the most objective beginning, because it is the most 
general beginning, and possibly also because it is the most certain beginning. According 
to Schelling, Hegel also thinks that the beginning that is most general is necessary, but 
Schelling thinks that Hegel is wrong about this. In Schelling’s view, the generality of 
“pure being” makes it an attractive beginning, at least to Hegel, but Hegel is wrong in 
supposing that this makes it necessary. 
b. The Presupposed Aim of the Logic 
The second presupposition of which Schelling accuses Hegel is intimately connected 
with the first one. While, in Schelling’s presentation, Hegel presupposes “pure being” at 
the beginning of his Logic on the basis of his own, contingent motives, he presupposes 
the aim of the Logic because he cannot help doing so. Because he presupposes a 
beginning that is devoid of content, he is compelled to seek the opposite, i.e., determinate 
or concrete being. Schelling explains that Hegel, just like every other thinking subject, is 
“already used to a more concrete being, a being more full of content.”24 Consequently, 
                                                          
22 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139. 
23 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139.  
24 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 138. 
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Hegel is incapable of being “satisfied with that meagre diet of pure being.”25 The 
movement of Hegel’s thought beyond the empty abstraction of “pure being” is thus an 
expression of his own basic dissatisfaction with this empty abstraction, which flows from 
his nature as a thinking being. As Schelling puts it, Hegel “feels it is impossible for it to 
stop at this most abstract and most empty thing of all.”26 
In connection with this, Schelling believes that there is a sense in which necessity 
does drive Hegel’s Logic forward, but this necessity is not intrinsic to (immanent in) the 
subject matter itself, as Hegel himself supposes. Rather, the development is driven 
forward by Hegel’s psychological desire to overcome the abstract indeterminacy of his 
own beginning.  
As Schelling puts it, the “necessity” at work in Hegel’s Logic is only “a necessity 
which lies in the philosopher,” not a “necessity which lies in the concept itself.”27 This 
necessity is “imposed” on the philosopher “by his memory” (of concrete being).28 The 
necessity at work in Hegel’s Logic is thus a psychological rather than a logical necessity 
in Schelling’s presentation of it. The only reason Hegel “attributes an immanent 
movement to pure being,” is that he feels this psychological compulsion and misidentifies 
it as an objective necessity that belongs to the concept instead of a subjective necessity 
                                                          
25 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 138. 
26 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 138. 
27 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 138. 
28 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 138.  
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belonging to him in particular. Following the initial movement from an empty abstraction 
(pure being) to the thought of determinate being, it is once again thought, in the person of 
the philosopher (Hegel) that makes itself increasingly determinate, that “seeks again 
successively to fulfil itself, seeks to get to a content, and finally to the complete content 
of the world and of consciousness.”29  
Schelling agrees with Hegel that this development takes place in a “necessary 
progression,” not a “random” one.30 However, again, in Schelling’s view, the reason the 
development is not random is that human psychology is not random. There is always an 
aim, a goal, that “tacitly leads” the progression, namely the desire for knowledge of the 
real world “at which science is finally to arrive.”31 Human psychology, in Schelling’s 
view, has at least to some degree, a universal and thus also a necessary character. Human 
beings, who are themselves determinate, are naturally attracted to the thought of 
determinate being. According to Schelling then, the fact that Hegel’s Logic moves on 
from pure being to determinate concepts simply instantiates this universal truth. Hegel 
thus commits two basic errors, according to Schelling. 
First, he substitutes the (objective, impersonal) concept for (subjective, human) 
thought. Hegel believes that this concept can “move itself,” but Schelling insists that this 
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is impossible.32 He assures us that “a thinking subject” is absolutely required and without 
it, “the concept for its own part would lie completely immobile.”33  
Second, Schelling protests against Hegel’s supposition that “thought is driven 
forward only by a necessity which lies in itself.”34 On the contrary, Schelling insists, 
thought “obviously has a goal that it is striving towards.”35 Moreover, Schelling explains, 
when the “person philosophizing,” namely Hegel, “seeks to hide consciousness” of the 
goal “from himself,” it will “for this reason unconsciously affect the course of 
philosophizing all the more decisively.”36 The fact that Hegel does not think that a goal 
drives the development of his Logic does not at all imply that this is not actually the case. 
Indeed, in Schelling’s psychoanalysis, the very fact that Hegel does not believe that a 
goal is driving the development of his Logic blinds him even more to the role that this 
goal plays in shaping each and every step. In this way, according to Schelling, Hegel 
presupposes the goal of his philosophizing and this presupposition rather a necessity 
immanent in the development itself drives the development forward.  
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c. Empirical Intuition in the Development of the Logic 
According to Schelling, Hegel’s effort “to erect his abstract Logic above the 
Naturphilosophie” (philosophy of nature) was doomed from the beginning.37  
Schelling notes that Hegel had hoped to elaborate an ontology of concepts that 
corrected the defects of previous metaphysical theories. In all of these theories, and in the 
philosophy of Christian Wolff in particular, Schelling recounts, “the various categories 
were set up and dealt with in a more or less just coincidental, more or less indifferent, 
juxtaposition and succession.”38 
In order to overcome this defect and “breathe a life, an inner compulsion to 
progression” into the “mere concepts” that make up the content of his Logic, Schelling 
relates, Hegel tries to employ the method of the Naturphilosophie in his exposition of 
these concepts.39 Schelling believes that this effort fails. In Hegel’s Logic, “the 
translation of the [natural] concept of process into the dialectical movement” also 
eliminates the “struggle” that is integral to natural processes, leaving “only a 
monotonous, almost soporific progression.”40 In his misguided effort to present concepts 
as somehow dynamic, Hegel “hid[es] the lack of true life” in the concepts by means of a 
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“misuse of words.”41 That is, he makes it sound as though the development, the “inner 
compulsion to progression,” comes from the concepts themselves, whereas it really 
comes from the thinker, from Hegel himself.42 
According to Schelling, Hegel’s misconstrual of the role of empirical intuition in 
his own thought plays an important role here. Whereas Schelling accepts the role of 
empirical intuition in his Naturphilosophie, Hegel, according to Schelling, tries to 
eliminate intuition from his logic. In order to make it seem as though the concepts 
themselves are the source of the transitions, Hegel tries to separate concepts from 
intuition, to purify them of intuition, and to consider them on their own. Schelling insists 
that this effort fails. Hegel “presuppose[s] intuition” at the very outset of his Logic, 
Schelling insists, and is unable to “take a single step without assuming it.”43   
In Schelling’s view, one has to presuppose the empirical intuition of nature before 
one can formulate concepts that correspond to what is to be found there. Abstractions 
cannot “be taken for realities, before that from which they are abstracted.”44 For example, 
Schelling insists that “becoming cannot be there before something becomes” and 
“existence not before something exists.”45 We have to have experience of existence and 
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becoming in the empirical world before we can abstract from this experience and 
formulate these concepts.  
Again, Schelling believes that this process of abstraction inevitably leaves 
something behind:   
 
Everything can be in the logical Idea without anything being explained thereby, 
as, for example, everything in the sensuous world is grasped in number and 
measure, which does not therefore mean that geometry or arithmetic explain the 
sensuous world. The whole world lies, so to speak, in the nets of the 
understanding or of reason, but the question is how exactly it got into those nets, 
since there is obviously something other and something more than mere reason in 
the world, indeed there is something which strives beyond these barriers.46 
 
There is of course a concrete content that geometry and arithmetic inevitably leave 
behind, whether it is the properties of matter, the requirements of life or the interactions 
of society, and we have knowledge of this content that exceeds the powers of 
mathematics to capture it. However, other than assuring us that it is “obvious” that 
something lies beyond “the nets of the understanding or of reason,” Schelling does not 
specify what it is that does so.47 The trouble with specifying this is, of course, that to 
                                                          
46 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 147. 
47 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 147. 
25 
specify it would be to explain precisely the thing that Schelling has just told us cannot be 
explained. Rather than dealing with this problem, Schelling returns to the issue of “how 
exactly [the sensuous world] got into” the “nets of the understanding or of reason,” but 
Schelling has just told us that the “how” is through the process of abstraction, so it 
remains somewhat unclear, at least at this stage of his career, what exactly what it is that 
he thinks lies forever beyond the grasp of reason and the understanding. 
d. Presupposed Logical Forms in the Development of the Logic 
According to Schelling, Hegel also presupposes the various “common logical forms” 
identified by other philosophers with whose work Hegel happens to be familiar.48 Indeed, 
he “must presuppose them,” Schelling insists.49  
Moreover, Schelling insists, Hegel “presupposes” not only the various “logical 
forms.”50 He presupposes “virtually all concepts which we use in everyday life” and he 
“take[s] up” each of these concepts “as a moment of the absolute Idea at a specific 
point.”51 In everyday life, we presuppose these concepts “without further reflection and 
without considering it necessary for us to justify ourselves because of them,” but Hegel, 
who claims to provide a justification of them, simply fails to do so.52  
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For instance, Schelling complains, Hegel claims that “‘Pure being is nothing,’ 
without in the least having proved anything about the meaning of this is.”53 He also “uses 
the concept nothing as one that needs no explanation, which is completely self-evident.”54 
In connection with this “is,” Schelling complains that Hegel fails to specify whether the 
proposition “Pure being is nothing” is supposed to be a tautology or an instance of 
judgment (predication).55  
Shelling insists that if it is meant to be a tautology, then the difference between 
“being” and “nothing” would be a difference of mere words in which “two different 
expressions” have one and the same meaning. But a tautological proposition “says 
nothing” and “nothing can follow from it.”56 
On the other hand, if the proposition “pure being is nothing” is meant to be a 
judgment, then it means “pure being is the subject, that which carries nothingness.”57  
Thus, Schelling does not think that Hegel explicitly endorses either presupposed 
logical form, identity or predication, but that it is impossible to employ an expression of 
the form “A is B” without presupposing one or the other. Hegel does not endorse either 
meaning and for Schelling this counts as a defect.  
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D. A Summary of Schelling’s Case against Hegelian Necessity 
In this chapter I have summarized Schelling’s criticisms of Hegel’s claim that the 
development of his Logic is necessary.  According to Schelling, Hegel’s Logic is vitiated 
by various presuppositions. Hegel’s presuppositions take several different forms. First, 
Schelling holds that the beginning of Hegel’s Logic is not necessary because it has a 
merely adventitious beginning. The beginning is not arbitrary, but neither is it necessary. 
Second, Schelling claims that Hegel unconsciously presupposes the aim of the Logic, 
namely knowledge of the real world or determinate being in all its concreteness. 
According to Schelling, Hegel unconsciously arrives at this aim as a result of his previous 
habits of thought that have been shaped by his experience of the real world. As a 
consequence, the Logic is cobbled together from concepts formed with the help of 
empirical intuition, unproven logical forms adopted from other philosophers, and 
concepts taken from everyday life. 
Two claims that Schelling makes in the course of his discussion of Hegel neatly 
summarize his stance on Hegelian necessity.  
First, he questions how Hegel can distinguish between necessity and its mere 
appearance. Recall that Schelling holds that the more a philosopher tries to suppress 
consciousness of his presupposed aim, the more influence it will have on his thinking. As 
a consequence, Schelling believes, thinking alone is unable to “guarantee” that it has 
successfully excluded “arbitrariness” in its arrangement of its thoughts.58 In Schelling’s 
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view then, thinking can be easily “satisfied with a mere appearance of necessity” or else 
“a mere appearance of the concept” if it is left to its own devices.59 
Second, since there is an irreducible element of arbitrariness in the way that one 
presents knowledge of the real world, Schelling believes that “one could easily produce 
this so-called real logic in 10 different ways.”60  
In the next chapter, I consider how one group of interpretations attempts to defend 
Hegel’s Logic against this charge of arbitrariness. 
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Chapter 2: The Intuitionist Defense of Hegelian Necessity
A. Introduction 
A group of interpreters of Hegel’s Logic, whom I term the intuitionists, set themselves 
the admirable goal of defending Hegel against Schelling and other opponents of his 
rationalist project. In this chapter, I explain the central tenets of their interpretation, with 
particular emphasis on the version of the interpretation offered by Stephen Houlgate in 
his book The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity.  
Houlgate’s interpretation of Hegel’s Logic is more sophisticated and textually 
accurate than that offered by many of the other intutionists. Moreover, Houlgate 
explicitly opposes Schelling’s stance on Hegel’s Logic and offers a defense of the 
necessary development of the latter.  
I show that, although Houlgate’s aims are admirable, his defense of Hegelian 
necessity against Schelling’s criticisms ultimately fails. In the present chapter I show that 
Houlgate’s stance on Hegelian necessity is internally inconsistent. In Chapter 4, I also 
show that it is also inaccurate because of what it ignores in Hegel’s texts.  
As I discuss below, I am not the first to notice internal inconsistencies in the 
intuitionist interpretation. However, up until now, the critics of intuitionism have used its 
inconsistencies to justify their skeptical stance toward Hegelian necessity and Hegel’s 
entire rationalist project. My aim in Chapters 3 and 4 will be to show that these skeptical 
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conclusions are not warranted. As I show there, the intuitionist defense of Hegelian 
necessity is not, as the anti-intuitionists presume, the only defense possible or even the 
most textually accurate one.  
However, before I proceed to the main task at hand, I would like to offer a brief 
explanation why I selected the terms intuitionist and intuitionism to describe the 
interpretations I am considering in this chapter, since my choice of terminology 
admittedly could be viewed as somewhat contentious (though this is not my aim).  
J. M. Fritzman calls this same group of interpreters “non-foundational Hegelians,” 
a designation they might prefer. The defense of the “presuppositionlessness” of Hegel’s 
Logic, i.e., its lack of a foundation in the traditional sense, is certainly central to their 
interpretation, and defending the presuppositionlessness of the Logic is indeed 
considerably more important to them than defending the necessity of its development. 
Houlgate, for example, makes presuppositionlessness the cornerstone of his interpretation 
and presents the presuppositionless beginning of the Logic more or less as a condition of 
the possibility of its subsequent necessary development.  
However, this emphasis on the possibility of a logical development is more akin 
to the Kantian approach to metaphysics than the Hegelian approach to logic. Hegel’s 
Logic is not supposed to be about the possibility of a logic whose development would be 
necessary, but that logic itself. Moreover, for Hegel, the beginning of the Logic is not, as 
Houlgate presents it, just a condition of the possibility of a subsequent necessary 
development but is itself necessary.  
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On the other hand, even though the group of interpreters I call the intuitionists 
place their emphasis on the possible development of Hegel’s Logic, they do also provide 
an interpretation of its actual development: they all present its actual development 
(implicitly if not explicitly) as a product of intuition. In some cases, this means that they 
both present it in such a way that it resembles a purely intuitive process and fail to 
distinguish it from the latter. However, it is not always obvious that their interpretations 
rely on intuition in this way. Rather, it is something that has to be demonstrated. 
Since, as I have explained, the actual development of the Logic is what is central 
for Hegel himself, the stance of an interpretation on this question should likewise be 
taken as central to the evaluation of that interpretation, and what one calls any such 
interpretation should reflect the centrality of this question. For this reason, once I have 
shown that intuition does indeed play the role in their interpretations that I attribute to it, I 
believe my use of the terms intuitionist and intuitionism is justified.  
Moreover, since, as I also show, the intuitionists present a self-contradictory 
defense of the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s Logic, the term “non-foundational 
Hegelians” is arguably also a misnomer. 
B. Intuitionism on the Role of Presuppositionlessness in Hegel’s Logic 
a. Presuppositionlessness 
Although, as I show, the intuitionists ultimately fail, the fact remains that their central 
aim is to refute the claims of those interpreters who either deny that Hegel intended his 
Logic to be free of presuppositions or, if he intended it, that he succeeded.  
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First, Houlgate seeks to establish that Hegel “really meant his philosophy to be 
presuppositionless,” contrary to the supposition of some “modern commentator[s].”61 He 
insists that both the testimony of Hegel’s “nineteenth-century critics”—including 
Schelling, Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard—and textual evidence from Hegel’s own 
works decisively refute their position.62  
Houlgate points out while none of Hegel’s nineteenth century critics “believed 
that Hegel’s philosophy was actually presuppositionless” or held that 
“presuppositionlessness is even desirable,” they nevertheless “all took seriously” Hegel’s 
claim that it was so.63 Moreover, in Houlgate’s view, “that is precisely why” these critics 
were “so eager to refute” his philosophy.64 
Houlgate insists that the Hegel’s texts support his interpretation. First, he quotes a 
passage from the Encyclopedia Logic, where Hegel says: 
 
All . . . presuppositions or assumptions (Voraussetzungen oder Vorurteile) must 
equally be given up when we enter into the Science, whether they are taken from 
representation or from thinking; for it is this Science, in which all determinations 
of this sort must first be investigated, and in which their meaning and validity like 
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that of their antitheses must be [re]cognized. . . . Science should be preceded by 
universal doubt, i.e., by total presuppositionlessness (die gänzliche 
Voraussetzungslosigkeit).65 
 
The second passage Houlgate quotes comes from the Science of Logic, where Hegel says: 
 
The beginning must be an absolute, or what is synonymous here, an abstract 
beginning; and so it may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated by 
anything nor have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire 
science.66 
 
Houlgate interprets these passages to mean that when we “philosophize ‘without 
presuppositions,’” this implies “that we do not take for granted any particular conception 
of thought and its categories at the outset of philosophy.”67 For example, we do not 
“assume (with Kant) that concepts are ‘predicates of possible judgments’” (CPR 205/109 
[B 94]). On the other hand, nor may we “assume that thought should be governed by the 
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rules of Aristotelian logic or that the law of noncontradiction holds, or that thought is 
regulated by any principles or laws whatsoever.”68 
Houlgate holds that if Hegel (or anyone else) proceeded on the basis of any 
principle at all at the outset, this principle would itself constitute a presupposition of the 
subsequent development. Consequently, Houlgate holds that it would also be wrong to 
criticize Hegel for not adopting any principle at the outset, since this would amount to the 
demand that Hegel adopt an unjustified presupposition.  
These “principles” may turn out to be correct but acknowledging this is different 
from assuming at the outset that they “are clearly correct and determine in advance what 
is to count as rational.”69 In other words, it is different from presupposing them. 
Since, for example, formal logic is not presuppositionless, it would be 
inappropriate to “look to formal logic to provide a standard by which to establish whether 
Hegel’s arguments in the Logic are rational” or else “judge that they are sophistical.”70  
As Houlgate notes, G.R.G. Mure adopts a similar position in his book A Study of 
Hegel’s Logic. The latter claims that it would be begging the question to “evaluate 
Hegel’s logic against the conventional standards of formal logic” since “Hegel is asking 
about the grounds of all logical validity.”71 Houlgate agrees with Mure’s assessment and 
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adds that “if there is one thing that a truly critical philosopher may not do, in Hegel’s 
view, it is ‘beg the question.’”72 
According to Houlgate, Hegel does not ultimately reject “all that traditionally 
counts as ‘thought,’ ‘concept,’ or ‘rationality.’”73 Rather, he insists on “suspend[ing] our 
familiar assumptions about thought” and “look[ing] to discover in the course of the 
science of logic whether or not they will prove to be correct.”74 The science of logic has 
to suspend these familiar assumptions “at the beginning” since the task of this science 
itself is to determine “what it is to think and which categories (if any) are inherent in 
thought as such.”75 Accordingly, Houlgate insists that Hegel’s critics “from 
Schopenhauer to Popper” are wrong to “rail against” him “for deliberately violating the 
law of noncontradiction” since this is not Hegel’s aim at all.76 Instead, Hegel simply 
refuses to presuppose these laws of thought at the outset before determining whether they 
are correct. 
b. Method 
In Houlgate’s view, the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s Logic has profound 
implications for what can count for it as a method. Because it cannot make any 
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assumptions at all concerning either categories of thought or principles for its direction, it 
cannot presuppose any methodological principles either.  
Houlgate elaborates on this question in a section entitled “Does Hegel Have a 
Method?” Because Hegel is committed to “radical presuppositionlessness,” Houlgate 
explains, he cannot presuppose that his “examination of thought … should take any 
particular course or follow any particular rule of procedure.”77  
Along these same lines, Houlgate endorses the claim of fellow intuitionist, 
Richard Winfield, who insists that for Hegel the “examination of thought ‘cannot be 
guided or legitimated by any propositional calculus, rules of syllogism, logic of 
discovery, semantic analysis, or doctrine of intentionality.’”78 Again, Houlgate explains, 
“none of these can be assumed at the outset to have any validity.”79 
Houlgate also expresses his agreement with yet another intuitionist, William 
Maker, who insists that Hegel cannot be said to have a method “insofar as one uses the 
term ‘method’ in its traditional philosophical sense,” that is, Houlgate explains, “to mean 
a rule of procedure that can be specified prior to its application to a given content.”80  
In the passage of Maker’s Philosophy without Foundations that Houlgate cites, 
Maker claims: 
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Insofar as method is that which can—even if only in principle—be justified, 
formulated or learned in abstraction from the subject matter to which it is to be 
applied, Hegel does not have a method. . . . Insofar as one can speak of there 
being, in the sense just outlined, a phenomenological method, a scientific method, 
a transcendental method, an analytical method, a speculative method, and so on, 
Hegel does not have a method.”81 
 
Accordingly, Houlgate insists that objections to Hegel’s procedure that suppose that 
Hegel’s application of the supposed rules of his method do not correspond to his actual 
presentation of the development of the Logic itself are missing the point, since no such 
abstract articulation is possible. 
For example, those who believe that Hegel wants “to proceed dialectically in the 
Logic by showing, say, how one category passes over into, or contains, its opposite and 
then is taken up with that opposite into a third category that synthesizes the first two” are 
mistaken.82 Again, this may well take place, “but we may not assume at the outset” that it 
will “or that our method should be to look for such dialectical slippage in other 
categories.”83 
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Nevertheless, according to Houlgate, the rejection of presuppositions, including a 
presupposed method, is not the same as having no method at all. He claims that Hegel 
does indeed oppose the “crude rejection of all method” even though he does not have a 
method in the traditional sense.84  
According to Houlgate, Hegel’s method “can consist in nothing more than 
considering indeterminate being itself and setting out what, if anything, the thought of 
such being involves.”85 He also claims that once Hegel “has ‘abstracted’ from everything, 
his method must be simply ‘to take up what is there before us’ and calmly ‘observe’ it.”86 
Putting these two claims together, the method, for Houlgate, consists in “abstract[ing],” 
“considering” or “observ[ing]” and then “setting out” what is “involve[d]” in being.87  
However, Houlgate does not think that Hegel’s method is entirely passive. One is 
active in employing this method insofar as one is actively passive, i.e., attentive to what 
is presented to passive observation. Houlgate elaborates his perspective on this question 
in the section of his book entitled “Passivity and Activity in Presuppositionless 
Thought.”88 He maintains there that Hegel’s philosophy is characterized by “a spirit of 
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radical openness,” which requires that “we simply let the thought of pure being take us 
where it will.”89  
In this sense, Houlgate maintains, Hegel’s Logic does have a presupposition, but it 
is a “hermeneutic presupposition” rather than a “founding presupposition.”90 This 
hermeneutic presupposition consists in nothing more than a “self-critical openness of 
mind,” a “willingness to let.”91 
Hegel’s Logic “presupposes” this same attitude “on the part of the reader,” this 
same “willingness to let our thinking be guided and determined by what is immanent in 
the matter at hand.”92 In other words, the “presupposition” does not determine the 
direction of development or the content of the Logic, but only a certain subjective attitude 
of openness that makes one receptive to the development of the content.  
Many of Hegel’s critics, on the other hand, base their criticisms on the supposition 
that Hegel does presuppose a “general philosophical method,” which they claim Hegel 
fails to apply correctly or consistently throughout the Logic.93 Houlgate objects to this 
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claim as well as to the claim that the “structure” of this method “can be described in 
abstraction from, and prior to, any particular Hegelian analysis.”94  
To summarize, the criticisms of Hegel’s method that Houlgate addresses are the 
following: (1) Hegel presupposes the abstract structure of his method; (2) in practice, his 
application of this method does not measure up to this presupposed abstract structure; and 
(3) the abstract structure of Hegel’s presupposed method or else its application are 
somehow inferior to the presupposed abstract structure of the critic’s own method. The 
problem with all such criticisms, according to Houlgate, is that they start from the 
assumption that Hegel acknowledges (or else ought to acknowledge) the appropriateness 
of presupposed abstract methodological criteria. Houlgate insists that the first two 
criticisms are based on an inaccurate reading of Hegel’s texts, while the third criticism is 
based on a stance that involves the uncritical adoption of presuppositions, a procedure 
that Hegel rightly rejects.  
Thus, in Houlgate’s view, there are really only two possibilities when it comes to 
method: (1) a method that is based on presupposed criteria for the development of the 
content or (2) a method that consists in absolute openness to “observing” how the content 
develops itself. He insists that Hegel adopts the latter sort of method.  
Again, for Houlgate, the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s Logic serves as a 
“hermeneutic presupposition,” a condition of the possibility of the employment of his 
method of radical openness. However, Houlgate does not specify how this method 
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unfolds the Logic. Instead, Houlgate seems to be under the impression that 
presuppositionlessness together with radical openness constitute the sufficient condition 
for the unfolding of Hegel’s Logic, since its method cannot involve the presupposing any 
other principle. 
c. Necessity 
The lack of specificity in Houlgate’s general characterization of Hegel’s method presents 
a problem for his defense of the immanent necessity of Hegel’s Logic. Given that 
Houlgate defends both the presuppositionlessness and the immanent necessity of Hegel’s 
Logic, it would be reasonable to expect Houlgate to provide some explanation of how, in 
his view, Hegel’s method is supposed to produce a development that is not only 
presuppositionless, but also immanently necessary. But this is something he cannot do 
because doing so would impute general principles of development to the Logic. 
Consequently, he is never able to tell us exactly what he thinks Hegel means by 
necessity.  
Instead his explanation of both the method and the necessity of the Logic stops at 
presuppositionlessness. For Houlgate, the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s Logic serves 
as a condition of the possibility of the method—"radical openness”—and its 
presuppositionlessness likewise serves as a condition of the possibility of the necessary 
development revealed by this method. 
Houlgate traces the tradition of criticism of Hegelian necessity back to Schelling, 
who, as we have already seen, criticizes both Hegel’s claim that his Logic is 
presuppositionless and his claim that it develops with immanent necessity. According to 
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Schelling, Houlgate recounts, the “development of the Logic beyond the initial abstract 
category of pure being” is not necessary because it “depends on upon the prior 
assumption” that the aim “is not actually abstract but concrete.”95 In Schelling’s view, 
Houlgate recounts, because Hegel finds that pure being is abstract rather than concrete, 
he concludes that it is “deficient” and, consequently, he “move[s] on from it to other, 
more determinate categories.”96 In Schelling’s view, Hegel only “pretend[s] that thought 
is moved forward by a necessity immanent within its most indeterminate category,” even 
though it is really driven forward by his own presupposition that he ought to end up at 
concrete being.97 In this way, Houlgate singles out only one of the reasons that Schelling 
provides in justification for his conclusion that Hegel’s Logic is not presuppositionless, 
though, as we will see, he also considers some of Schelling’s other criticisms in more 
contemporary forms.   
Houlgate observes that subsequent critics of Hegel’s Logic have followed 
Schelling’s lead in arguing that the Logic cannot have an immanently necessary 
development because, allegedly, it presupposes its aim.  
On the contrary, Houlgate maintains, Hegel’s Logic has no “preset goal” or 
“assumption of absolute closure,” but instead “begins from self-critical openness.”98  
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In discussing the role of necessity in Hegel’s Logic, Houlgate also addresses an 
issue related to Schelling’s claim that Hegel relies on empirical intuition, unproven 
logical forms adopted from other philosophers, and concepts taken from everyday life. 
Specifically, Houlgate insists that Hegel does not approach the derivation of the 
categories empirically in the way that Kant does, by deriving them from the forms of 
judgement enumerated without proof by the traditional logic. What Houlgate has in mind 
here when he calls this procedure empirical has nothing to do with sensory intuition, 
however. Rather, Kant’s procedure is empirical in the sense that he “base[s] his account 
of the categories on various kinds of judgment that he finds in formal logic after they had 
themselves been found by formal logicians in thought.”99 
However, Houlgate explains, Hegel is not satisfied with knowing “how [basic 
categories] have in fact been understood” in the past.100 Houlgate notes that both Fichte 
and Hegel criticize Kant’s “account of the categories” because it relies on “unproven 
assumptions.”101 Kant only shows how the categories, in Houlgate’s words, “are to be 
understood given those assumptions,” not how they “have to be understood.”102 An 
understanding of the categories that does not rely on presuppositions, but is, instead, 
“completely necessary” requires a “deduction” of the categories, a demonstration of 
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“which categories are inherent in thought as such.”103 Houlgate maintains that, for Hegel, 
as for Fichte, “we can only do this if we allow pure thought to determine itself—and so to 
generate its own determinations.”104 
Note that in Houlgate’s presentation, we “can” find out which categories are 
inherent in thought and “how they have to be understood” only if “we allow pure thought 
to determine itself” and “only the suspension of one’s cherished assumptions will 
[automatically?] lead to what is necessary and true.”105 Again, Houlgate presents a 
condition of the possibility of a necessary development but does not explain what makes 
that development necessary itself.  
According to Houlgate, Fichte and then Hegel follow in Kant’s footsteps in 
seeking an explanation of how the understanding produces categories, but they believe 
that Kant’s own derivation of them is not “rigorous” enough.106 Whereas Kant simply 
takes up the forms of judgment and the corresponding categories from an empirical 
examination of consciousness, Fichte and Hegel seek to “demonstrate that the categories 
follow necessarily from what thought itself is.”107    
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But what precisely does Houlgate think Hegel means by necessity? Houlgate 
apparently does not think that Hegel’s derivation of the categories is a logically necessary 
deduction in a traditional sense, that is, a product of reasoning in accordance with the 
principle of non-contradiction. He explicitly states that he believes that Hegel’s Logic 
does not presuppose this principle and would not be presuppositionless if it did. He also 
believes that Hegel’s Logic can have a necessary development only if it is 
presuppositionless. If it presupposed the principle of non-contradiction, it could not be 
necessary. So whatever Houlgate thinks Hegel means by “logic,” it cannot be reasoning 
in accordance with the principle of non-contradiction.  
Indeed, Houlgate makes this position more or less explicit when he declares that 
the “ontology” of Hegel’s Logic is “prefigured in Kant’s transcendental logic” and that 
Hegel is “indebted to Kant” for his idea of a logic of concepts that is distinct from 
“general logic.”108 For Kant, the latter consists in the “rules of [formally] valid thinking,” 
Houlgate explains, whereas the former, transcendental logic, is devoted to the rules our 
thinking must observe “if what we are conscious of is to count as an object rather than a 
mere succession of subjective images or perceptions.”109 In Houlgate’s view, Hegel 
develops his own version of a transcendental logic, namely an ontological logic (a logic 
of being). The main difference between Hegel’s ontological logic and Kant’s 
transcendental logic, for Houlgate, is that Hegel’s logic is presuppositionless, whereas 
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Kant’s so-called deduction is merely the result of an empirical examination of the 
contents of consciousness. 
However, Houlgate’s explanation of some of the things that Hegelian necessity is 
not still leaves it all rather mysterious what Houlgate thinks Hegelian necessity is. As I 
explained at the beginning of this section, Houlgate cannot explain how Hegelian 
necessity works, i.e., what it is, because doing so would involve explaining the 
development to the Logic in terms of general principles, which he has told us is 
impossible.  
The way that Schelling and his intellectual descendants frame their criticisms of 
Hegelian necessity also allows Houlgate to avoid this question. Again, they deny that it is 
possible for Hegel’s Logic to be necessary since, as they insist, it relies on 
presuppositions. In defense of the necessity of Hegel’s Logic, Houlgate then simply 
denies that it relies on presuppositions.  Thus, in Houlgate’s presentation, Hegel seeks a 
presuppositionless derivation of the categories as a condition of the possibility of a 
necessary development. However, Houlgate never takes the further step of explaining 
what this necessity that is made possible by presuppositionlessness in fact is, and perhaps 
he does not even believe that he has to do so, since the entire discussion, as framed by 
Schelling and his intellectual descendants, concerns the very possibility of a necessary 
development.  
C. Intuitionism on the Actual Development of Hegel’s Logic 
As I explained in the introduction to this chapter, intuitionism offers not only an 
interpretation of the condition of the possibility of the (necessary) development of 
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Hegel’s Logic, but also an interpretation of the development itself. There, if anywhere, 
we should gain some insight into what the proponents of this interpretation mean by 
necessity. Let us now turn to this side of intuitionism.  
I wish to introduce this discussion by turning briefly from the examination of the 
version of intuitionism presented by Houlgate to that presented by Michael Rosen in 
order to provide a deeper understanding of the interpretations offered by Houlgate and 
the other intuitionists. Once I have explained Rosen’s view of the development of the 
Logic, I will elaborate the ways in which it coincides with Houlgate’s approach to this 
same question. 
I believe it is valuable to examine both obvious examples and less obvious, more 
subtle examples of specific ways of thinking about Hegel’s Logic. In the present case, 
Rosen explicitly claims that Hegel develops his Logic by means of intuition, whereas it is 
much less obvious that this is Houlgate’s position. The examples in which it is more 
obvious what is going (Rosen’s interpretation in this case) on can serve as a bridge to 
grasping how the same sort of thing is going on in the more subtle examples (Houlgate’s 
interpretation in this case). It is, in turn, worthwhile to examine the more subtle examples 
in order to see where they in fact diverge from Hegel’s texts in order, through this 
process, to gain ultimately a more precise conception of the Hegel’s own positions. In the 
present case, it is not entirely obvious, as I indicated in the introduction to this chapter, 
that everyone I call an intuitionist ought to be called intuitionists at all. Whereas Rosen’s 
interpretation is openly intuitionist, other intuitionists approach the role of intuition in 
Hegel’s Logic with a certain degree of ambivalence. My aim is to show that in spite of 
this ambivalence, intuition plays the same role for them that it does for Rosen. Having 
48 
presented a clear picture of the claims of intuitionism, I will then be in a position to 
evaluate its internal coherence and its success or failure as an answer to Schelling’s 
criticisms.   
a. Rosen’s Open Intuitionism 
Rosen’s intuitionist interpretation of Hegel’s Logic differs significantly from that of the 
other intuitionists in two additional respects. First, Rosen does not believe that Hegel’s 
Logic is presuppositionless. So, regarding what makes Hegel’s Logic possible, Rosen’s 
interpretation differs from that of the other intuitionists, even though, as I will show, his 
interpretation more or less coincides with theirs regarding the actual development of the 
logic. Despite the fact that this difference would be deemed as highly significant by those 
intuitionists who emphasize the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s Logic, it will play no 
role in my discussion here, since it does not relate directly to the role of intuition there. 
The second significant difference concerns the role of inference in Hegel’s Logic. As I 
will explain shortly, this difference goes some of the way to explaining the ambivalence 
of the other intuitionists on the question of the role of intuition. 
According to Rosen, Hegel’s Logic does not develop in accordance with a 
“dialectical procedure.”110 On the contrary, he insists, “the movement of the Logic is non-
inferential,” and for this reason also “intuitionistic.”111 The type of intuition that Rosen 
believes is responsible for the development of the Logic “consists,” he explains, “solely 
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in holding in Thought the Thought-content.”112 While the movement of this thought “has 
the status of a proof,” the movement is nevertheless “non-inferential” insofar as “it is not, 
nor does it depend on, an argument, operation or calculus.”113 In other words, Hegel’s 
does not present a logic at all. The exposition contained in the Logic somehow manages 
to be a “proof,” while failing to achieve the status of a logical deduction. 
Rosen observes that some scholars may object to the interpretation of Hegel’s 
procedure as “intuitionistic” on the grounds that it seems to contradict Hegel’s “own 
text.”114 In fact, as Rosen acknowledges, in the Preface to the Phenomenology, “Hegel is 
scathing about the pretensions of intuition to displace Science” and “he contrasts the 
Scientific status of philosophy with what is “dished up with the assurance that it comes 
from the shrine of ‘divine intuition.’”115 
However, Rosen is unwilling to interpret such statements on Hegel’s part as a 
rejection of “intuitionistic” thought.116 Instead, when Hegel objects to intuition as a 
source of knowledge, Rosen explains, Hegel is actually addressing Jacobi’s claim that 
intuition provides knowledge that is “immediate.”117 Rosen then summarizes the grounds 
on which Hegel rejects such immediate knowing. First, he explains, Hegel insists that the 
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proponents of immediate knowledge mistakenly suppose that “subjective certainty” can 
serve as “the standard of truth.”118 Second, Hegel objects that “immediate consciousness” 
does not have a “criterion by which to discriminate among claims to truth.”119 Third, 
Hegel contends that immediate knowledge excludes “specific content” and confines itself 
to generalities.120 
All three objections, Rosen maintains, are directed against a “one-sided” approach 
to immediate knowledge but not against immediate knowledge as such. Therefore, he 
argues, Hegel’s presentation of these criticisms does not imply that he endorses “mediate, 
in the sense of inferential, knowledge.”121  
In support of this position, Rosen cites Hegel’s approving remarks about 
Descartes’ Cogito (“I think, therefore I am.”) and Hegel’s denial that it constitutes and 
inference. 
Rosen also points out Hegel’s emphasis on “the observing character of the 
Scientific activity” and how this differs from the “common conception of argument, as 
Räsonnieren.”122 In support of this point, he includes an extended quote from Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, in which Hegel says: 
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Argumentation [Räsonnieren] is freedom from its content and vanity towards it. 
What is required of it is the effort of giving up this freedom and, instead of being 
the arbitrary moving principle of the content, to sink its freedom into the content 
and to allow the content to move itself spontaneously according to its own 
nature—viz. the self as its own self—and to observe this movement. To refrain 
from intruding into the immanent rhythm of the notion and not to intervene 
arbitrarily or with wisdom obtained from elsewhere is itself an essential moment 
of attention to the notion.123 
 
In Rosen’s view, Hegel’s criticism of argumentation, the arbitrary rearrangement of the 
content and the eclectic insertion of irrelevant “wisdom” obtained in another context, 
implies an absolute rejection of inferential thought. He interprets this passage to mean 
that “the dialectical movement cannot be justified with reference to [inferential] 
principles” because only the “actual carrying out” of the “movement” can serve as 
“conclusive vindication.”124 Evidently, in Rosen’s view, the role of principles or laws is 
to serve as justification, and justification always constitutes a form of “‘external’ 
discourse,” so the justification through principles or laws cannot “adequately capture” 
this movement.125 That is, because Rosen views any principles or laws as necessarily 
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external to the immanent development of the Logic, he believes that such principles or 
laws must play no role.  
Rosen’s position here clearly bears a striking resemblance to Houlgate’s position 
on this same question, except that for Houlgate, unlike for Rosen, this development 
somehow constitutes a deduction. However, despite this difference, the two 
interpretations coincide on the question of the principle of non-contradiction. Inasmuch 
as Hegel’s Logic is, according to Rosen, non-inferential, it cannot consist in reasoning at 
all. Therefore, for Rosen as for Houlgate, it cannot consist in reasoning in accordance 
with the law of non-contradiction. 
Having established to his satisfaction, that Hegel’s Logic is non-inferential in 
character, Rosen explains how he thinks the intuition in the Logic is different from 
sensory intuition: 
 
To emphasize the difference between the progress of Thought and ‘inner 
picturing’ one might call the dialectical process of the Logic a process of 
hyperintuition, to indicate that it is a non-inferential form of development whose 
specific character consists in being beyond the ‘inner picturing’ which intuition is 
normally taken to be; it is accomplished by the purified consciousness of Thought, 
rather than the everyday one of Vorstellung.”126 
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Rosen does not provide a discursive explanation of the development or the “dialectical 
process” that is the object of such “observation,” since he believes that such a process lies 
outside the domain of discursive explanation.  
b. Covert Intuitionism 
i. Metaphorical Language 
The problems with the metaphorical language employed by the intuitionists that I discuss 
below are in part inspired by the work of David Kolb, who, in his essay, “The Necessities 
of Hegel’s Logics,” offers some apt criticisms of Houlgate’s interpretation of Hegel’s 
Logic. I return to Kolb’s criticisms of Houlgate’s interpretation and discuss the 
conclusions he draws about Hegel on the basis of its shortcomings toward the end of this 
chapter.  
As I discussed in relation to Houlgate’s interpretation of Hegel’s stance on 
method, the former, like Rosen, places heavy emphasis on the role of “observation” in 
Hegel’s Logic. In this context, I quoted Houlgate’s claim that Hegel’s method consists 
first in abstracting from all presuppositions and then “take[ing] up what is there before 
us’ and calmly ‘observ[ing]’ it.”127 
Houlgate makes repeated references to this injunction to “observe” throughout his 
book. At another point, for example, Houlgate insists that Hegel, as a “presuppositionless 
philosopher,” does not “aim” to begin by “demonstrat[ing] that the thought of being 
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generates a more complex—dialectical or nondialectical—view of the world.”128 Instead, 
his aim “is simply to consider the indeterminate thought of being itself, to dwell with that 
category for its own sake, and to observe where, if anywhere, it takes us.”129 
At yet another point in his text, Houlgate expresses this same position once again 
when he says that in determining “what, if anything, is implicit in [the] idea of sheer 
being,” the task is “simply to observe what, if anything, happens to the idea as we attend 
to it in thought.”130 
Houlgate does not, like Rosen, explain what kind of mental activity this 
metaphor—observation—is supposed to represent but instead introduces several other 
metaphors of his own to describe what it is we are supposed to find ourselves 
“observing.” 
For instance, in his discussion of Hegel’s method, he explains that the transition 
from being to nothing in Hegel’s Logic is an instance of “dialectical slippage.”131 Later 
he says that  
 
the thought of pure being slips away of its own accord into the thought of nothing, 
and the thought of nothing itself slips away into the thought of pure being, thereby 
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generating a new thought of this very slippage or “vanishing,” which Hegel names 
becoming.132 
 
At another point, Houlgate refers once again to the “dialectical slippage of 
nothing into being” and claims that nothingness “slip[s] ineluctably into being.”133.  
 
Moreover, in Houlgate’s presentation, such slippage produces not only transitions, 
but distinctions: while “being is certainly understood to be distinct from nothing” it also 
“comes to be distinguished from nothing in the very dialectical slippage through which 
that distinction is undermined.”134 
On one occasion, Houlgate defines this process of “dialectical slippage” of one 
category into another as a process in which “each [category] negates itself through what it 
is into its negation,” but he does not indicate why this is the case.135 
Houlgate goes even deeper into the territory of metaphor when he refers to the 
“conversion or slippage of being and nothing into one another through their own nature 
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and ‘action’” as the “tragic nature of being.”136 Like “heroes and heroines, such as 
Macbeth and Antigone, [who] destroy themselves through their own actions,” being gives 
way to nothing out of its own nature.137 While this is a vivid and interesting metaphor, it 
does not in and of itself explain much of anything. 
Another favorite formulation of Houlgate’s relates to the way that “categories” 
allegedly “mutate” into other “categories.” We observe, according to Houlgate, that less 
determinate “categories” in Hegel's Logic “mutate” into more determinate ones.138 
Houlgate uses the terms “mutate” and “mutation” over and over again to describe the 
development of Hegel’s Logic.  
As he puts it in one passage, Hegel’s Logic “shows an initial indeterminate 
thought mutate into further categories in terms of which we must think and must 
understand being.”139 
Often, Houlgate attaches the adverb “logically” to the verb “mutate” but he does 
not explain what precisely this descriptor is supposed to signify. For example, he claims 
that, although “being and nothing are initially pure and indeterminate,” being eventually 
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“mutate[s] logically” into something “much more determinate and complex,” namely 
“reality, being-something, actuality, and ultimately, space.”140  
At one point, Houlgate claims that finitude “mutat[es] logically into infinity.”141 
He generalizes this formulation when he claims that there is something about each “level 
of being” that develops out of the first thought of pure being that “requires it to mutate 
logically into a more complex level.”142 
Because, in Houlgate’s view, there can be no consistent methodological principle 
or law that determines the course of each and every instance of slippage or mutation, this 
would seem to imply that there is no consistent meaning that can be assigned to the 
adverb “logically” either. This is problematic, however, because if no consistent 
definition can be provided, it will be difficult if not impossible to distinguish what is 
logical from what is illogical.  
In Rosen’s presentation, what is observed is of course not a logical inference at 
all, so the difficulty in explaining what is logical about it does not arise for him in the 
same way.  
Houlgate, however, does seem to want to hold onto the idea that there is an 
inference involved. According to Houlgate, Hegel’s task in the Logic is to show how the 
later categories “render explicit what is implicit” in the earlier categories. To accomplish 
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this, Houlgate tells us that Hegel must simply “let each category unfold its own 
implications and thereby mutate of its own accord into further categories.”143 But to grasp 
out the implications of something is to make an inference, so it seems that Houlgate, 
unlike Rosen, does think that Hegel’s Logic consists in making inferences even if he 
cannot make any generalizations at all about what this inferential process involves and 
even if he thinks that inferring is some sort of passive activity.   
In any case, it is safe to say that neither Houlgate nor indeed Hegel himself, could 
have meant for us to take the term “observation” literally as visual observation. When 
Houlgate says there is a “slippage” of one category into another, he surely does not mean 
to indicate that a physical object is losing its balance because of a shift in its center of 
mass or because it is too slick for the force of friction to hold it firmly in place against the 
tendency of various other forces to dislodge it. Or when he tells us that categories 
“mutate,” he is not telling us that they have cells with a genetic structure that is different 
in some fundamental way than the cellular structure of their parent cells or organisms. 
Rather, these are all metaphors for something non-physical and non-biological. We are 
meant to gather that our attitude toward the development of the Logic is supposed to be 
somehow like visual observation and that what we “observe” is supposed to be like a 
slippage or a mutation.  
However, the problem with metaphors is that things that are merely like another 
thing in some way or other and not actually one and the same with that thing are also 
unlike that other thing in other ways. It is not that metaphors are never useful, but they 
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should only play a supplementary role in an explanation that is supposed to be scientific 
in the broad sense of the term, as opposed to poetic or literary, because an explanation 
that relies exclusively on metaphor is ineluctably imprecise. This is why Rosen makes the 
effort to distinguish what he calls Hegel’s “hyperintuition” from sensory intuition, even if 
this explanation is not entirely satisfying.  
But Houlgate fails to offer any explanation of his metaphors. Consequently, we 
are left to wonder how Hegel’s inferences are supposed to be like and how they are 
supposed to be unlike the observation of slippages and mutations.  
Of course, it is not too difficult to recognize one similarity between a necessary 
development and visual observation. The cognition of a necessary development involves 
a kind of compulsion. When we observe something slipping or mutating, our observation 
is determined by the thing we are observing rather our own subjective desire to see one 
thing or another or one or another outcome. The observer is compelled by the object of 
observation to observe whatever it is that that object does and that compulsion acts as a 
kind of external necessity on the observer.  
But, again, a metaphorical explanation can never, by itself, tell us about all of the 
respects in which the object of comparison may be like or unlike the thing with which it 
is compared. The explanation it supplies is always incomplete.  
Perhaps, for example, thought is never anything like observation except when it is 
driven by the consistent application of some principle or other, in which case it is 
compelled through its dedication to that principle to follow certain ideas to definite 
conclusions. For visual sensation to take place, certain stable physical and biological 
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requirements have to be met. Perhaps similarly stable requirements (in the form of the 
operation of principles) have to be in place for the cognition of the necessity of the 
transitions in Hegel’s Logic. In Houlgate’s view, this is not how Hegel’s Logic works, 
since it cannot, in his view, presuppose any principle at the outset. However, since 
Houlgate maintains his explanation at the level of superficial metaphor, he keeps it so 
vague that he never has to face this challenge. 
Moreover, back to the visual analogy, the presence of a kind of compulsion acting 
on an observer would not imply that there was also some kind of necessary development 
in whatever was being observed. Houlgate may have selected the “mutation” metaphor 
because it suggests some sort of transformation to the imagination, but it also 
(presumably inadvertently) suggests that this transition is random rather than a necessary.  
If Houlgate wanted to make the case that Hegel’s Logic has a necessary development 
immanent in the concepts themselves, he should have explained how the transitions in the 
Logic are not only like but also unlike mutations, and, even more importantly, why we 
should believe that this is the case. 
Let us explore just how limited the visual analogy with the development of 
Hegel’s Logic is. In vision the principle of organization is an object of cognition, i.e., it is 
external to the action of seeing. So seeing can never perceive an intrinsic relation 
between the things that it sees. Moreover, in observing, there does not have to be 
anything that intrinsically binds successive visual sensations. Just looking around a room, 
we successively observe all kinds of things that have no intrinsic relation to one another 
besides spatial juxtaposition. If one holds that there is an intrinsic or even a necessary 
relation between the content of observations, this is the product of an inference. One does 
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not explain the inference by falling back on an analogy with observation. So, in order to 
find an intrinsically necessary relation, one has to go beyond analogies with 
observation.144   
This does not imply that Hegel does not or should not enjoin us to observe the 
development, but one would hope that he would say something more about what it is that 
is supposed to make the development we observe necessary.  
Houlgate never explains or justifies how Hegel (or we) might tell the difference 
between a situation in which a category was mutating “logically” rather than illogically, 
or necessarily rather than contingently or randomly. He does not explain or justify this 
difference because his interpretation rules out an explanation or justification of it. In 
Houlgate’s view, there is no consistent methodological principle at work in Hegel’s 
Logic that could serve as such an explanation or justification. His interpretation thus 
requires that the difference between logic and illogic, between reason and irrationality, 
and between inference and leap remain unspecified. All he tells us that the development 
ought to be presuppositionless, but without any criterion for distinguishing logic from 
illogic, reason from irrationality or inference from leap, how will we know when a 
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presupposition is being introduced and when it is not? Houlgate gives no indication that 
this question can be answered. 
Among the intuitionists, this problem is not unique to Houlgate. Alan White, 
another intuitionist, characterizes the self-contradictory character of “being” and 
“nothing” in Hegel's Logic as a “conflict” between absolutely diverse terms.145 But in any 
given “conflict,” there are at least two possible outcomes and neither outcome is 
absolutely necessary or else there would be no genuine conflict, but simply an inevitable 
outcome. So, again, the metaphor undermines the explanation of what it is supposed to be 
explaining (necessary development and transition) since we are never told how the 
development is unlike a conflict. White’s term “conflict,”—like Houlgate's “mutation,” 
suggests a contingent rather than a necessary development. 
As I argue shortly, it is this element of mystery about the object of “observation” 
and about what will be observed next that opens the door to intuition as a stand-in for an 
explanation of Hegel’s Logic.  
ii. Houlgate’s Rejection of a Kind of Intuitionism 
However, before we get to this, it is important to acknowledge that Houlgate explicitly 
denies that Hegel’s Logic is the product of a “mysterious” or “esoteric” power of 
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intuition.146 Houlgate tells us that Hegel rejects a purely intuitive method insofar as such 
a method might be considered the property of an exclusive few individuals: 
 
Hegel’s Logic is difficult, but nothing about it is meant to be esoteric; it is not to 
be the province of a privileged few who are gifted with some mysterious power of 
dialectical insight or intuition. It is intended to be a rigorous, disciplined study of 
the categories of thought that can be followed by anyone who seeks to understand 
what it is to think and what it is to be, without assuming in advance that they 
already know.147 
 
This implies that, in Houlgate’s interpretation, if intuition plays a role in the development 
of Hegel Logic, this role should be comprehensible to more than just Hegel himself. It 
should be publicly accessible.  
And there is indeed a specific sense in which Houlgate presents Hegel’s method 
as publicly accessible. Supposedly anyone at all can engage in “radical openness.” But 
this simply gives the problem another name. It does not matter how open we are if we 
have no criterion for determining when we are being open to “observing” a category 
mutating “logically” rather than illogically, or necessarily rather than contingently or 
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randomly. So, if there is a right way to be “radically open,” it cannot be articulated and 
communicated. 
iii. Houlgate’s Explicit Endorsement of a Role for Intuition 
Nevertheless, Houlgate, like Rosen, believes there is a sense in which Hegel’s Logic is 
intuitive. He claims that, for Hegel, thought is intuitive insofar as it grasps being directly 
without the need of an intermediary: 
 
For Hegel, pure thought is indeed the intellectual intuition of being. It is directly 
aware that there is being and it understands by itself what being is. This is why, at 
the beginning of the main text of the Logic, Hegel speaks of the category of 
nothing as “the same empty intuition or thought (Anschauen oder Denken) as pure 
being.”148 
 
Hegel opposes Kant on this question, Houlgate explains, since Kant holds that thought 
cannot be intuitive insofar as it also has the discursive character of judgment. 
Houlgate makes this same point in an earlier paper, “Schelling’s Critique of 
Hegel’s Science of Logic” in which he contrasts Hegel’s perspective with Schelling’s 
Kantian perspective. In this paper, Houlgate claims that “the principal difference between 
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Hegel and Schelling” is that Schelling, like Kant, believes that “thought is primarily 
discursive,” whereas “Hegel understands thought to be a form of intellectual intuition.”149  
Moreover, Houlgate claims in this paper that, for Hegel, “in its proper 
functioning,” thought is “primarily” the “thought of being” or “the intellectual intuition 
of being as such,” not “judgment or predication.”150 However, Hegel also “show[s] in the 
Logic that thought involves determining, thinking quantitatively, judging, and so on.”151 
In other words, Houlgate believes that, in Hegel’s view, we have immediate—and 
thus intuitive—access to a content that turns out to be discursive. This access is not the 
province of a few individuals but is granted to anyone who succeeds in adopting a stance 
that is sufficiently “radical” in its openness to being, i.e., sufficiently free of 
presuppositions.  
iv. The Implicit Role of Intuition in Houlgate’s Interpretation 
Despite these explanations, there remains something mysterious about Houlgate’s view 
of the role of intuition in Hegel’s Logic as well as about his interpretation taken as a 
whole. His explicit position on the role of intuition does not reveal very much about how 
he thinks Hegel’s Logic develops, i.e., how Hegel gets from one thought to the next, 
except that the thoughts themselves supposedly “mutate” somehow without the 
intervention of the thinker. Again, Houlgate does not consider Hegel’s Logic to be “non-
                                                          
149 Houlgate, “Schelling’s Critique,” 119. 
150 Houlgate, “Schelling’s Critique,” 120. 
151 Houlgate, “Schelling’s Critique,” 120. 
66 
inferential” as Rosen does, even though he uses similar metaphorical language to Rosen 
to describe its development. Nor does Houlgate, like Rosen, explicitly claim that intuition 
is the source of the transitions in the Logic.  
So, does Houlgate think that the development of the Logic is intuitive process, the 
product of a series of immediate insights, or does he hope to describe some other sort of 
process by means of his metaphors? Perhaps Houlgate thinks that thought is intuitive 
only insofar as it gives us direct access to being, including the various determinacies of 
being or “categories”? But Houlgate thinks that Hegel’s “method” of “radical openness” 
reveals the “slippage” or “mutation” of one “category” into another and that this 
“slippage” or “mutation” is immanent in the categories. So what role, if any, does 
Houlgate think intuition plays in this process? He does not say.  
Thankfully, even though Houlgate is somewhat evasive on this questions, White’s 
position is much less so and can offer us some insight into Houlgate’s view as well, since 
Houlgate claims he “fully endorse[s] White’s understanding of Hegel’s dialectical 
method.”152 Once again, a more explicit example of a way of thinking about Hegel’s 
Logic can provide insight into a less obvious example of the same way of thinking about 
it.  
White declares that, for Hegel, “there is an ‘intuitive’ moment in each dialectical 
move” in the Logic inasmuch as “the logician must ‘see’ the category that will meet the 
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requirements of the dialectic at each point.”153 In this process of consecutive seeing, 
“each category must arise spontaneously—and thus be ‘immediate.’”154 After the logician 
sees a given category, he must “analyze” it in order to “know” it as “determined through 
its relation to other categories, by which it is mediated.”155 
This position, expressed by White and apparently endorsed by Houlgate, is 
substantially the same as Rosen’s. Rosen claims that Hegel rejects “one-sided” intuition 
and White claims that Hegel’s “dialectical move[s]” have an “‘intuitive’ moment,” 
implying that there is also some kind of discursive moment involved in these “moves” as 
well. These positions are also similar to Houlgate’s position on the relationship between 
the discursive and intuitive moments as I explained it in the previous subsection, namely 
that, in Hegel’s view, we have immediate—and thus intuitive—access to a content that 
turns out to be discursive. 
None of the intuitionists explain how the two “sides” or “moments” are supposed 
to work together, but simply assert that they do. In this way, they present the 
development of Hegel’s Logic as a fundamentally mysterious process.  
Indeed, they cannot explain the role of the discursive and intuitive moments of the 
development in terms of any principle, since they deny that it presupposes or is 
determined by any principle in the first place.  
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The consequence of this for Houlgate’s interpretation is that, despite his explicit 
denial that Hegel’s method amounts to a “mysterious power of dialectical insight or 
intuition” belonging only to “a privileged few,” as well as his effort to cast Hegel’s Logic 
as a rigorous development of success implications, his interpretation of what Hegel 
means by presuppositionlessness nevertheless demands that it remain mysterious why the 
Logic develops in the way that it does.156 The demand for radical openness contains in 
itself no criterion, available for public scrutiny, for judging whether one is being “open” 
enough such that a transition can be determined to be the product not of unconscious 
presuppositions but of a necessity immanent in the thought determinations themselves. 
Moreover, Houlgate’s account of the development rules out any explanation why one 
should accept that any given example of a Hegelian deduction is indeed an instance of 
logical necessity.  
I have pointed out a number of inconsistencies in Houlgate’s intuitionist 
interpretation.  Houlgate would like to defend the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s 
Logic, but his interpretation of what this means in practice is so vague that he is unable to 
provide a criterion by which it could be determined when a presupposition is or is not 
being introduced. He would like to defend Hegelian necessity but does not define what 
necessity means for Hegel. He compares the allegedly necessary development of Hegel’s 
Logic to mutation, which is generally a random event. He would like to deny that Hegel’s 
Logic is the product of a mysterious power of intuition and therefore the property of an 
exclusive few individuals, but he defines its development in such a way that it is 
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indistinguishable from a mysterious power of intuition. He wants to claim that the 
development of Hegel’s Logic involves implication, but he denies that Hegel presupposes 
the law of non-contradiction. These are all serious problems.  
However, we are not yet finished. Since my primary purpose in examining 
Houlgate’s interpretation is to evaluate its success as a defense of Hegel’s Logic against 
Schelling’s criticisms, at this point I would like to consider the implications of its 
inconsistencies for this defense. I will then consider how other critics of the intuitionists 
have responded to some of these inconsistences before providing my own interpretation 
of Hegelian necessity in Chapter 3, and then, in Chapter 4, bringing this interpretation to 
bear on the other interpretations I have considered.  
D. Intuitionism as an answer to Schelling 
As we saw in Chapter 1, Schelling does indeed criticize Hegel for allegedly falsely 
claiming that his Logic is presuppositionless and has a necessary development, as 
Houlgate emphasizes. Recall that, in Schelling’s presentation, Hegel’s presuppositions 
take the form of (1) a merely adventitious beginning, and (2) an unconsciously 
presupposed aim (a concept of determinate being) derived from his previous habits of 
thought, which include (a) unproven logical forms adopted from other philosophers and 
concepts taken from everyday life and (b) concepts formed with the help of empirical 
intuition.  
Recall, in addition, that Schelling remarks that in his view “one could easily 
produce” a logic like Hegel’s, which is supposed to be a logic of reality, “in ten different 
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ways.”157 Since Schelling does not think that Hegel produces his Logic out of a necessity 
immanent in the thought determinations themselves, there is, in Schelling’s view no one 
single way that Hegel’s aim—a concept of concrete being—could be produced. A related 
point Schelling raises is that it is important to be able to distinguish necessity from the 
mere appearance of necessity. In his view, Hegel fails at this.  
Let us now consider how Houlgate’s intuitionism fares as a defense of Hegelian 
necessity against each of these criticisms.  
a. The Adventitious Beginning  
As I explained in Chapter 1, Schelling denies that the beginning of Hegel’s Logic is a 
product of necessity. As I also explained there, Schelling thinks that Hegel has definite 
reasons for finding “pure being” attractive as a beginning, but that this alone does not 
imply that the beginning is necessary, only that it is not groundless. However, since the 
beginning is, according to Schelling, not a product of necessity, another philosopher 
could with equal or even superior justification, begin in an entirely different way.  
According to Schelling’s account, the thought with which his Logic begins, pure being, is 
supposed to be necessary because it is absolutely general in the sense that “nothing could 
exclude itself from this concept.”158 Schelling is not a fan of this beginning and, again, 
does not agree that it is necessary. 
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Houlgate does not address this objection to the necessity of Hegel’s Logic at all. 
Of course, Houlgate is a fan of Hegel’s beginning, since he thinks that a 
presuppositionless beginning is a condition of the possibility of a subsequent 
presuppositionless and necessary beginning. For Houlgate, it is enough that Hegel should 
have good reasons for selecting “pure being” as the beginning of the Logic.  
If Schelling is right that Hegel intends the beginning itself to be necessary (In 
Chapter 3, I show that he is.), it follows that Houlgate either does not notice this about 
Hegel or else does not agree with Hegel that the beginning is necessary. If the latter 
explanation is correct, this would imply that Houlgate agrees with Schelling that the 
beginning is adventitious without agreeing with Schelling that Hegel’s beginning is 
flawed. In either case, Houlgate has no cause to defend Hegel’s Logic against this 
criticism by Schelling, since he and Schelling both hold that the beginning is not 
necessary. 
b. The Presupposed Aim  
As I explained in Chapter 1, Schelling believes that Hegel presupposes the aim of the 
Logic from the very beginning and that the development of the Logic is a product of “a 
necessity which lies in the philosopher” rather than a “necessity which lies in the concept 
itself.”159 As I also explained there, Schelling believes that this aim consists in knowledge 
of the real world “at which science is finally to arrive.”160 In Schelling’s view, the 
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necessity at work in Hegel’s Logic is thus psychological rather than logical. Recall, 
moreover, that Schelling presses onward with his psychoanalysis of Hegel by suggesting 
that the latter “seeks to hide consciousness” of his goal “from himself,” and precisely 
because he represses his consciousness of this goal, it “affect[s] the course of 
philosophizing all the more decisively.”161 
No one questions whether an outcome is necessary on the grounds that it is 
desired in the case of mathematics. If a mathematician offers a proof of a theorem, no one 
ever attempts to refute the proof simply by pointing out that the mathematician hoped the 
initial conjecture would turn out to be correct. But in the case of Hegel’s Logic, Houlgate 
takes this argument as good coin. While Houlgate is right to oppose the claim that the 
course of Hegel’s Logic is determined by a presupposed aim, he opposes this claim 
essentially by claiming that the Logic is aimless.  
Houlgate addresses this criticism by denying that Hegel believed he was guiding 
the process by means of some preconceived idea of its aim. He falsely supposes that the 
absence of a conscious aim that could serve as the motivation for a merely contingent 
development guarantees the alternative, namely that the development is necessary. But if 
psychological motivation is different from logical necessity, both (a) a conscious aim and 
(b) the lack of a conscious aim are compatible with either (1) a necessary or (2) a 
contingent development. If the development of Hegel’s Logic were indeed the product of 
a mysterious power of intuition—and, again, Houlgate presents the Logic in such a way 
that his explanation of its development is ultimately indistinguishable from this—then its 
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aim might well be the psychological force that drove its development. Consequently, 
Houlgate’s attempt at a defense of Hegelian necessity against Schelling’s second 
criticism fails.  
c. Presupposed Concepts and Intuitions 
Recall that Schelling not only discusses the aim of Hegel’s Logic in general terms, as 
knowledge of concrete being, i.e., the real world. He also discusses the nature and origins 
of this knowledge, which he believes consists in abstractions produced by empirical 
intuition, concepts of everyday life, and logical forms developed by other philosophers. 
In Schelling’s view, the concepts found in Hegel’s Logic cannot be a product both of a 
necessity immanent in the concepts themselves and a knowledge of empirical reality and 
socially developed forms of thought, and since they are a product of the latter, they 
cannot be a product of the former. 
Recall Houlgate’s account of the difference between Kant and Hegel on the 
question of the derivation of the categories. According to Houlgate, Kant derives the 
categories from the forms of judgment as described by the traditional logic, whereas 
Hegel does not simply accept this account, but seeks to “demonstrate that the categories 
follow necessarily from what thought itself is.”162 However, Houlgate has only the 
metaphor with observation to offer as an account of how Hegel provides a necessary 
derivation of the “categories.” Moreover, as I noted above, there does not have to be 
anything that intrinsically binds successive visual sensations and if Hegel’s procedure is 
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analogous with visual observation, he may well end up with an arbitrary collection of 
thoughts that have no intrinsic relationship with one another. Thus, this metaphor is 
unable to account for how Hegel is supposedly able to distinguish his procedure from 
Kant’s empirical examination of consciousness. 
Consequently, Houlgate’s interpretation does not seem to have the resources to 
defend Hegel’s Logic against Schelling’s objection that Hegel uncritically adopts his 
insights from a variety of sources rather than producing them with immanent necessity. 
Houlgate does address this objection more directly, though not in answer to 
Schelling in particular. However, I postpone the detailed consideration of this response to 
Part 2, where I consider a related objection to the necessity of Hegel’s Logic offered by 
Trendelenburg and the intuitionist response to this objection.  
d. No Guarantee against Arbitrariness or the Mere Appearance of Necessity 
Again, Schelling does not believe that Hegel has any means of distinguishing necessity 
from the “mere appearance of necessity.”163 Like Houlgate, Schelling apparently 
believes that because Hegel insists that the Logic must be presuppositionless, Hegel is not 
in a position to appeal to any principles in distinguishing necessity from its mere 
appearance.  
According to Houlgate, “external criticism” of Hegel’s Logic is illegitimate since, 
unlike Hegel’s Logic itself, this sort of criticism bases itself on presuppositions and is 
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therefore automatically less self-critical than the Logic.164  However, Houlgate does not 
think that this implies that Hegel’s Logic is absolutely beyond all criticism. 
As Houlgate puts it, “any rational person can examine Hegel’s account of what is 
implicit in the initial category of being (and the subsequent categories) and consider 
whether or not that account is correct” and “to the extent that Hegel does not in fact 
render explicit what is implicit in a specific category, he is open to criticism and 
correction by the reader.”165 
This is the closest Houlgate comes to addressing Schelling’s concern. However, 
Houlgate does not explain how it would be possible to distinguish when the “mutations” 
that one intuits are necessary (successfully avoiding the introduction of 
“presuppositions”) and when one merely mistakenly believes that they do. Indeed, 
Houlgate's view implies that no such criterion can exist, since the criterion itself would 
constitute an external presupposition.   
Houlgate would claim that we do not need a criterion, since pure being itself can 
guide us. But this throws us right back into the same problem, because we would then 
need a criterion for judging when it was being that we were perceiving and when it was 
some figment of an individual subjective consciousness.  
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Incidentally, White’s interpretation of Hegel’s dialectical method, which Houlgate 
“fully endorse[s]” suffers from the same problem.166 That is, White does not address a 
situation in which one logician “sees” one category and another logician “sees” another 
category at one and the same point and both believe that their respective intuitions “meet 
the requirements of the dialectic.”167 In other words, what White leaves out is precisely 
an explanation of what would makes an intuition necessary rather than contingent on the 
peculiarities of a given “logician.” 
Though Houlgate and White agree with Schelling that Hegel's method is purely 
intuitive, they fail to recognize—as Schelling did—that a “method” consisting entirely of 
intuition is incapable of distinguishing necessity from the mere appearance of necessity, 
no matter how blind this intuition claims to be about where it is going. Moreover, as I 
have shown, Schelling himself never claimed that Hegel consciously departed from a 
necessary development. Rather, he insisted that an unconscious aim would affect the 
course of Hegel's philosophizing “all the more decisively.”168  
Thus, Houlgate fails to defend Hegel against Schelling's accusation that the 
former unconsciously presupposed the determinate content of the development of the 
Logic from the beginning and that his conclusions are the mere circular repetition of his 
unconscious presuppositions.   
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What merely appears necessary to one thinker may not appear necessary to 
another. Given Houlgate’s and White’s accounts of the way that Hegel’s Logic develops, 
Schelling’s claim that “one could easily produce” a logic like Hegel’s “in ten different 
ways” cannot be discounted.169  
Moreover, the failure of the intuitionists to specify any universally acceptable 
criterion by which the one could judge that Hegel’s Logic is or is not necessary or, to put 
it another way, their failure to define Hegelian necessity, opens the door to contemporary 
critics of Hegelian necessity whose criticisms of Hegel are similar to Schelling’s. 
E. The Criticisms of the anti-intuitionists 
The inadequacies of the intuitionist interpretation of Hegel’s Logic have not gone 
unnoticed by the opponents of immanent necessity. In this section, I review the criticisms 
of the intuitionist interpretation presented by several other Hegel interpreters and the 
alternative view of Hegelian necessity they believe these criticisms justify. I then 
conclude that Hegelian immanent necessity requires an entirely different kind of defense 
than that offered by the intuitionists. 
In his essay “The Necessities of Hegel’s Logic,” David Kolb presents some of the 
same criticisms I have developed in this chapter. He criticizes the visual analogies that 
permeate the texts of the intuitionists and the element of contingency bound up with them 
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and expresses concern about the vagueness of appeals to “clear sight.”170 He also points 
out that these same problems arise when Houlgate makes a direct appeal to intuition:  
 
Winfield and Houlgate presuppose that the internal development must be unique. 
Why should it be so? And even if it were, what if two versions of the development 
both seem plausible? How do we conduct their "examination"? How do we tell 
which is right? Essentially, we are told to just look. Performing the examination 
properly, we can see which version is right, or necessary, or truly self-developing. 
There is a good deal of visual imagery in Houlgate and the others' 
discussions of the Logic. We are to look and see the necessity happening, while 
we keep ourselves passive and become aware. Eventually Houlgate says that pure 
thought involves an intellectual intuition of pure being and its self-development. 
But what if I see something different than you do? Appeals to intuition always 
have trouble when they yield divergent results. Houlgate is forced into the 
position Husserl found himself in: one of us lacks sufficiently clear sight. We 
must purify our intuition. Rather than Husserl's endless preparatory reductions, 
Houlgate opts for the strength of a "resolve" to see only what is internal and its 
(presumed) unique necessary development.171 
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We also see here a reiteration of one of the same criticisms of Hegel’s Logic expressed by 
Schelling, namely that if the “necessity” at work in Hegel’s Logic is not genuine logical 
necessity, but only some form of intuition, then there are no grounds for supposing two 
people will intuit one and the same development.  
The inadequacy of the intuitionist account thus provides part of the impetus for 
Kolb’s argument that Hegel’s Logic does not in fact develop with immanent necessity. 
Like Schelling and all the other anti-intuitionists, Kolb concludes that various 
presuppositions must determine the course of development of the Logic. Inasmuch as the 
intuitionists have nothing but visual analogies, or intuition—which amounts to the same 
thing—to offer in defense of their claim that Hegel’s Logic develops with immanent 
necessity, they fail to defend their position against the claim that such presuppositions 
determine the course of its development.   
Moreover, since intuitionism cannot provide a concrete explanation of why Hegel 
changes his mind at various points about the sequential emergence of the various thought 
determinations and presents the development slightly differently in the Science of Logic 
and the Encyclopedia Logic, except perhaps to say that he becomes more “self-critical” or 
more nearly achieves the goal of “presuppositionlessness” or achieved clearer vision—all 
equally vague assurances—Kolb is free to interpret these changes as evidence against the 
supposition that the development of Hegel’s Logic is immanently necessary. 
And Kolb is not the only one to use the complete absence in the literature of an 
adequate defense of the immanent necessity of Hegel’s Logic as a justification for 
80 
concluding that the development is a contingent one. The inadequacy of the intuitionist 
defense of immanent necessity is taken as decisive in this regard. 
Wendy Lynn Clark and J. M. Fritzman, for example, base their criticism of the 
idea that Hegel’s Phenomenology is driven by immanent (“prospective”) logical necessity 
in part on the failure of Kenley Dove’s “Nonfoundational Hegelian” (intuitionist) 
interpretation. Dove, like Houlgate, White and others, presents the development of 
Hegel’s Logic as nothing more than the passive observation of a sequence of categories. 
Clark and Fritzman point out that Dove’s interpretation does not capture the way 
that Hegel presents the connections between the diverse moments of its development, and 
they also draw rather drastic conclusions from this fact. As they put it: 
 
The point to be made is that how a succession of experiences is seen—whether as 
constituting a scientific progression, a going to hell in a handbasket, or just one 
damned thing after another—is not determined at the level of observation but 
instead is decided at the metalevel of punctuation.172 
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What they mean by this is that a consciousness that merely “experiences” a “sequence of 
events” cannot distinguish, as Hegel’s Phenomenology clearly does, between these 
different forms of progression.173  
However, since Dove and Houlgate, whom they also cite, present no other 
criterion for the development other than to say that it results from passive observation, 
Clark and Fritzman are free to conclude that Hegel must supply the connection by means 
of external criteria.  
They note that “Hegel frequently claims that the transitions from one shape of 
spirit to the next are necessary,” but insist that “it is clear” that the necessity that is 
operative in Hegel’s Phenomenology “cannot be logical necessity” because “what the 
next shape will be cannot be deduced” from “the set of successive shapes reached at any 
point in the text.”174  
Having thus assured us that Hegelian necessity is not genuine logical necessity, 
they suggest an alternative interpretation of it: “given a difficulty or contradiction 
encountered within a particular shape, its successor is necessary because only that 
successor could resolve the problem.” 175 However, they reject this explanation as “not 
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credible,” since “problems generally have more than one solution.”176 Like Schelling and 
like Kolb, they can imagine a logic like Hegel’s developing in ten different ways.  
Having decided that each successive shape is not uniquely logically necessitated 
by the previous shape, they set out to determine “in what sense … the transitions from 
one shape of spirit to the next [are] necessary.”177 
Building on Philip J. Kain’s interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology, they decide 
that “the necessity at issue here is not logical necessity but narrational necessity.”178 
Explaining how this narrational necessity works, they argue: 
 
In order to make sense of spirit’s sojourn, Hegel narrates a story explaining that 
its various shapes were leading to its present result. After one shape has succeeded 
another, everything prior to that shape becomes necessary for that shape to have 
occurred. This is so because if anything prior to that shape had been different, the 
shape itself would have been different too.179 
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While those who deny that the development of Hegel’s logic is immanently or 
even genuinely logically necessary base their interpretations in part on considerations I 
have not gone into here, the weaknesses of the intuitionist interpretation, and the absence 
of any competing defense of the immanent necessity of Hegel’s Logic, play a decisive 
role in allowing them to exclude immanent necessity from their explanations of Hegel’s 
philosophy.  
F. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined the intuitionist interpretation of Hegel’s Logic with 
particular emphasis on the version of this interpretation presented by Houlgate. My focus 
has been Houlgate’s defense of Hegelian necessity against Schelling’s criticisms. I have 
shown that this defense fails because intuition, as the intuitionists present it, is 
fundamentally mysterious such that it cannot explain why Hegel’s procedure produces 
the results that it does. Moreover, I have shown that the weaknesses of intuitionism have 
made it relatively easy for other interpreters to dismiss Hegel’s claim that his Logic has 
an immanently necessary development.  
In the next chapter, Chapter 3, I advance my own interpretation of the necessity of 
Hegel’s Logic. Then, in Chapter 4, I use this interpretation to defend Hegelian necessity. I 
show there that intuitionism and its opponents misinterpret Hegelian necessity and 
consequently fail to defend it successfully against Schelling’s criticisms.  
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Chapter 3: An Interpretation of the Immanent Logical Necessity of 
Hegel’s Logic
A. Introduction 
In this chapter, I advance my own explanation of the immanent necessity of Hegel’s 
Logic. I show that its necessity flows from Hegel’s application of the principle or law of 
non-contradiction to the content of pure thought.180 
 First, I review Hegel’s claims about the necessity of the Logic. Then, I address the 
thought of pure being with which Hegel’s Logic begins, and show that, for Hegel, this 
beginning is a necessary insofar as it results from the application of the law of non-
contradiction to the subject matter of the Logic.  
 Next, placing my interpretation in the context of Hegel’s general account of the 
concept, I show that, for Hegel, it is precisely the consistent, rigorous application of the 
law of non-contradiction that yields unavoidable, i.e., necessary, contradictions in the 
subsequent development of the Logic. That is, the very law that forbids contradictions in 
fact produces them. For Hegel, this self-contradiction implies that the law is not 
absolutely but only relatively true.   
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 According to Hegel, every concept has three “sides” or “moments” that constitute 
together what that concept is. These moments are a product of logical necessity insofar as 
they follow from the law of non-contradiction. Hegel calls the thinking that is dominated 
by the first moment, the understanding. Its activity consists in fixing distinctions, 
separating and abstracting a given content from every other content and holding it there 
in thought. The second or dialectical moment consists in the intrinsically and necessarily 
self-contradictory character of every finite determination, which can and logically must 
be deduced from that content, regardless of whether any thinker happens to be willing to 
do so. The third or speculative moment is a subsisting contradiction; it consists in the 
unity of opposed determinations that results from their mutual transition into one another.  
 After I explain the role the law of non-contradiction, the law of contradiction and 
the law of the unity of opposites in Hegel’s deduction of thought determinations from 
other thought determinations, I discuss in what sense it is and is not correct in Hegel’s 
view to interpret these as separate laws.  
 Next, I show that the development at the beginning of Hegel’s Logic does indeed 
instantiate Hegel’s general account of the moments of the concept in their necessary 
transitions. This shows that Hegel’s general account of it is consistent with at least one 
actual example of a development that he presents in the Logic.  
 I then consider and refute a possible objection to my claim the first few thought 
determinations and transitions in Hegel’s Logic instantiate the moments of the concept as 
laid out in his general account of them. Following up on my reply to this objection, I then 
consider and refute a possible criticism of Hegel’s procedure in the Logic.  
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 Finally, I show that Hegel’s stance on intellectual intuition agrees with my 
interpretation of Hegelian logical necessity. 
 In the course of this chapter, I take note of claims about Hegel’s Logic made by 
Schelling and the intuitionists that are justified by the texts I consider here. However, I 
hold off most of my criticisms of their interpretations until the next chapter, Chapter 4. In 
Chapter 4, I bring the interpretation presented in this chapter to bear on the criticisms of 
Hegelian necessity discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.  
B. The Demand for Necessity 
Aside from the discussion of necessity in relation to freedom, contingency, actuality and 
possibility in the second subdivision of the logic, the “Doctrine of Essence,” as Hegel 
calls it in both the Encyclopedia Logic and the Science of Logic, references to necessity in 
both works are sparse and appear mostly in the prefaces and introductions.  
 For example, in the 1831 preface to the second edition of the Science of Logic, 
Hegel says that this work puts the content of the older sciences of metaphysics and logic 
in true philosophical form, so that thinking can be exhibited “in its own immanent 
activity or what is the same, in its necessary development.”181 
 Conversely, in the introduction to the same work, he claims that if a science 
begins with a definition, then it will fail to “demonstrate the necessity of the subject 
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matter” and it will thereby also fail to demonstrate the necessity “of the science itself.”182 
In Hegel’s view, only a science that is necessary throughout is fully justified and fully 
scientific.  
 Moreover, Hegel insists in this same preface that “the immanent coming-to-be of 
the distinctions and the necessity of their connection with each other must present 
themselves in the exposition of the subject matter itself.”183 
 In the preface to the 1827 second edition to the Encyclopedia Logic, he claims 
that the time is ripe for the replacement of mystery with a scientific grasp of the basic 
logic of all reality. This is the “task” of the science of logic, in which thinking 
 
affirms the stubborn determination only to be reconciled with the solid content so 
far as that content has at the same time been able to give itself the shape that is 
most worthy of it. This is the shape of the Concept, the shape of the necessity that 
binds all content and thoughts alike, and precisely thereby makes them free.184 
 
Likewise, in the introduction to the Encyclopedia Logic, he insists that mere “familiarity” 
with the objects of philosophy thought is inadequate. Therefore, it “inadmissible” simply 
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to presuppose these objects or provide mere “assurances” about them.185 Rather, 
philosophy must deduce the nature of its objects from start to finish.  
 As I mentioned above, Hegel also discusses necessity in the “Doctrine of 
Essence” in both the Encyclopedia Logic and the Science of Logic, in terms of its relation 
to freedom, contingency, actuality, and possibility. This discussion builds on what he 
says about freedom and necessity in the 1827 preface quoted above. For example, Hegel 
explains in the Encyclopedia Logic that freedom and necessity ought not to be viewed as 
“mutually exclusive.”186 True necessity, for Hegel, is not external compulsion, but 
intrinsic development in accordance with the true nature, or concept, of a thing. Likewise, 
true freedom is not mere whim, but is likewise development in accordance with the true 
nature or concept of something. For example, thinking is free insofar as it flows from the 
true nature, or concept, of thinking as such in its necessary development. Thus, thinking 
is free, according to Hegel, insofar as it is logically necessary. However, while this 
discussion and the discussion of contingency, actuality and possibility contribute to a full 
appreciation of Hegel’s stance on necessity, it is not the focus of the present study.  
 What is most relevant here with regard to Hegel’s explicit claims about necessity 
are (1) his insistence that logic ought to be put in the form of immanent necessity, and (2) 
his claim that his logic accomplishes this. Let us begin the examination of these claims by 
considering the role of logical necessity at the beginning of the Logic. 
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C. The Logical Necessity of the Beginning 
Hegel explains that the various special sciences each presuppose a method or principles 
that do not receive their justification within the science itself. He insists that the science 
of logic must differ from these other sciences in this respect. The science of logic must 
not have a beginning that presupposes a content that lies outside of it, since the 
clarification of the “nature of cognition” is its own task.187 
 In this regard, the intuitionists are certainly correct to point out that Hegel’s Logic 
is supposed to be presuppositionless. As we have seen, Houlgate in particular backs up 
his position on the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s Logic with solid textual evidence.  
 Moreover, Schelling is correct in maintaining that, according to Hegel, the 
beginning itself is necessary. As Hegel explains, the beginning is not an “arbitrary” or 
“merely provisional assumption” that is at first “tentatively presupposed,” and then only 
“subsequently shown to have been properly made the beginning.”188 Thus, according to 
Hegel, the beginning must be necessary. Indeed, according to Hegel, the beginning, pure 
being, is then necessitated by and flows from the very concept of an absolute beginning. 
 Hegel explains that the thought of being, with which the Logic begins, is the 
thought of indeterminate immediacy. In the Science of Logic, he points out that “if [the 
beginning] were not this pure indeterminateness, if it were determinate, it would have 
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been taken as something mediated, something already carried a stage further.”189 But 
something that is determinate is not genuinely logically first at all in that, as Hegel puts it, 
it “implies an other to a first.”190 Hegel concludes from this that “it lies in the very nature 
of a beginning that it must be being and nothing else.”191 In other words, any other 
beginning would contradict the concept of a beginning. It would be “a first” that was at 
the same time not a first. In this way, Hegel reasons from the principle of non-
contradiction applied to the concept of the beginning to the necessity of beginning with 
pure being.  
 Similarly, in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel insists that the science whose subject 
matter is logic must begin with pure being because “the first beginning cannot be 
anything mediated and further determined.”192 There too he claims that the “nature of the 
beginning” itself “implies” the thought of pure being.193 The science begins with 
indeterminacy because it cannot begin with anything determinate. If it began with 
something determinate, this would imply “both one and another” and “at the beginning 
we have as yet no other.”194 Hegel explains moreover that the beginning is “immediate” 
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insofar as it lacks any determination at all.195 It is not a relative (“mediated”) lack of 
determination, but “the lack of determination in all its immediacy, what lacks 
determination prior to all determinacy, what lacks determinacy because it stands at the 
very beginning.”196 Hegel submits that what fits this description is that which “we call 
‘being.’”197  
 Again, all of this shows that the beginning is not an “arbitrary” or “merely 
provisional assumption” that is at first “tentatively presupposed.”198 It is in this respect 
that a logical deduction is entirely different from the situation in geometry where “it 
becomes apparent only afterwards in the proof that one took the right course in drawing 
just those lines and then, in the proof itself, in beginning with the comparison of those 
lines or angles.”199 In a geometrical proof of this kind, “drawing such lines and 
comparing them” does not constitute “an essential part of the proof itself,” but is only 
done beforehand in preparation for the proof.200 Hegel contrasts this kind of proof with 
logical proof in which “the ground, the reason, why the beginning is made with pure 
being … is directly given in the science itself.”201  
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 When Hegel says that lines are drawn in “preparation for the proof,” his point is 
that drawing the lines and comparing them serves a purpose but the purpose it serves 
becomes apparent only in retrospect. One might say that drawing and comparing the lines 
is necessary for the aim of producing the proof insofar as they are needed in order to 
achieve that end. However, this is not the kind of necessity Hegel claims is at work in the 
Logic.  
 Recall that Schelling thinks that for Hegel pure being is “pure certainty itself.”202 
It is therefore worth noting here that Hegel does raise certainty as a criterion for a good 
beginning of philosophy from the point of view of other philosophers. Then he rejects this 
criterion. Motivated by a desire for “something strictly certain, i.e., with the certainty of 
oneself, or with a definition or intuition of what is absolutely true” philosophers have 
proposed various beginnings, including for example “I = I, as absolute Indifference or 
Identity” or “intellectual intuition.”203 The problem with all of “these forms” is that they 
all contain mediation within them and therefore “they are not truly first [for] mediation 
consists in having already left a first behind, to go on to a second, and in a going forth 
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from moments that are distinct.”204 Thus, according to Hegel, certainty is not an adequate 
criterion for the beginning of a science of logic.  
 Now, although beginning with pure being is necessary, according to Hegel, he 
nevertheless presents this beginning as a presupposition, since, as he points out, “a 
beginning (being something immediate) does make a presupposition or, rather, it is itself 
just that.”205 The specific presupposition with which the Logic begins is, however, 
necessary insofar as it is implied by the concept of the absolute beginning itself. How can 
Hegel demand a presuppositionless beginning but then claim that this presuppositionless 
beginning is a presupposition? How can a presuppositionless beginning be a 
presupposition?  
 This requires some interpretation, but I believe that there are two reasons. First, 
the beginning, pure being, does not presuppose anything else and is only the 
presupposition of what follows from it. Second, the specific presupposition with which 
the Logic begins (assuming Hegel is right to call it a presupposition) is unavoidable—
necessary—whereas the presuppositions involved in a relative (rather than an absolute) 
beginning are avoidable. Hegel thus avoids all avoidable presuppositions but does not 
seek to avoid what is intrinsically unavoidable. 
 However, to grasp fully the difference between Hegel’s use of presuppositions 
and the ordinary use of them (which often results in circular formal reasoning that begs 
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the question) we will have to examine the way in which Hegel’s Logic approaches 
necessity and contradiction in the subsequent development of the Logic.  
D. The General Form of Logical Necessity in Hegel’s Logic  
In a section of the Encyclopedia Logic entitled “More Precise Conception and Division of 
the Logic,” Hegel describes the three “sides” or three “moments of everything logically 
real; i.e., of every concept or of everything true in general.”206 Hegel explains that these 
so-called “moments” are not “three parts of the Logic.”207 Rather they are intrinsic in 
every concept and constitute together what that concept is. I will argue that Hegel’s 
presentation of these moments is consistent with viewing them as produced by necessary 
principles or laws.  
 Hegel’s explanation in this section is only preliminary precisely because a 
necessary deduction, by its nature, is something that has to be demonstrated concretely. 
That is to say, an exposition that is about a necessary deduction is not the deduction itself 
and therefore cannot serve as a substitute for it. Rather, it is the task of the Logic as a 
whole to deduce the necessity of each and every transition and relation.  
 Houlgate is thus correct in pointing out that Hegel’s Logic is not the result of 
Hegel’s imposition of a presupposed conception of the moments of the concept on the 
concepts or “categories” developed there. As Houlgate correctly notes, it is possible that 
the development could turn out to have a regular form even if Hegel did not assume that 
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it did at the outset. Indeed, it is entirely possible that Hegel wrote the section I am 
discussing here as preparation for the reader after he wrote the body of the text.  
 Nevertheless, as I argue below, the content of the section refutes the supposition 
that Hegel does not presuppose any rules, laws or principles of thought. In particular, it 
serves to refute his claim that Hegel does not assume the law of non-contradiction at the 
outset. 
a. The Understanding 
Hegel names the first moment, the “side of abstraction” or just the “understanding,” after 
an activity and stance of subjective cognition.208 When subjective cognition is dominated 
by this moment, its thinking, Hegel explains, consists in “separat[ing] and abstract[ing]” 
some content from everything else.209  
 If human beings were incapable of understanding, they would accomplish 
nothing, because, Hegel explains, in that case there would be “no fixity or determinacy in 
the domains either of theory or of practice.”210  
 In the theoretical sphere, the understanding “begins by apprehending given ob-
jects in their determinate distinctions.”211  For example, in natural science, Hegel 
explains, “distinctions are drawn between matters, forces, kinds, etc.,” and each of these 
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are kept separate or “in isolation one from another.”212 If such distinctions were not made 
and the various matters, forces and kinds were not distinguished from one another, no 
progress could be made in natural science. 
 When thinking as the understanding considers things or attributes as distinct, it 
does not—at least initially—reflect on where the distinct things or attributes originate. It 
simply accepts them, takes them as given. To maintain its distinctions, the understanding 
holds them apart from one another, and takes their separateness to be permanent and 
absolute. 
 In the practical sphere, the understanding can take the form of singlemindedness 
and determination. Hegel notes that “a man of character is a man of understanding” and 
that this allows him to have “definite purposes in mind” that he pursues “with firm 
intent.”213 Such a person, who finds himself “in a definite situation,” will have to “stick to 
something determinate and not dissipate his powers in a great many directions” if he 
wishes to achieve something.214 
 But while “understanding” is an activity of a thinking subject, Hegel also takes 
pains to emphasize that the “moment” that corresponds to this activity does not find its 
sole manifestation in human thought. He contends that “logical thinking in general must 
not be interpreted merely in terms of a subjective activity, but rather as what is strictly 
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universal and hence objective at the same time.”215 As I noted at the beginning of this 
section, he claims that the three moments of the concept to which the section is devoted 
belong to “everything logically real,” to “every concept,” to “everything true in 
general.”216 Thus, the indispensable role that this moment plays in the activity of thinking 
subjects is a reflection of the fact that such thinking contains genuine truth.  
 According to Hegel, the fact that the moment of the understanding is not merely a 
subjective activity, but also finds its manifestation in the world in general is reflected in 
popular consciousness when people talk about “the goodness of God.”217 In essence, this 
idea that God provides reflects the fact that “finite things are, that they subsist.”218 Hegel 
elaborates on this point as follows: 
 
For instance, we recognise the goodness of God in nature by the fact that the 
various kinds and classes, of both animals and plants, are provided with 
everything they need in order to preserve themselves and prosper. The situation is 
the same with man, too, both for individuals and for whole peoples, who similarly 
possess what is required for their subsistence and their development. In part this is 
given to them as something that is immediately present (like climate, for example, 
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or the character and products of the country, etc.); and in part they possess it in the 
form of aptitudes, talents, etc. Interpreted in this way, then, the understanding 
manifests itself everywhere in all the domains of the ob-jective world, and the 
‘perfection’ of an ob-ject essentially implies that the principle of the 
understanding gets its due therein.219 
 
In making this observation, Hegel’s point is not primarily theological. He is not telling us 
that he believes that another subject, God, actually produces finite things that subsist. 
Rather, his point is that the idea of God’s goodness is one way in which popular 
consciousness grasps something fundamental about the nature of things (that they are and 
that they subsist), and that this corresponds to the moment of the understanding. In this 
way, the separating and abstracting activity of the understanding grasps and corresponds 
to a definite side or “moment” of the concept of some content. The concept (Begriff), in 
Hegel’s use of the term, is not the exclusive possession of thinking, but also belongs to 
nature and society as a regularity, a universal form of motion. A regularity or universal 
form of motion qualifies for Hegel as conceptual whether it is grasped by subjective 
cognition or not.  
 So, how does all of this relate to the practice of philosophy? Again, Hegel 
explained at the beginning of this section that the moments of the concept belong to 
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“everything logically real” and “everything true in general.”220 Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that Hegel holds that philosophical thinking, like all other domains of theory 
and practice, requires the activity of the understanding.  “Philosophy,” Hegel insists, 
“cannot do without the understanding.221 In philosophy, “each thought should be grasped 
in its full precision” and “nothing should remain vague and indeterminate.”222  
 The “principle” of the understanding is “identity, simple self-relation.”223 Since 
Hegel presents the moment of the understanding as theoretically and practically 
necessary, insofar as without it, there is “no fixity or determinacy in the domains either of 
theory or of practice,” the principle of the understanding is necessary as well.224 This 
principle is necessary for all thinking and all human activity, not because it is written 
down and accepted by everyone, nor because it is used by everyone as an external 
criterion for the correctness of all thoughts and actions, but because in thinking or in 
acting in some definite way or other, one is, at that moment, thinking and acting in that 
way and no other.  
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 In adopting this principle, the understanding also implicitly presupposes the 
principle of non-contradiction because to suppose that a thing is what it is is not to 
suppose that it is what it is not.   
 Hegel shows that, although the moment of the understanding plays an 
indispensable role in all areas of theory and practice and corresponds to an essential 
moment of the real world in which human beings find themselves, this moment does not 
contain the absolute truth within itself. It encompasses only a partial truth about the 
world.  
 However, apparently on account of its successes, the understanding (or those 
whose thinking is dominated by this moment) tends to presuppose that its principles have 
absolute, unconditional validity. It seems that the very nature of the law of non-
contradiction encourages this “prejudice,” as Hegel calls it.225 The understanding, in 
observance of the law of non-contradiction, insists that identity is a more 
“characteristically essential and immanent” determination than contradiction and indeed 
that “there is nothing that is contradictory.”226 According to the understanding, Hegel 
explains, contradiction is essential neither to actual things, nor to the thinking or 
imagining subject. In both cases, contradiction is considered “a kind of abnormality and a 
passing paroxysm of sickness.”227 
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 Thus, Hegel could just as easily have claimed that both identity and non-
contradiction are principles of the understanding. 
 The reason that this view of contradiction is a prejudice, according to Hegel, is 
that the application of the analytic principles of the understanding reveals the relative 
inadequacy, the relative falsity, of these very principles, above all the principle of non-
contradiction. This is where the second moment of the concept, the dialectical moment 
comes in.  
b. The Dialectical Moment  
The dialectical moment consists in “the immanent transcending of the isolated 
determinacy” that was posited by the understanding.228 In general, the immanent 
transcending, or sublation (Aufhebung), of the abstractions of the understanding is a result 
of the fact that an abstracted content, an isolated determinacy, “contradicts itself 
inwardly.”229 Moreover, because the abstracted content of thought that is first 
presupposed to be self-identical and non-contradictory is shown in fact to be self-
contradictory precisely through the application of the principle of non-contradiction, this 
contradiction is itself necessary.  
 Again, for Hegel, that this takes place is not to be taken simply as an article of 
faith. In the Logic, he shows again and again how such a development takes place. The 
section entitled “More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic” and the other 
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introductory sections in the Encyclopedia Logic and the Science of Logic are only 
concerned with characterizing the general form of the concept and the attitudes of 
different philosophers toward them. On the other hand, the body of the texts of these 
works is devoted to demonstrating the emergence of contradictions (and, as we will see, 
their resolution as well). 
 When faced with an unavoidable contradiction, Hegel notes, the usual procedure 
of the understanding, when exercised beyond the bounds of its validity, is to adhere to its 
formal principles anyway, but irrationally refuse to accept the conclusions that follow 
necessarily from their application. The understanding cannot accept the principle of 
contradiction that is affirmed by Hegel, namely that “everything is inherently 
contradictory.”230 
 But Hegel insists that the dialectical moment, the moment of contradiction, “must 
in no way be regarded as present only for philosophical consciousness.”231 The 
intrinsically contradictory character of things “is found already in all other forms of 
consciousness, too, and in everyone’s experience.”232 Indeed, Hegel even goes so far as 
to claim that “everything around us can be regarded as an example of dialectic.”233 This is 
demonstrated by the fact that “instead of being fixed and ultimate, everything finite is 
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alterable and perishable, and this is nothing but the dialectic of the finite.”234 Through this 
dialectic, the finite “is driven beyond what it immediately is and overturns into its 
opposite,” since it is “implicitly the other of itself.”235 
 Just as, in popular consciousness, the understanding finds its reflection in the 
“goodness of God,” the dialectic likewise finds its reflection there in the idea of “God’s 
might.”236 
 Contained in this expression is the insight, in popular form, that “all things,” that 
is, all “finite [things] as such come to judgment.”237 Again, the issue for Hegel here is not 
whether there is actually a God who judges things in this way. Rather, the point is that 
this is the way in which popular consciousness conceives a fundamental truth about all 
things, a fundamental moment of reality. Hegel calls this moment “the dialectic.”238 It is 
“the universal, irresistible might before which nothing can subsist, however firm and 
secure it may deem itself to be.”239 
 In a section of the Encyclopedia Logic on Kant’s critical philosophy, Hegel 
discusses Kant’s position on contradiction in relation to his own. According to Hegel, 
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Kant’s great insight in his Critique of Pure Reason is that there are unavoidable 
contradictions. As Kant explains and Hegel recounts, there are “opposed propositions 
about the same ob-ject” and that these propositions “must be affirmed with equal 
necessity.”240 Although Kant does not deduce these contradictions in the way that Hegel 
does, Hegel nevertheless believes that Kant has grasped something essential in positing 
their necessity. In particular, Hegel thinks that it is important that the contradictions in 
Kant’s antinomies result from the “categories on their own account.”241 Kant’s insight 
that “the contradiction” that follows from the categories of the understanding is “essential 
and necessary” is, in Hegel’s view, “one of the most important and profound advances of 
the philosophy of modern times.”242 However, Hegel does not think that Kant follows 
this insight to its logical conclusion, since Kant, limited by the prejudices of the 
understanding, refuses to believe that the “ob-ject in and for itself” is contradictory.243  
 The “solution” that Kant proposes to the problem presented by the antinomies is 
to claim that contradiction is contained in “reason and its cognition of the ob-ject” instead 
of in the object itself.244 Kant achieves this solution by reducing the object to something 
subjective, a mere combination of categories and intuitions, and simultaneously emptying 
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the real object, the object in and for itself, of all content, reducing it to an empty thing in 
itself. 
 The reason that Kant proposes such a drastic solution, Hegel maintains, is not that 
it actually resolves the contradiction successfully, but that Kant shares in that “usual 
tenderness for things, whose only care is that they do not contradict themselves.”245 In 
Kant’s view, “the stain of contradiction ought not to be in the essence of what is in the 
world.”246 Instead, this stain is supposed “to belong only to thinking reason, to the 
essence of the spirit.”247 Kant does not find it “objectionable that the world as it appears” 
to the “sensibility” and “understanding” of the thinking subject “shows contradictions to 
the [subjective] spirit that observes it.”248 However, Hegel insists, Kant “forgets” that he 
does not resolve the contradiction at all in this way, but only shifts it to the thinking 
subject.249 
 Moreover, Hegel maintains, not only does Kant fail to resolve the contradictions 
he presents in his antinomies. He also grossly underestimates the extent of the problem. 
Hegel insists that Kant is mistaken in “bring[ing] forward only four antinomies” and that 
this evinces Kant’s “failure to study the antinomy in more depth.”250 Hegel maintains that 
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“antinomy is found not only in the four particular ob-jects taken from cosmology” that 
Kant discusses, “but rather in all objects of all kinds, in all representations, concepts, and 
ideas.”251 To gain knowledge of the role of contradiction in objects is “what is essential in 
philosophical study,” Hegel contends.252  
 In the Science of Logic, Hegel once again affirms the ubiquity of contradiction. 
Indeed, he insists that it ought to “be grasped and enunciated as a law: everything is 
contradictory.”253 
c. The Speculative Moment 
Again, Hegel presents the inadequacy of premises or presuppositions and the principles 
through which they are defined as a relative, not an absolute inadequacy. But how can 
Hegel claim to deduce anything positive at all from a contradiction, let alone an entire 
series and system of thought determinations? Does the deduction of a necessary 
contradiction resulting from an application of the principle of non-contradiction not 
constitute a devastating indictment of any claim on the part of thought that it is capable of 
grasping truth?  
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 Perhaps such a conclusion would be warranted if the result of the dialectic were 
only an “empty, abstract nothing,” but, in order to come to such a conclusion, one would 
have to ignore what a “result” is.254 Hegel insists that a result is “not an immediate 
nothing” precisely because it is the “result,” the “negation” of those determinations from 
which it issues forth.255 A result as such is not merely something negative, but a product 
of some development and therefore something positive. This result is not just an abstract 
thought but is also “something-concrete” inasmuch as it contains within it “distinct 
determinations,” both the content from which it issued and the negation of that content.256  
 This brings us to the third moment of the concept, what Hegel calls the synthetic 
or “speculative or positively rational” moment.257 This moment is both new and not new. 
It both goes beyond and does not go beyond the first two moments, or, rather, is nothing 
but the going beyond themselves of these moments themselves.  
 The first determination is what it is not, and what it is not is a second 
determination, but what it is not is therefore once again the first determination at the same 
time that it is the second. The speculative moment is apprehended when one stands back 
and recognizes the determinate unity that results from these continual mutual transitions. 
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 Because the application of the analytic principles of the understanding produced a 
self-contradiction, the positing of the identity of its determinations and the positing of 
their self-contradiction are not two separate activities but are equally logically necessary 
sides or moments of one and the same movement. Speculative thinking is the recognition 
that the logical derivation of the self-contradiction and mutual transition of 
determinations it initially presupposed as absolutely distinct is nothing but the positive 
proof of their own intrinsic unity.  
 The principle or law of the unity of opposites therefore follows from the entire 
antecedent development. However, since it is a unity of opposites, the distinction 
between the two opposed moments is not completely obliterated by their unity. As Hegel 
often puts it, the contradiction is not removed, but suspended (aufgehoben). Although 
Hegel himself does not present the speculative moment in the form of a law, one could 
express it in this form: everything that is necessarily contradictory is in truth a unity of 
opposed determinations. 
 Since Hegel holds that the “concrete thoughts” of the sort that result from 
speculative thinking are the necessary consequence of the application of the law of non-
contradiction and the law of contradiction, Hegel thinks that philosophy too ought to 
devote itself to such thoughts, and not content itself with “mere abstractions or formal 
thoughts” of the sort that belong to “what is usually called logic,” the formal “logic of the 
understanding.”258 Since formal logic leaves out “the dialectical and the rational,” Hegel 
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holds that it is inadequate and untrue and not suitable for philosophy.259 After all, he 
explains if one leaves out the dialectical and the rational what is leftover is merely “a 
descriptive collection of determinations of thought put together in various ways, which in 
their finitude [is supposed to] count for something infinite.”260 
 Hegel returns here to the demand that he sets forth in the 1827 preface to the 
Encyclopedia Logic that mystery give way to a scientific grasp of the logic of reality. He 
claims that in “earlier times” people meant the same thing by “mystical” that he refers to 
here as “the speculative” or what is “positively rational.”261 However, the meaning of 
“the ‘mystical’” had changed and people now tended to refer to whatever “is mysterious 
and incomprehensible” as mystical.262 According to Hegel, the mystical, which he 
equates here with the speculative, does not have to be mysterious unless one adheres to 
the standpoint of the understanding. The understanding is confused by the mystical 
because it views everything in terms of its principle of “abstract identity.”263 It grasps 
determinations “only in their separation and opposition” so that the concrete speculative 
unity of these determinations is incomprehensible to it.264   
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 Those who “recognise the mystical as what is genuine” sometimes view it as 
“something utterly mysterious, and just leave it at that.”265 Hegel explains that for these 
people, as well as for those who place value on the understanding and renounce what is 
mysterious, “thinking has only the significance of an abstract positing of identity.”266 
That is, they reduce thinking to the understanding. As a consequence, they believe that 
“in order to attain the truth we must renounce thinking.”267 
 However, all those who reduce thinking to the understanding are mistaken in 
equating it with thought as such and, moreover, they are mistaken about the character of 
the understanding. The abstract thought of the understanding is, Hegel explains, not “firm 
and ultimate” in the way that many suppose, but “proves itself, on the contrary, to be a 
constant sublating of itself and an overturning into its opposite.”268 
 On the other hand, “the rational as such is rational precisely because it contains 
both of the opposites as ideal moments within itself.”269 For this reason, “everything 
rational can equally be called ‘mystical,’” since it “transcends the understanding,” but 
this does not mean that it is “inaccessible to thinking and incomprehensible.”270 
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E. Hegel on Laws of Thought 
I have claimed that Hegel’s presentation of the moments of the concept is consistent with 
viewing them as produced by necessary principles or laws. In the last three sections, I 
have discussed four such laws or principles of thought: the laws of identity and non-
contradiction; the law of contradiction; and the law of the unity of opposites. Let us 
review these principles or laws briefly before discussing Hegel’s general stance on laws 
of thought.  
 The first principle I have discussed, the principle of identity, is implicitly 
presupposed by and inherent in the activity of the understanding. Again, according to 
Hegel, the moment of the understanding is necessary for human activity insofar as no 
theoretical or practical progress can be made without it. Hegel also holds that this 
moment is intrinsic in what is immediately other than subjective cognition and appears as 
the relative permanence of things. This moment is then reflected in popular 
consciousness as the “goodness of God,” the idea that God provides.271 
 The second principle or law I have discussed, the law of non-contradiction, is 
implicit in the theoretical activity of the understanding, which asserts the separateness 
and distinctness of its determinations, and the practical activity that engages in one 
definite form of activity rather than others. However, Hegel calls only identity the 
principle of the understanding, perhaps because he takes the law or principle of non-
contradiction as following from it.  
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 The third principle or law (or the second, depending how you look at it) 
corresponds to the second moment, the dialectical moment and consists in the emergence 
of unavoidable and therefore necessary contradictions produced by the activity of the 
understanding. This is the law of contradiction, according to which “everything is 
contradictory.”272 In popular consciousness, this moment corresponds to the idea of 
“God’s might.”273 
 The fourth law I have presented is the law of the unity of opposites—everything 
that is necessarily contradictory is in truth a unity of opposed determinations. Hegel 
never calls the fourth law I have presented a “law”; I have only inferred that it is such. I 
would like to justify this way of characterizing it by means of a brief discussion of 
Hegel’s position on “laws of thought.”  
 In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel discusses and criticizes a number of 
different conceptions of the relationship between thought and its object. He calls one 
family of such conceptions “observing reason.”274 According to one of these conceptions, 
there are logical laws or “Laws of pure thought” in much the same way that there are 
natural laws of inorganic nature.275 
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 Viewed in this way, in terms of a collection of laws, thinking appears to be 
determined by “a multitude of detached necessities.”276 As Hegel explains, when viewed 
in this way, the laws are abstracted from or “torn out of [the] context” of the motion of 
thought “in the course of considering them.”277 Consequently, each law contains a 
necessary relation, but it does not contain the whole continuously necessary development 
of thought.  
 The conception of thought according to which it is determined by “a number of 
different Laws” contradicts in this way “the unity of self-consciousness.”278 According to 
Hegel, the laws themselves ought to be grasped as moments, not as “fixed” and 
“constant” in the way that the stance of “observing reason” conceives them.279 As he also 
puts it, the “Laws of thought” are “single vanishing moments whose truth is only the 
whole movement of thought, knowing itself.”280 
 Thus, although Hegel is critical of the standpoint of “observing reason,” this does 
not mean that he is absolutely opposed to conceiving of thought in terms of laws. As 
moments, one law produces the next. It is only when they are conceived as detached 
necessities that viewing them as laws is a problem, in Hegel’s view. For instance, in the 
case of the law of non-contradiction and the law of contradiction, these two laws directly 
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contradict one another. Both laws—nothing is contradictory and everything is 
contradictory—express a form of necessity, but when they are detached from the context 
of the development of thought in which the former law, together with the law of identity, 
produces the latter law, the two laws simply contradict one another and it remains unclear 
which one ought to be considered applicable. From a Hegelian perspective, this is part of 
the problem with the standpoint of the understanding. Since it views laws of thought as 
detached necessities, it has to take the law of non-contradiction as absolute or not apply it 
at all, but if it does not apply it at all, then it cannot make any progress at all in theory or 
in practice, so it rejects the law of contradiction instead, or, rather, it takes all 
contradictions to be nothing but “a kind of abnormality and a passing paroxysm of 
sickness.”281 
 For Hegel, on the other hand, the law of non-contradiction produces 
contradictions and these contradictions produce their own resolution in the unity of 
opposites. I have claimed that the latter can be expressed in the form of a law—
everything that is necessarily contradictory is in truth a unity of opposed determinations. 
If this law is not conceived as a detached necessity, but as a moment, a result of the 
application of the laws of non-contradiction and contradiction, then viewing it as such 
does not contradict Hegel’s own presentation of it. Moreover, doing so brings to the 
forefront the relationship between laws of thought and the three moments of the concept. 
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F. The Moments of the Concept and the Beginning of the Logic 
It is now time to show that the development at the beginning of Hegel’s Logic does 
indeed accord with Hegel’s general account of the moments of the concept in their 
necessary transitions. Unfortunately, it is impossible to examine in the space of the 
present work whether the entirety of Hegel’s Logic, every transition and every moment, 
indeed instantiates the three moments of the concept as Hegel presents them in the 
section “More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic.” However, my aim in 
showing that the beginning accords with Hegel’s general account is to show that the latter 
it is consistent with at least one example of an actual development that he presents in the 
Logic.  
 Of course, one might suppose that in Hegel’s view only the “Doctrine of the 
Concept,” the third major section of Hegel’s Logic, should instantiate these moments, but 
this supposition would involve a mistaken conception of Hegel’s position on truth. Again, 
according to Hegel, the moments of the concept belong to “everything logically real” and 
“everything true in general.”282 It follows that if the content of the “Doctrine of Being” is 
“logically real” or true to any degree or in any sense, then the development presented in 
this part of the Logic should instantiate these moments. And while Hegel presents the 
third part of the Logic, the “Doctrine of the Concept” as the perfected form of truth, this 
does not imply that he thinks that being and essence are absolutely false or that their 
refutation, the deduction of their relative inadequacy, in “Doctrine of Being” and the 
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“Doctrine of Essence,” is an absolute refutation.  As Hegel explains, in reference to the 
history of philosophy, 
 
when people talk about a philosophy’s being refuted, they usually take this first in 
a merely abstract, negative sense—in other words, as meaning that the refuted 
philosophy is simply no longer valid at all, that it is set aside and done with.283 
 
If this way of conceiving of the history of philosophy were correct, Hegel points out, then 
it would be pointless to study this history. Older philosophies have indeed “been refuted,” 
Hegel submits, but, he likewise insists, “it must also equally be affirmed that no 
philosophy has ever been refuted.”284 First of all, the “content” of “every philosophy 
worthy of the name” is “the Idea,” i.e., “what is true in and for itself.”285 Second of all,  
 
every philosophical system should be regarded as the presentation of a particular 
moment, or a particular stage, in the process of development of the Idea. So, the 
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“refuting” of a philosophy means only that its restricting boundary has been 
overstepped and its determinate principle has been reduced to an ideal moment.286 
 
In another place, he claims that  
 
the genuine refutation of one philosophical system by another … consists 
precisely in the fact that the principle of the refuted philosophy is exhibited in its 
dialectic and reduced to an ideal moment of a higher concrete form of the Idea.287 
 
To refute is in general to show something is false. The foregoing discussion implies that, 
in Hegel’s view, a refutation of a philosophy deserving of the name does not result in the 
conclusion that that philosophy is absolutely false. The principle of a philosophy 
(considered here in a broader sense than merely the most basic logical principles 
discussed above) is generally not absolutely false but corrects what is false in the 
previous philosophy and to a limited extent finds its place in the next one. Hegel’s 
definition of philosophical truth confirms this interpretation.  
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 He claims that “in the philosophical sense” truth consists in “the agreement of a 
content with itself.”288 This implies that if the content does not absolutely “agree” with 
itself, that is, if it is self-contradictory, then is relatively untrue or false. However, it must 
also be relatively true in order to be what it is at all. The beginning of Hegel’s Logic, for 
instance, is not absolutely false because there is some degree of agreement of the content 
with itself.  
 Indeed, it is not too difficult to discover how the three moments of the concept are 
instantiated at the beginning of the Logic.  
 The beginning of the Logic, pure being or “indeterminate immediacy” is the result 
of an abstraction from all content. I have already discussed in section C of this chapter 
why this beginning is necessary. Recall that I explained there that, for Hegel, it is 
necessary insofar as any other beginning would contradict the idea of an absolute 
beginning.  In this way, the beginning is implied by the principle of non-contradiction, 
which, according to Hegel, must be presupposed for any theoretical progress to be made 
at all. The activity of the understanding consists in applying this principle along with the 
principle of identity in that it consists in positing the content of its thought in its absolute 
separateness and distinctness from everything else.  
 As I already explained in section C, all mediation and determinacy imply a 
development beyond the beginning. Therefore, the beginning, when taken separately and 
in abstraction from that of which it is the beginning is absolute immediacy and 
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indeterminacy as such.  Again, this is the thought of indeterminate immediacy, or pure 
being, and it is not possible to fix this beginning in thought without presupposing that it is 
self-identical (principle of identity). But if it is identical only with itself, then it cannot be 
identical with anything else that it is not. Thus, Hegel also presupposes the principle of 
non-contradiction.  
 In its activity of absolute abstraction, the understanding would try to hold the 
thought of indeterminate being apart from the thought of abstract nothing and posit the 
absolute distinctness of these two thoughts. Accordingly, Hegel issues the following 
challenge to those who stop short at the standpoint of the understanding: “Let those who 
insist that being and nothing are different tackle the problem of stating in what the 
difference consists.”289 
 The understanding is unable to answer this challenge and explain what 
distinguishes indeterminate being and nothing because its own analytic principles require 
that it adhere to the simple thoughts of indeterminate being and indeterminate nothing 
and not ascribe any determinacy to them. As Hegel explains:  
 
                                                          
289 Hegel, Science of Logic, 92.  
120 
If being and nothing had any determinateness by which they were distinguished 
from each other then, as has been observed, they would be determinate being and 
determinate nothing, not the pure being and pure nothing that here they still are.290 
 
Since indeterminate being and nothing are indistinguishable, they must be identical. This 
contradiction follows with necessity from the presupposition of analytic principles, 
including the principle of non-contradiction. As Hegel maintains, “the deduction” of the 
unity of being and nothing is “entirely analytic” and the “whole course of philosophising” 
is “methodical, i.e., necessary” inasmuch as it is “nothing else but the mere positing of 
what is already contained in a concept.”291 
 However, this necessary conclusion does not prompt Hegel to draw the further 
and unwarranted conclusion that the analytic logical principles of the understanding are 
absolutely false. He recognizes that only by presupposing these principles was he able to 
deduce the contradiction. Therefore, these principles are not absolutely, but only 
relatively false, and being and nothing are still non-identical at the same time that they 
are identical.   
 The deduction of the contradiction is also the deduction of the first determinate 
concept of the Logic, namely becoming. This concept is a solution to or dissolution of the 
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source of the contradiction in being and nothing. Unlike these simple thoughts, it is 
determinate and therefore distinguishable through this determinacy from both 
indeterminate being and indeterminate nothing.  
 However, becoming is also not absolutely distinct from being and nothing. 
Hegel's method does not consist in recognizing the inadequacy in being and nothing and 
then searching for [intuiting] a concept that simply does not have this inadequacy. Such a 
procedure would represent a departure from the path of logical necessity.  
 Rather, the concept of becoming is the recognition and affirmation of the 
deduction that has already taken place. The concept of becoming is the mutual transition 
of being into nothing and nothing into being. This concept has already emerged as soon 
as these transitions have been shown to be necessary. Therefore, becoming itself emerges 
necessarily as the speculative moment of the development.  
 In this way, the law of contradiction and the law of the unity of opposites are not 
imposed by Hegel on the development of the content from the outside. Nor are these laws 
used as criteria for judging after the fact whether the development follows the course that 
it ought to follow. However, the contradiction and the unity of opposites follow from the 
initial (necessary) application of the principle of non-contradiction at the beginning in 
precisely as Hegel explains that it will in the “More Precise Conception and Division of 
the Logic” discussed in section D of this chapter.  
 Now if thinking, in its activity as the understanding, once again supposes that it 
has, in the concept of becoming, reached the end of its labor, it will be disappointed. The 
application of its analytic principles to this concept—which it must apply in order to 
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develop its thinking further—will lead it to yet another contradiction, but this will yield 
yet another resolution of the contradiction and so on. This is the method by which the 
subsequent course of the Logic is supposed to proceed. However, as I have already noted, 
the demonstration that this is indeed what takes place in the subsequent course of 
development of the Logic is outside of the scope of the present study.  
 I have claimed that the principle of non-contradiction plays a central role in 
Hegel’s Logic from the very beginning. It may be objected that Hegel himself must not 
presuppose this principle in the “Doctrine of Being,” since Hegel does not introduce this 
principle explicitly until he gets to the “Doctrine of Essence.” Indeed, some of the quotes 
I have used in support of my interpretation come from that section in the Science of 
Logic.  
 However, my point is that, given Hegel’s claim that without the understanding 
there is “no fixity or determinacy in the domains either of theory or of practice,” the 
moment of the understanding and the principles of formal identity and non-contradiction 
must be presupposed from the beginning even if Hegel does not explicitly state these 
principles there.   
 This brings up yet another possible objection. That is, it could be argued that if I 
am right, that only compounds the problem because it implies that, in the “Doctrine of 
Being,” Hegel presupposes a principle he only deduces later in the “Doctrine of 
Essence,” so perhaps he is only pretends to deduce the principle later or else deceives 
himself that he does so. However, this objection would miss the point. There is no sleight 
of hand involved. As I have already explained, the Logic begins with a necessary 
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presupposition. Thinking is impossible without the moment of the understanding. 
However, the full articulation of what that moment is and involves requires mediation, a 
second, and the Logic must begin with what is first. It is thus necessary for it to begin 
with the application of principles that have not yet been fully articulated.  
 I will not go into detail here into the deduction of identity itself. In the present 
context, I believe it is sufficient to note (1) why the principle must be presupposed at the 
beginning and (2) why the subsequent explicit affirmation of this principle in the 
“Doctrine of Essence” does not imply that Hegel’s Logic begs the question. 
 The demand for a justification of a principle before it is used is related to what 
Hegel calls, in the Encyclopedia Logic, “the mistaken project of wanting to have 
cognition before we have any cognition.”292 He compares this project with “not wanting 
to go into the water before we have learned to swim.”293 In Hegel’s view, the Kantian 
philosophy falls into this error when it seeks the conditions of the possibility of 
knowledge rather than knowledge itself.   
 Hegel certainly acknowledges that “the forms of thinking should not be used 
without investigation,” but he points out that “this process of investigation is itself a 
process of cognition.”294 There is no way of investigating thinking without thinking. 
Instead of approaching the matter in that way, he insists that “the activity of thinking” 
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and the “critique” thereof “must be united within the process of cognition.”295 The kind 
of thinking that is capable of investigating itself, of “point[ing] out [its] own defects” and 
correcting them, is  called the “dialectic.”296 
 It is precisely because the deficiencies of certain forms of thought inevitably 
reveal themselves in self-contradictions that Hegel is able to begin by presupposing the 
(necessary) principles of identity and non-contradiction without worrying that his Logic 
is tainted by a presupposition that may turn out to be false. It does turn out to be 
relatively false, and it is his Logic that shows this.  
 Hegel ultimately subjects the formal principle of identity to such an investigation 
and shows that this principle itself contains a contradiction within it. Thus, far from 
undermining the subsequent development by presupposing the principle at the beginning, 
its shortcomings are demonstrated in an initial way in the contradiction that emerges in 
the thought of being in spite of the application of this principle at the beginning of the 
Logic. Thus, Hegel did not presuppose that the principle has absolute validity, but he also 
did not presuppose that it gave way to a contradiction either in itself or in the content to 
which it was applied.  
 On the other hand, those who proceed from the standpoint of the understanding 
consider formal identity to be “something true.”297 They insist that “identity is not 
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difference, but that identity and difference are different.”298 The characteristic activity of 
those who proceed from the standpoint of the understanding consists in separating 
determinations and holding them apart from one another and they have faith that this 
procedure will always produce results in line with their prejudices.  
 Consequently, they are blind to the fact that their position is self-contradictory. As 
Hegel points out, “in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is 
different” when they claim that “identity is different from difference.”299 Granted, they 
are saying it is different from difference, but they cannot do so without saying, at the 
same time, that identity itself contains difference. The fact that identity is different from 
difference is not just a claim about the nature of difference or something external to 
identity. It is a claim about “the nature of identity” itself300. Thus, those who cling to the 
standpoint of the understanding are correct when they claim that identity and difference 
are different, but they also succeed thereby in saying that identity and difference are not 
absolutely different, and, since it is impossible not to say both at once, both are correct. 
However, they do not recognize that what they are saying is self-contradictory or that by 
“clinging to” a false concept of identity as “unmoved” and absolutely distinct from 
difference “they thereby convert it into a one-sided determinateness which, as such, has 
no truth.”301 
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 It is important to note that Hegel does not conclude here that identity itself has no 
truth. What has no truth is the supposition that the identity subsists in absolute separation 
from difference. For this reason, Hegel claims that “true identity” is different from the 
“formal identity” of the understanding insofar as it is not just an empty tautology, but 
“contain[s] distinction” within it.302 
 What all of this implies is that identity is not simply presupposed in the “Doctrine 
of Being” and then reiterated uncritically in the “Doctrine of Essence.” Instead, it is 
refuted in both. That is, its relative inadequacy is demonstrated in both, though implicitly 
in the “Doctrine of Being” and explicitly in the “Doctrine of Essence.”  
G. Intellectual Intuition 
Since intellectual intuition (or “hyperintuition,” as Rosen calls it) plays a central role in 
the intuitionist interpretation of Hegel’s Logic, and since Hegel himself does think that 
there is such a thing as intellectual intuition, my defense of Hegelian necessity would not 
be complete without a discussion of what Hegel actually says about intellectual intuition, 
its role in his philosophy, and its relationship with the necessary development of the 
Logic.  
 In his discussion of intuition in the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel explains that 
“immediate or sensory consciousness,” which is sometimes falsely equated with intuition 
as such, “relates itself [only] to the immediate individuality of the object” without 
grasping in what the unity of that object consists. Inevitably, sensory consciousness views 
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the object as “a multiplicity of aspects” without comprehending the genuine, animating 
concept of the object.303 The problem with sensory consciousness is thus above all a 
problem with its form.  
  “Genuine,” or “mindful” or “intellectual,” intuition, on the other hand, Hegel 
explains, consists in “a totality, a cohesive fullness of determinations” and “apprehends 
the solid substance of the object.”304  
 According to Hegel, acquiring such an intuition 
 
requires that a man enter into relationship with the subject-matter with mind, with 
heart and soul, briefly in his entirety, that he stand in the centre of it and give it 
free play. Only when thinking is firmly grounded in intuition of the substance of 
the object can one, without deserting the truth, go on to consider the particular 
which is rooted in that substance, but becomes worthless straw when detached 
from it.305 
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According to Hegel, this holds true not only when it comes to the study of philosophy, 
but in the study of any and every subject matter. Hegel considers the example of “a 
talented historian,” who has studied his subject-matter closely and “has before him in 
vivid intuition the whole of the conditions and events he is to describe.”306 Such a vivid, 
cohesive whole is only possible on the basis of such study. Conversely, a person “who 
possesses no talent for the portrayal of history” and who fails to immerse himself in such 
a study, “confines himself to individual details” while “overlook[ing] the substantial.”307 
 Hegel insists that “in all branches of knowledge, and especially in philosophy too, 
one should speak from intuition of the subject-matter” because if “a solid intuition of the 
object is lacking from the outset or if it disappears again,” then the result will be that 
“reflective thinking loses itself in the consideration of the manifold, individualized 
determinations and relationships occurring in the object.”308 In that case,  
 
the separating intellect tears the object apart, even when it is a living creature, a 
plant or an animal, by its one-sided finite categories of cause and effect, external 
end and means, etc., and in this manner, despite all its clever ruses, fails to 
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comprehend the concrete nature of the object, to recognize the spiritual bond 
holding together all the individual details.309 
 
This one-sided reflective thinking is the sort of thinking engaged in by the understanding.  
 Conversely, someone who has transcended the standpoint of the understanding 
and achieved “the pure thinking of conceptual reason” has acquired “a perfectly 
determinate, genuine intuition” and this intuition is “only the solid form into which his 
completely developed cognition is concentrated again” in the form of “an internally 
articulated, systematic totality.”310 
 Thus, for Hegel, intellectual intuition is indeed very important, but as the result of 
the development of the science, not as what produces the result. Of course, the Logic 
produces various intermediate results, which are also concrete. It is above all the 
speculative moment that has the form of an intellectual intuition insofar as it too is an 
internally articulated systematic totality. Intellectual intuition is thus the speculative 
moment in the form of subjective cognition. 
H. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented my own interpretation what Hegel means when he says 
that the development of his Logic is necessary. The principle of non-contradiction plays a 
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central role in my interpretation because Hegel’s application of it leads to unavoidable 
contradictions that instantiate yet another principle, the principle of contradiction. This 
principle serves as a corrective to the inadequacy of the principle of non-contradiction, 
which violates itself by producing contradictions. Moreover, the principle of the unity of 
opposites, as I have called it, follows unavoidably from the fact that a second 
determination, contradicting a first, is a result of this first. The necessity of Hegel’s Logic 
is thus supposed to consist in a more rigorous application of the very same principles 
presupposed by the understanding than the understanding itself is capable of achieving. 
 I have based my interpretation throughout on a careful reading of Hegel’s texts, 
and have shown that it is borne out in the transitions at the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. 
Moreover, I have shown that Hegel’s aim is to transcend mystery in his elucidation of the 
basic determinations of cognition and the real world, and that the role of logical 
principles in his effort at such an elucidation is indeed not mysterious at all.  
 The reader has probably already noticed some of the ways in which my 
interpretation differs from those of Schelling, the intuitionists, and the anti-intuitionists. 
In the next chapter, Chapter 4, I make these differences explicit.  
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Chapter 4: The Demystification of Hegel’s Logic: An Answer to Hegel’s 
Critics and Defenders
A. Introduction 
In this chapter, I use my interpretation of Hegelian logical necessity, which I presented in 
Chapter 3, to address several closely related questions. Schelling, the intuitionists, and the 
anti-intuitionists ignore any textual evidence that does not accord with their 
interpretations. The refutation of their positions therefore consists above all in drawing 
attention to those passages that they ignore. This is what I have already sought to do in 
Chapter 3 in the course of elaborating my own interpretation. However, it is worth (1) 
drawing explicit attention to some of the major discrepancies between the interpretations 
presented by these critics and defenders of Hegel’s Logic and Hegel’s own texts, and (2) 
seeking an explanation of some of the deeper reasons for these discrepancies. Each of the 
sections in this chapter are aimed at accomplishing both of these goals. Section B of this 
chapter is devoted to answering Hegel’s more recent interpreters and section C is devoted 
to answering Schelling.  
 In section B, I first discuss the mystification of Hegel’s Logic by the intuitionists 
within the context of a broader tendency within Hegel scholarship to interpret Hegel from 
the standpoint of the understanding. I then argue that the deficiencies of intuitionism flow 
from a prejudice in favor of the understanding for which, Hegel indicates, dialectical and 
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speculative thinking is mysterious. Since anything beyond the understanding genuinely is 
mysterious for the understanding, the intuitionists’ adoption of the standpoint of the 
understanding would, from a Hegelian point of view, explain why they cannot help 
viewing the development of Hegel’s Logic as mysterious.  
 I then take Alexander Magee’s interpretation of Hegel’s Logic as an instructive 
example of a very different interpretation of Hegel’s Logic that is nevertheless similar to 
intuitionism in several important respects. This example is interesting not only because of 
the way it marries the standpoint of the understanding with mystery, but also because 
Magee, unlike the intuitionists, adopts this standpoint in an explicit effort to discredit the 
possibility of rational cognition of the world.  
 I then turn back to the intuitionists and address three major areas where, as I 
argue, they show a preference for the standpoint of the understanding at the expense of an 
accurate grasp of Hegelian necessity: (1) the question of intellectual intuition; (2) the 
question of the role of principles in Hegel’s Logic; and (3) the question whether Hegel’s 
Logic is viciously circular or begs the question. 
 In Chapter 2, I showed that the intuitionists present Hegel’s Logic as though 
intuition were responsible for its development. It Chapter 3, I showed that, for Hegel, 
conversely, a logical deduction rather than intellectual intuition produces the 
development. I also showed that, for Hegel, intellectual intuition is essentially a result 
rather than a mode of development. I also argued that intellectual intuition is the third or 
speculative moment of the concept in the form of subjective cognition in that it consists 
in an immediate concrete unity of thought determinations. Given all of this, I argue in the 
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present chapter that, when the intuitionists present the logical deduction as a whole as an 
intellectual intuition or series of intellectual intuitions, and they do so at the expense of 
the other two moments, and that just as Hegel himself explained, when the speculative 
moment is not grasped as a result, its emergence becomes incomprehensible and 
therefore mysterious. 
 In Chapter 2, I also showed that by denying that principles play any role in 
Hegel’s Logic, the intuitionists make it impossible to explain what Hegelian necessity is. 
In Chapter 3, I offered my interpretation of Hegelian necessity in terms of the role of 
logical principles in the development in Hegel’s Logic. Given all of this, I argue in the 
present chapter that the intuitionist rejection of the role of principles in the development 
of Hegel’s Logic is a consequence of their false supposition that either logical principles 
must be imposed externally on the subject matter of the Logic or else they must play no 
role there at all. While Houlgate and Rosen are correct in supposing that Hegel does not 
apply external criteria to the development of the Logic, they are incorrect in supposing 
that the principle of non-contradiction is such an external criterion.  
 In Chapter 2, I discussed the centrality of the question of presuppositionlessness 
in the intuitionist interpretation of Hegel’s Logic. I also discussed Houlgate’s claim that, 
in Hegel’s view, a self-critical philosopher must avoid begging the question, that is, 
reiterating the questionable content of its premises in its conclusion. In Chapter 3, I 
argued that, far from simply reiterating the content of contingently selected premises, the 
Logic proceeds from necessary premises to the equally necessary refutation of the 
inadequacy of these premises. Given all of this, I argue that, far from coming from a 
standpoint of radical self-criticism, the intuitionist approach to this question avoids a 
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serious confrontation with the presuppositions of formal logic. The intuitionists avoid 
addressing Hegel’s deduction of the necessary self-contradictions in the thoughts and 
concepts of the understanding. Indeed, it is striking how little the intuitionists have to say 
about contradictions in general. Presenting Hegel’s logic as a “transcendental logic” or an 
“ontological logic” in which the “observation” of “mutations” or “slippage” takes the 
place of logical deduction, Houlgate suppresses and conceals the contradictory (i.e., 
dialectical) content of the Logic. Having missed the real reason why Hegel’s Logic is not 
circular, namely that it consists in the dialectical refutation of premises rather than the 
formal reiteration of the content of these premises, he tries to defend Hegel against the 
charge of begging the question by appealing to its presuppositionlessness alone. 
 The consideration of the intuitionist approach to these three questions taken 
together shows that the intuitionist defense of Hegelian necessity fails above all because 
it fails to confront the standpoint of the understanding of which Hegel’s Logic is the 
refutation.  
 However, the anti-intuitionist effort to refute the immanent necessity of Hegel’s 
Logic therefore fails not only because its own conception of Hegelian necessity is 
textually inaccurate, but also because the intuitionist interpretation of Hegelian immanent 
necessity to which it counterposes itself is likewise textually inaccurate both in its 
approach to specific questions and it the overall orientation from which this approach 
flows.  
 This leaves only Schelling himself. In section C, I return once again to Schelling’s 
criticisms of Hegelian necessity and show that they too are based on a prejudice in favor 
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of the standpoint of the understanding. Not only does Schelling want to discredit Hegel’s 
thoroughgoing rationalism in order to leave room for something mysterious. Hegel’s 
Logic is also mystery to him because he is blinded to the dialectic by his own dogmatic 
adherence to the standpoint of the understanding. 
B. The Marriage of Mystery with the Standpoint of the Understanding 
As I discussed in Chapter 3, Hegel explains that, from the point of view of the 
understanding, only the thinking of the understanding itself is genuinely thinking at all. 
Consequently, the understanding can only be transcended by going beyond all thought. 
But whatever is beyond all thought is mysterious to thinking. Thus, from the standpoint 
of the understanding, anything that lies beyond itself is mysterious.  
 However, as I also explained in Chapter 3, Hegel insists that the understanding is 
mistaken in supposing that only its own thinking is genuinely thinking at all. Dialectical 
and speculative thinking (the thinking that grasps the dialectical and speculative moments 
of the concept) is beyond the understanding in the sense that it refutes the limited 
standpoint of the understanding. As Hegel explains, it could be called mystical in the 
sense that it is beyond the understanding, but not in the sense that it is genuinely 
mysterious to all thinking.  
 I raise this again here because many of the misinterpretations of Hegel’s Logic 
can themselves be traced back to a prejudice in favor of the standpoint of the 
understanding. Instead of presenting the dialectical and speculative moments as the 
refutation of the inadequacy of the (equally necessary) moment of the understanding, one 
tendency within Hegel scholarship reduces Hegel’s Logic to a combination of mysterious 
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insights on the one hand, and various operations of the understanding on the other. This 
tendency encompasses a considerable variety of interpretations. However, the problem 
with this approach is not the variety of ways in which it is carried out, nor even that it is 
critical of Hegel’s claim that only for the understanding is the transcendence of its 
standpoint something mysterious. The problem is rather that it uncritically presents 
Hegel’s philosophy within the confines of an absolute opposition of understanding and 
what lies beyond all thought, as though Hegel’s philosophy did not itself offer a 
refutation of this very opposition.  
 As a consequence, those critics and defenders of Hegel’s Logic who proceed from 
a prejudice in favor of the standpoint of the understanding miss the role of logical laws, 
including the law of contradiction, in its development. Far from refuting Hegel’s 
refutation of the standpoint of the understanding, these interpreters simply take for 
granted an absolute opposition of the understanding and a mysterious beyond, perhaps in 
some cases without even realizing they are doing so. 
 Alexander Magee’s interpretation of Hegel’s Logic is one example of an 
explanation of Hegel’s philosophy from the standpoint of the understanding. Although 
Magee is not concerned with the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s Logic in the way that 
the intuitionists are, I believe a brief discussion of his interpretation will shed helpful 
light on their view. 
 Once again, as in the case of Rosen and the other intuitionists, it is valuable to 
examine both obvious examples (Magee) and less obvious, more subtle examples of 
specific ways of thinking about Hegel’s Logic (the intuitionists). In the previous case, 
137 
where I compared the positions of Rosen and the other intuitionists on the question of the 
role of intuition in Hegel’s Logic, I explained that the examples in which it is more 
obvious what is going on can serve as a bridge to grasping how the same sort of thing is 
going on in the more subtle examples, while an examination of the more subtle examples 
as subtle examples of the same thing can reveal where they too diverge from Hegel’s 
texts. In the present case, I hope by means of this procedure to provide a stark illustration 
of a broader problem in Hegel interpretation that has proved to be a stumbling block even 
for vastly different interpretations. 
a. Alexander Magee’s Mystical Interpretation 
Magee takes the somewhat unorthodox position that mysticism, in particular 
Rosicrucianism and Hermeticism, had a significant influence on Hegel in his formulation 
of the Logic. Whereas most mystical doctrines hold that we must “embrace ‘mystery’” in 
order to transcend “the categories of the Understanding, or the ‘opposites’,” Magee 
explains, Hegel holds the opposite. Like the Hermeticists, Hegel believes that we can 
gain “discursive knowledge” of what transcends these opposites and ultimately 
“discursive knowledge of the nature of God.”311 
 Magee describes the general course of development of Hegel’s Logic follows: 
 
In Hegel’s thought, the tension between opposites is used as a stepping stone to go 
beyond the Understanding to a higher level of thought from which we can know, 
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in discursive, rational form, the actual nature of God or the Absolute. Hegel 
employs a logic of contradiction (dialectic) to articulate the ‘moments’ or aspects 
of this God, taken as an organic whole. Instead of merely pointing to an Absolute 
that transcends the oppositions of the Understanding, Hegel uses these oppositions 
to define the Absolute itself in terms of a system of moments in which each 
element depends upon every other, and each is what it is only in relation to the 
whole.312 
 
This description certainly bears a resemblance to the development of Hegel’s Logic as he 
explains it in the section on the “More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic.” 
However, the wording reveals a fundamental distortion of the content. According to 
Magee, Hegel “employs a logic of contradiction,” “uses” oppositions, and “uses” the 
“tension between opposites.”313 What is missing here is the role of necessity in the form 
of a logical deduction. Magee reads Hegel’s Logic as though the contradictions are not 
necessary but are merely a device introduced by Hegel to serve a specific purpose. 
However, Magee neither acknowledges nor attempts to refute Hegel’s position that there 
are necessary contradictions and a necessary resolution of these contradictions. Thus, if 
he does not quite present contradictions as “a kind of abnormality and a passing 
paroxysm of sickness” in the way that Hegel says the understanding tends to view them, 
neither does it occur to him to see them in any other way than contingent. This 
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misreading of Hegel only makes sense if Magee himself is proceeding uncritically from 
the standpoint of the understanding and assumes that everyone else must do so as well. 
 It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that, having argued to his satisfaction that 
Hegel’s thought is influenced by a type of mysticism, Magee goes on to suggests in a 
highly formalistic manner that one of the “larger implications” of this influence “for 
Hegel scholarship and for the history of ideas in general” is the supremacy of the 
irrational over the rational.314 Of course, the type of mysticism that Magee has attributed 
to Hegel does not, in Magee’s presentation, embrace mystery or the extra-rational at all, 
but this does not stop him from sweeping aside all such distinctions in his haste to use 
Hegel’s alleged mysticism to dismiss rationality itself. For Magee, if Hegel, the 
consummate rationalist, could learn anything at all from anyone who calls himself a 
mystic for any reason, or elaborate a philosophy that bears even a superficial resemblance 
to some mystical doctrine or other, then the case against reason itself is decisive: 
 
But if the very idea of the autonomy and progressive unfolding of reason has 
deeply irrational roots, then perhaps history is better understood as Heidegger 
said, not as an intelligible progression from superstition to reason, but merely as a 
random and contingent succession of superstitions, the most stubborn of which are 
those that present themselves as rational.315 
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Perhaps, Magee muses, we are mistaken is supposing that reason “is self-grounding and 
can therefore emancipate itself from and transcend unreason,” that “it can progress 
beyond the historical contingencies of its starting point.”316 
 What is striking above all about this defense of unreason and irrationality is its 
marriage with the standpoint of the understanding. Magee’s would-be refutation of 
Hegel’s credentials as a rationalist amounts to nothing more profound than the uncritical 
reiteration of the principle of identity, for which irrationality is irrationality. He asks us 
to accept as a matter of course that irrational roots or origins lead only to irrational 
consequences. Transcendence in a dialectical sense, consisting in the refutation of mere 
roots, is, in Magee’s view, simply impossible and to be dismissed without argument. Of 
course, Magee never actually specifies what is irrational in Hegel’s Logic. Nor does he 
attempt to refute Hegel’s refutation of the standpoint of the understanding. Indeed, Magee 
does not present himself as a defender of the understanding against dialectical and 
speculative thinking at all, but he nevertheless adopts its standpoint in his effort to defend 
mystery.  
b. The Intuitionists and the Standpoint of the Understanding 
Let us now return to the intuitionists and examine how they too bind the standpoint of the 
understanding with an intuitionistic and semi-mystical reading of Hegel’s Logic. Unlike 
Magee, they do not present themselves as opponents of rationalism or defenders of 
mystery. However, they exhibit a relatively consistent pattern of preference for the 
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standpoint of the understanding. Houlgate and Rosen, for example, consistently soften the 
critical edge of the dialectic. The inevitable consequence of this, if not the intention, is 
that their interpretation of many of the Hegel’s individual statements, which are actually 
sharply critical of the standpoint of the understanding, become incomprehensible. Thus, 
as I show, although the details of execution and even the motivations behind Magee’s, 
Rosen’s and Houlgate’s approaches to Hegel’s Logic are each quite different, the end 
results are similar: a marriage of mystification with an uncritical attitude toward the 
understanding. While it seems as though Houlgate must break from such a stance, since 
he denies that Hegel presupposes one of the central tenets of the understanding, the 
principle of non-contradiction, this is ultimately not the case. 
 I have already discussed the way in which intuitionism, in effect, portrays the 
development of Hegel’s Logic as mysterious. I showed in Chapter 2 that, despite 
Houlgate’s explicit denial that Hegel’s method amounts to a “mysterious power of 
dialectical insight or intuition” belonging only to “a privileged few,” his interpretation 
nevertheless demands that it remain mysterious why the Logic develops in the way that it 
does.317 As I pointed out there, the demand for radical openness contains in itself no 
criterion, available for public scrutiny, for judging whether one is being “open” enough 
such that a transition can be determined to be the product not of unconscious 
presuppositions but of a necessity immanent in the thought determinations themselves. 
Moreover, as I also pointed out there, Houlgate’s account of the development of Hegel’s 
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Logic rules out any explanation why one should accept that any given example of a 
Hegelian deduction is indeed an instance of logical necessity.  
 I now show that Rosen’s and Houlgate’s intuitionist reduction of Hegel’s logical 
deduction to what can only be described as mystical inspiration is bound up with a 
prejudice in favor of the standpoint of the understanding.  
i. Intellectual Intuition 
Intellectual intuition, as Hegel explains it, is not clearly the source of the necessary 
transitions in the Logic as the intuitionists present it. Rather, intellectual intuition grasps a 
concrete content that is essentially a result.  
 Moreover, not only does intellectual intuition not produce the development in 
Hegel’s presentation, but it is something completely different for Hegel than it is for the 
intuitionists. As Hegel presents them, the speculative moment and intellectual intuition 
both consist in an immediate concrete unity of determinations. Intellectual intuition is 
thus the speculative moment in the form of subjective cognition. Conversely, when the 
intuitionists reduce logical deduction to intellectual intuition, this moment thereby also 
loses its own specific content and becomes something mysterious or mystical instead.  
 Recall Houlgate’s use of Hegel’s claim that “nothing” is “the same empty 
intuition or thought (Anschauen oder Denken) as pure being.”318 According to Houlgate, 
this quote proves that, for Hegel, “pure thought” and “intellectual intuition” are the same 
thing. In making this claim Houlgate ignores Hegel’s distinction, in the Philosophy of 
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Mind, between sensory intuition, which “relates itself [only] to the immediate 
individuality of the object” and “genuine,” or “mindful” or “intellectual,” intuition, which 
consists in “a totality, a cohesive fullness of determinations” and “apprehends the solid 
substance of the object.”319 
 According to Hegel, the intuition of being (and nothing) is “empty,” however, so 
it is clearly not a “a totality, a cohesive fullness of determinations.”320 Therefore, the 
intuition of being is only intellectual in the most meager sense of the word.  
 In Chapter 2, I showed that although Houlgate in particular does not explicitly 
claim that intellectual intuition is responsible for the development of Hegel’s Logic, this 
is nonetheless his position. Hegel’s own definition of intellectual intuition as “a totality, a 
cohesive fullness of determinations” that is able to apprehend “the solid substance of the 
object” as a result of its immersion in the subject matter refutes this position as well.321 
The purpose of Hegel’s Logic may be the achievement of such an intellectual intuition, 
such an apprehension “of the solid substance of [its] object,” but it can achieve this aim 
only through logical deduction, and it is the nature of this logical deduction that Houlgate 
fails to explain. 
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 Recall that Houlgate never provides a definition of the nature of the necessity of 
Hegel’s logical deduction. Recall, moreover, according to Houlgate, the method of 
Hegel’s Logic consists in nothing more than a “self-critical openness of mind” or a 
“willingness to let.”322 Inasmuch as Houlgate does not specify and indeed denies that it is 
possible to specify the form that either this necessity or criticism take, his interpretation 
suppresses Hegel’s refutation of the standpoint of the understanding. 
ii. Principles and Laws 
The intuitionists deny that Hegel presupposes any principles or that his Logic involves 
the application of principles.  
 Recall that, in Chapter 2, I included a quote from Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Mind that Rosen uses to justify his thesis that Hegel’s Logic does not develop by means 
of logical inferences. Let us consider this passage once again: 
 
Argumentation [Räsonnieren] is freedom from its content and vanity towards it. 
What is required of it is the effort of giving up this freedom and, instead of being 
the arbitrary moving principle of the content, to sink its freedom into the content 
and to allow the content to move itself spontaneously according to its own 
nature—viz. the self as its own self—and to observe this movement. To refrain 
from intruding into the immanent rhythm of the notion and not to intervene 
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arbitrarily or with wisdom obtained from elsewhere is itself an essential moment 
of attention to the notion.323 
 
First of all, in invoking this quote, Rosen acknowledges something that Magee ignores, 
namely that, from Hegel’s point of view, the development of the Logic is not the product 
of a series of external operations but is immanent in the content itself. 
 Recall that in Rosen’s view, Hegel’s opposition to externally imposed “wisdom 
obtained from elsewhere” implies an opposition to justification through principles or 
laws, since the latter procedure is a form of “external discourse” that cannot “adequately 
capture” the development of Hegel’s Logic.324  
 Houlgate of course holds the same position. As I explained in Chapter 2, Houlgate 
insists that Hegel does not “assume that thought should be governed by the rules of 
Aristotelian logic or that the law of noncontradiction holds, or that thought is regulated 
by any principles or laws whatsoever” because, in Houlgate’s view, to do so would be to 
make an unjustified presupposition. Because Rosen and Houlgate view any principles or 
laws as necessarily external to the immanent development of the Logic, they think that 
such principles or laws must play no role whatsoever.  
 But why do Rosen and Houlgate suppose that principles or laws would have to be 
imposed externally? This is certainly the attitude of the understanding toward its 
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principles. In the passage quoted by Rosen, Hegel opposes the imposition of the 
standpoint of the understanding on the subject matter of the Logic. In general, a principle 
or law is imposed externally when the application of it is not a product of necessity.  
 According to Hegel, it is the understanding that applies principles or laws under 
circumstances when it is not strictly necessary to apply them. Recall, for instance, 
Hegel’s discussion of the retrospective necessity at work in a geometrical proof. Once the 
proof has been completed, it becomes clear why various lines or figures were drawn in 
the sequence that they were. However, there was no immanent necessity of introducing 
those lines or figures in that sequence, no necessity intrinsic in one line of drawing the 
next one.  
 The understanding elevates the principle or law of identity or else the principle or 
law of non-contradiction to the status of an absolute: it may not be violated at all under 
any circumstances, even if the violation itself is a product of the application of the law. 
The understanding stands in judgment of each and every step of an argument and forbids 
contradictions from entering explicitly anywhere regardless of the source of these 
contradictions. This is what Hegel opposes. However, the intuitionists seem to believe 
that since principles or laws can be applied externally, any and every application of a 
principle or law must constitute an external application thereof.  
 I contend that Hegel’s Logic is the counterexample to this supposition. As I have 
already discussed, if the Logic is to make an absolute beginning, this implies that it must 
begin with the one idea that does not contradict this concept, the thought of pure being. 
But beginning in this way involves abstracting and separating pure being from everything 
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else. In order genuinely to begin with pure being it is likewise necessary to presuppose 
that pure being is what it is and is not what it is not. Then the application of the principle 
does not take the form of an external imposition of a judgment. Rather, the application of 
the principle, itself a product of necessity makes the thought of pure being what it is. This 
is the activity of the understanding in its proper place. As Hegel explains and as we have 
already discussed, there is “no fixity or determinacy in the domains either of theory or of 
practice” without the understanding.325 This is illustrated by the fact that it is only 
possible to make progress, that is, to make the subsequent discovery that being is in fact 
nothing, if one first presupposes that it is only what it is and not what it is not, i.e., if one 
presupposes the principle of non-contradiction. Again, Hegel does not externally impose 
the law of contradiction, according to which “everything is inherently contradictory” on 
the content of his Logic.326 He does not use this principle to judge externally whether the 
Logic is taking the correct course. Rather, the principle is produced by the by the 
principles or laws of identity and non-contradiction, which it necessarily presupposes.  
 My point, in presenting my interpretation of Hegel’s Logic, was that that the 
principles themselves produce their own application. In a situation in which it is 
necessary to presuppose a certain principle, it would be absurd to claim that it ought not 
to be presupposed.  
 Hegel holds that thinking that grasps the truth contains these “laws” as 
“moments,” but they are not “fixed” and “constant” in the way that the standpoint of 
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“observing reason” conceives them.327 The law of identity produces the law of non-
contradiction and this produces the law of contradiction, which then produces the law of 
the unity of opposites. 
 It might be wondered whether, if these principles or laws are not external, it 
makes any difference at all whether we talk about the development of Hegel’s Logic in 
terms of them. If the development of Hegel’s Logic is immanent, would it not be what it 
is regardless of whether we ever talk about it in terms of principles or laws? Houlgate 
seems to think that any general observations that we might make about the course of 
development of the Logic might be correct but are not essential to the development itself. 
We might notice patterns after the fact, but the immanent development itself does not 
depend on us doing so.  
 Houlgate is correct that Hegel does make generalizations. As I have discussed, 
Hegel claims that the three moments of the concept belong to “everything logically real” 
or “everything true in general.”328 Houlgate is also most likely correct that Hegel 
composed the prefaces and introduction in which these generalizations appear after 
completing the body of the text of the Science of Logic or Encyclopedia.  
 As I have already argued, the laws or principles that determine the first moment of 
the concept must be presupposed for any progress at all to be made. The necessity of the 
development depends entirely on whether these principles are presupposed at the 
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beginning. Even though, at the beginning, these determinate principles cannot yet be 
articulated within the Logic itself, since they involve mediation, Hegel could not know 
that pure being was the necessary beginning without knowing that these principles are 
responsible for its necessity.  
 However, having once grasped the significance of the laws or principles of 
identity and non-contradiction in establishing the necessity of the contradiction that 
followed, Hegel would have to consider the significance of the contradiction that 
followed from the application of this principle on the level of principle as well. 
 That the application of the laws of identity and non-contradiction produced a 
contradiction shows that this principle is not the absolute truth in itself but is capable of 
giving way to its opposite. This is a significant result in even one instance, not a mere 
side issue. Of course, Hegel formulated the law of contradiction as a generalization, 
namely that “everything is inherently contradictory,” but his point was not so much that 
he had observed that there was an interesting pattern of contradiction in a number of 
things that he had observed, but that contradictions are a product of a necessity inherent 
in things.329   
 The moments of the concept should not be viewed as nothing more than an 
interesting pattern, the way that we would view shapes we perceive in the clouds as 
interesting patterns that in no way had any bearing on their essence. Grasping the 
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necessity of the transitions from being to nothing to becoming requires a precise 
characterization of the role of principles in these transitions.  
 The end result of the intuitionists’ failure to acknowledge the fact that Hegel 
begins by presupposing the principle of non-contradiction is that they suppress Hegel’s 
dialectical refutation of this principle. Houlgate, for example, never discusses the 
principle of contradiction at all. The intuitionists thereby exhibit an irrational bias in 
favor of the standpoint of the understanding.  
iii. Vicious Circularity and Begging the Question 
In focusing on the alleged fact that, at the beginning, Hegel withholds judgment on the 
law of non-contradiction, Houlgate manages to suppress Hegel’s criticism of the 
standpoint of the understanding and its dogmatic adherence to the principle of non-
contradiction. It is only because Hegel does presuppose the law of non-contradiction that 
he is able to refute it, since the application of this law itself produces the contradiction.  
 Moreover, as I have already explained, a prejudice in favor of formal identity is 
evinced in the effort of the intuitionists to rescue Hegel’s Logic from the charge of 
vicious circularity. Hegel’s dialectical reasoning, on the other hand, does not merely 
uncritically reiterate its premises (or presuppositions), but deduces from them a 
contradiction that demonstrates the relative inadequacy of those very premises (or 
presuppositions). It consists in the refutation of the relative adequacy of necessary 
presuppositions. 
 This brings us back to the question of what Hegel’s Logic does and what it does 
not presuppose. In beginning with pure being, Hegel makes what he claims is a necessary 
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beginning. Moreover, as I mentioned in section B, above, Hegel himself calls the 
beginning a presupposition. I would suggest that it is a presupposition in the same sense 
that the first moment, the moment of the understanding, always takes the form of a 
presupposition. It is presupposed (vorausgesetzt), that is, supposed or posited (gesetzt) in 
advance (voraus) of its refutation. It is the moment of fixity and determinacy that 
precedes the dialectical moment of contradiction and transition.   
 Houlgate believes that Hegel may not even presuppose the principle of non-
contradiction if his Logic is going to be presuppositionless because he thinks that 
presupposing this principle would make Hegel’s Logic viciously circular. For related 
reasons, according to Houlgate, Hegel’s Logic should not be judged by the standards of 
formal logic when it comes to whether he should presuppose the law of non-contradiction 
in the way that formal logic does. As Houlgate puts it, judging his Logic by presupposed 
standards would beg the question of the correctness of these standards, and “if there is 
one thing that a truly critical philosopher may not do, in Hegel’s view, it is ‘beg the 
question.’”330  
 However, there is an ambiguity in Houlgate’s presentation of this issue. 
Presuppositions (or premises) as such, whether on the part of Hegel’s critics or Hegel 
himself, do not beg the question. It is the method of reasoning from those presuppositions 
(or premises) that either begs the questiA<on or not.  
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 In formal deductive reasoning, the form and the content are indifferent to one 
another. All formal reasoning is viciously circular and “begs the question” inasmuch as 
its conclusion merely uncritically reiterates the content of its premises (or 
presuppositions). It purports to provide proof of some conclusion or other but it is only 
able to do so because that very same content was already present in the premises. 
 Hegel’s dialectical reasoning, on the other hand, does not merely uncritically 
reiterate its premises (or presuppositions), but deduces from them a contradiction that 
demonstrates the relative inadequacy of those very premises (or presuppositions). It 
consists in the refutation of the relative adequacy of necessary presuppositions. For 
example, Hegel does not presuppose the universal applicability of the law of non-
contradiction under all circumstances, but he does begin by presupposing that it is 
applicable at the beginning and, indeed, that it must be applied at the beginning. The 
subsequent reasoning from this very law refutes the law. Since Hegel’s dialectical logic 
does not behave uncritically toward its premises or presuppositions, since it does not 
merely reiterate the same content once again in the conclusion, it does not beg the 
question. 
 Houlgate and his fellow intuitionists, on the other hand, base their entire defense 
of Hegel’s Logic on the supposition that it simply does not have any presuppositions at 
all. However, as we have seen, this cannot be what Hegel means when he talks about the 
presuppositionlessness of the Logic, since he himself calls the first thought, being, a 
presupposition. Moreover, if being is a presupposition of the refutation that follows it, 
then every definite, finite thought determination that comes after being in the 
development of Hegel’s Logic is also a presupposition of its refutation. In that case 
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Hegel’s Logic is full of presuppositions, though it also consists in the successive 
refutation of these presuppositions. When Hegel claims that the Logic must be 
presuppositionless, all he means is that it should have no unnecessary presuppositions 
and that it should begin with a presupposition that is truly the first one.  
 The intuitionists take it as a given that if Hegel presupposes anything, including 
the principle of non-contradiction, his Logic will be viciously circular. This supposition 
blinds them to Hegel's consistent application of the principle of non-contradiction. 
Together with their presentation of an intuitive mode of development of Hegel's Logic, 
this supposition amounts to a denial of the logical character of the Logic. This is the 
fundamental reason why the intuitionist defense of its logical necessity fails. As I have 
shown, contrary to Houlgate, dialectical logical necessity is non-circular not because it 
avoids presuppositions—and thereby thought itself—but because it is the immanently 
necessary self-refutation and correction of the relative inadequacy of its own necessary 
presuppositions.  
 Houlgate’s emphasis on the presuppositionlessness of the Logic harkens back to 
what Hegel calls “the mistaken project of wanting to have cognition before we have any 
cognition,” which I discussed in the previous chapter.331 Rather than appealing to the 
presuppositionlessness of the Logic as a condition of the possibility of thinking that is 
already beyond reproach, Hegel insists that thinking subject itself to investigation. 
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 Conversely, notwithstanding the intuitionists’ repeated references to the role of 
“self-criticism” in Hegel’s Logic, they reduce Hegel’s method to the essentially uncritical 
observation (or intuition) of the “mutations” of “categories” in consciousness. They 
provide no criterion, no principle, by which these mutations could be distinguished from 
a mere stream of consciousness.  
 In their approach to Hegel’s Logic, the intuitionists thus fail to address the role of 
contradiction in the development, substituting their own version of an empirical 
development for the dialectical one that Hegel presents. Houlgate and Rosen, for 
example, present the development of Hegel’s Logic as a product of “observation” without 
providing a criterion or method for determining how or why this observation is supposed 
to be distinct from the observation of the contents of consciousness.   
 The intuitionists thereby evince a prejudice (conscious or unconscious) in favor of 
the understanding. From the point of view of the understanding, as Hegel explains, 
contradiction is always “a kind of abnormality and a passing paroxysm of sickness,” not 
an essential and necessary moment of the development of everything.332 The intuitionists 
do not attempt to refute Hegel’s position on contradiction. They simply ignore it. On the 
part of the intuitionists, it is perhaps symptomatic of a certain embarrassment in the face 
of the something that they too view as “abnormal” or “sick,” but which Hegel presents, 
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with a straight face as it were, as a necessary moment “in all objects of all kinds, in all 
representations, concepts, and ideas.”333  
 But perhaps this characterization of Houlgate’s reaction to Hegel’s dialectical 
moment will seem too harsh to some. After all, Houlgate is correct when he claims that 
any “violat[ion]" of the law of non-contradiction on Hegel’s part would not be a result of 
his decision “to abandon it” but of the fact that “thought proves not to be completely 
governed by that law.”334 This would seem to imply that Houlgate is not too embarrassed 
about the way that Hegel “violates” the law of non-contradiction to acknowledge Hegel’s 
deduction of the relative inadequacy of this law.  
 However, the way that Houlgate acknowledges this once again evinces his 
prejudice in favor of the understanding. Houlgate either does not notice or does not 
acknowledge that Hegel proves that the law of non-contradiction does not hold, that it is 
necessarily false, under certain circumstances, i.e., that he refutes the law, its 
absoluteness and universality. But since Hegel has to presuppose the law in order to 
begin the logical deduction in his Logic, he can only refute it once he has presupposed it. 
However, this only demonstrates that the analytic principles of the understanding are 
relatively inadequate, not that they are absolutely inadequate. They are not absolutely 
inadequate because thinking at all requires their application. However, they are also not 
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absolutely adequate because they are themselves responsible for the emergence of the 
contradiction.  
c. The Case against Intuitionism and Anti-Intuitionism 
Recall that, in Chapter 2, I showed that intuitionism fails in its defense of Hegelian 
immanent necessity insofar as it both fails to define this necessity and presents the 
development of Hegel’s Logic in such a way that it appears to be the mysterious product 
of intuition, which no one would be obligated rationally to find the least bit convincing. 
In Chapter 3, I argued that Hegel’s Logic develops through logical principles and that its 
necessity of each of the other principles flows from his application of the principle of 
non-contradiction. 
 In this chapter I have argued that the underlying reason why the intuitionists fail 
to define Hegelian necessity in terms of logical principles is that they adopt an uncritical 
attitude toward the standpoint of the understanding. This attitude is evident in their 
approach to three fundamental questions. Once again, these questions are (1) the question 
of intellectual intuition; (2) the question of the role of principles in Hegel’s Logic; and (3) 
the question whether Hegel’s Logic is viciously circular or begs the question. The 
consideration of the intuitionist approach to these three questions taken together shows 
that the intuitionist defense of Hegelian necessity fails above all because it fails to 
confront the standpoint of the understanding of which Hegel’s Logic is the refutation.  
 Despite their trenchant criticisms of intuitionism, the anti-intuitionists, for their 
part, also fail to provide an accurate definition of Hegelian necessity. The anti-intuitionist 
position that Hegel’s Logic does not develop in accordance with immanent logical 
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necessity, but some form of narrational or retrospective “necessity” instead, has no basis 
in Hegel’s texts. Instead, it presents itself as a straightforward alternative to intuitionism 
and the failure of the latter to establish the immanent necessity of the Logic by means of 
intuition. Apart from the fact that Hegel himself denies that logical necessity has a 
retrospective character, and explicitly affirms that it has an immanent character, the anti-
intuitionists also conflate the claim that the development of Hegel’s Logic is immanently 
necessary with the presentation of this development as a product of intuition. Since the 
intuitionist defense of immanent necessity fails, the anti-intuitionists conclude that no 
defense of it can succeed. However, I have shown that Hegelian immanent necessity, 
correctly conceived, is not a product of intuition at all. In this way, my refutation of 
intuitionism in this chapter and in Chapter 2 and the textual evidence I presented for my 
interpretation of Hegelian logical necessity in Chapter 3 serve to refute the anti-
intuitionist position on Hegelian necessity as well.  
 Before moving on to Schelling, I think it is important to note that the result of my 
refutation of intuitionism has not been purely negative. Rather, the thorough dissection of 
the problems with Houlgate’s intuitionism has served an important purpose. It has 
revealed the alternatives. If we deny that Hegel’s Logic presupposes anything at all, 
including the principle of non-contradiction, then it is not possible both to defend 
Hegelian necessity and explain what it is. But if we cannot explain what it is, all that is 
left is the assurance that it is. This is why, despite the ambivalence of Houlgate and some 
of the other intuitionists on the question of intuition, they inevitably end up presenting it 
as the product of an inexplicable power that is indistinguishable from intuition. This not 
only contradicts Hegel’s own position on the role of intuition, but also contradicts the 
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spirit of Hegel’s Logic, which is the positive refutation of the standpoint of the 
understanding. 
 With this in mind, I now turn back to Schelling and show that his criticisms of 
Hegelian necessity, like the intuitionist interpretation of the latter, are grounded in a 
prejudice in favor of the standpoint of the understanding. Hegel’s Logic is ultimately a 
mystery to Schelling because he is blinded to the dialectic by his own dogmatic 
adherence to the standpoint of the understanding, he too misses the role of logical 
principles in the development of Hegel’s Logic. 
C. An Answer to Schelling 
As I explained in Chapter 1, Schelling hopes to refute Hegel’s claim that his Logic has an 
absolutely necessary development from start to finish by showing, or at least suggesting, 
that Hegel unconsciously sets out with various presuppositions that he subsequently 
makes explicit in the course of the Logic.  
 In this section, I argue that my interpretation of Hegelian logical necessity 
successfully refutes Schelling’s criticisms of the latter, whereas intuitionism fails to do 
so. So far, rather than countering Schelling’s claims about Hegel’s presuppositions 
directly, I have focused my defense of Hegelian necessity on elaborating an interpretation 
of it that does not suffer from the weaknesses of the intuitionist interpretation. 
 On the one hand, I have shown that presuppositions do not represent for Hegel the 
threat that Schelling and the intuitionists believe they do. Both Schelling and the 
intuitionists fail to realize that it is the method of reasoning from presuppositions (or 
premises) that either begs the question or not. If the conclusion simply reiterates these 
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presuppositions or premises, then the reasoning is viciously circular, and this begs the 
question. However, if the reasoning is dialectical, it consists in the refutation of 
presuppositions or premises. Since Hegel’s Logic consists in the refutation of premises, 
even if it turned out that Hegel does presuppose everything that Schelling claims he 
presupposes, this would not automatically imply that Hegel fails to refute the 
inadequacies of all of these presuppositions in the course of his Logic.  
 Conversely, neither Schelling nor the intuitionists attempt to refute Hegel’s 
presentation of the emergence of the dialectical and speculative moments. Perhaps on 
Schelling’s part this is symptomatic of his inability to come up with of any sort of 
adequate rejoinder in defense of the understanding. 
 Recall that Schelling, like Magee, is an explicit opponent of rationalism. Like 
Magee, he is motivated by a desire to undermine Hegel’s claim that there is nothing that 
is in principle inaccessible to the human mind. This alone does not make him either right 
or wrong about Hegelian necessity, but it is worth noting because it suggests that like 
Magee, and also like the intuitionists, Schelling’s own position on mystery is bound up 
with a preference for the standpoint of the understanding.  
 I would now like to focus more closely on a few of Schelling’s criticisms. The 
reader will recall that, in Schelling’s presentation, Hegel’s presuppositions take the form 
of (1) a merely adventitious beginning, and (2) an unconsciously presupposed aim (a 
concept of determinate being) derived from his previous habits of thought, which take the 
form of (a) unproven logical forms adopted from other philosophers and concepts taken 
from everyday life and (b) concepts formed with the help of empirical intuition.  
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a. The Adventitious Beginning 
Unlike some of Hegel’s recent interpreters, Schelling was well aware that Hegel claimed 
that the beginning of his Logic was necessary. However, Schelling invented a contingent, 
external explanation for this beginning that contradicts this claim without establishing 
any basis for this explanation in Hegel’s texts. Indeed no such basis exists. 
 Recall once again that, as I explained in Chapter 1, in Schelling’s account, Hegel 
thinks that the thought with which his Logic begins, pure being, is necessary because it is 
absolutely general in the sense that “nothing could exclude itself from this concept.”335 
This explanation is nowhere to be found in either the Science of Logic or the 
Encyclopedia Logic.  
 Recall, in addition, that Schelling claims that Hegel’s beginning, being, is “pure 
certainty itself.”336 However, this is not at all how Hegel explains the necessity of the 
beginning. As I explained in Chapter 3, Hegel rejects various beginnings that other 
philosophers have selected on the grounds that they are supposed to be “strictly certain,” 
or “absolutely true.”337 Recall that Hegel’s objection to such beginnings as “I = I, as 
absolute Indifference or Identity” or “intellectual intuition” is not that they are not 
general enough or not certain enough, but that all of these beginnings are mediated.338 All 
                                                          
335 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139. 
336 Schelling, History of Modern Philosophy, 139. 
337 Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, 137. 
338 Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, 137. 
161 
of these beginnings are mediated and “mediation consists in having already left a first 
behind, to go on to a second, and in a going forth from moments that are distinct.”339 In 
other words, mediation presupposes immediacy. There is no mediation without 
immediacy. But to be determinate is likewise to contain mediation and to have left 
indeterminacy behind. Therefore, in the same way, determinacy presupposes 
indeterminacy. Thus, for Hegel, the beginning is necessary insofar as the very concept of 
the beginning implies what the beginning must be: pure being. If we accept Hegel’s 
demand for an absolute beginning of the Logic, we will have to admit that any other 
beginning than pure being would involve a contradiction with the concept of an absolute 
beginning.  
 However, Schelling never grapples with Hegel’s own explanation of the necessity 
of the beginning. Instead, Schelling argues that it is impossible for Hegel (or anyone else) 
to begin with the idea of pure being because all being is determinate being, so there is no 
such thing as pure being, and therefore too Hegel must presuppose determinate being in 
order to have an idea of being at all.  
 But when Schelling insists that there is no pure being, if what he really means that 
there are no determinate instances of being that are not instances of a type of being 
(essential or objective), since to be an instance is to be distinguished from other instances 
and thereby determined as such, then Schelling certainly would be correct as far as this 
goes. However, this would not at all imply that the thought of pure being itself is 
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nonsensical, only that the thought of an instance of a type of pure being is nonsensical 
because determinate being is not pure being. 
 On the other hand, if Schelling is attacking the idea of pure being for its intrinsic 
inadequacy, its emptiness, i.e., its intrinsically contradictory character, then Hegel 
himself certainly agrees that it is inadequate, but this is something that has to be 
demonstrated, not simply assumed at the outset.  
 As I explained in Chapter 3, Hegel shows that insofar as we have a concept of an 
absolute beginning, we must also have an idea of pure being. A concept of determinate 
being follows from the inadequacy of the idea of pure being. Thus, from the point of view 
of Hegel’s Logic, it is really Schelling who, in conceiving determinate being, is 
presupposing pure being without acknowledging that he is doing so. 
b. The Presupposed Aim 
Recall that Schelling tries to refute Hegel’s claim that the development of his Logic is 
necessary by arguing that Hegel presupposes the aim of the Logic. 
 However, the situation is actually the reverse. Schelling’s supposition that it even 
matters whether Hegel presupposes the aim of the Logic actually follows from his prior 
assumption that Hegel’s Logic is not a product of logical necessity at all. That this is the 
case follows from the meaning of logical necessity. If Hegel’s Logic were a product of a 
necessary development, it would not matter at all what Hegel might hope the result of this 
development would be. The result would be whatever it was regardless of his wishes one 
way or the other. In particular, if Hegel’s subjective wishes about the end result of his 
deduction coincided with such a necessary development, this would not make the 
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development any less a product of necessity. Psychoanalysis is not philosophical 
refutation. 
 Thus, in pointing out that Hegel’s Logic ends in the result Hegel desired, what 
Schelling succeeds in providing is not so much a refutation of the necessity of Hegel’s 
Logic as an explanation of how it came about, assuming at the outset that it could not 
have been the product of a necessary development. Perhaps, as I have already suggested, 
Schelling is simply blind to the role of logical principles in the development of Hegel’s 
Logic because, proceeding from the standpoint of the understanding, their development is 
mysterious to him. Schelling believes Hegel’s Logic is not a product of immanent 
necessity because he does grasp what kind of necessity is supposed to be at work there 
c. Presupposed Concepts and Intuitions 
Recall, once again, that Schelling discusses the nature and origins of the knowledge he 
believes Hegel presupposes, which he believes consists in abstractions produced by 
empirical intuition, concepts of everyday life, and logical forms developed by other 
philosophers. Again, in Schelling’s view, the concepts found in Hegel’s Logic cannot be 
a product both of a necessity immanent in the concepts themselves and a knowledge of 
empirical reality and socially developed forms of thought, and since they are a product of 
the latter, they cannot be a product of the former. 
 Recall, in addition, that Schelling claims Hegel presupposes that a sentence such 
as ‘Pure being is nothing’ makes sense even though he also refuses to specify whether 
164 
this “is” is supposed to signify tautology or, conversely, predication.340 Schelling is also 
upset that when Hegel makes the claim that “Pure being is nothing” he has not “proved 
anything about the meaning of this is.”341  
 I would contend Hegel has in mind not so much tautology as identity. As I have 
already explained at length, identity is, according to Hegel, the principle of the 
understanding, which must be presupposed implicitly in order for the Logic to make its 
beginning. Later in the Logic, in the “Doctrine of Essence,” Hegel subjects both formal 
predication and formal identity to criticism. Thus, Schelling is right that Hegel 
presupposes identity at the beginning of the Logic, but he does so because logically he 
must. Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter 3, he subjects formal identity to criticism in the 
“Doctrine of Essence,” or, far from simply unquestioningly assuming that the principle of 
identity is absolutely true, he deduces a self-contradiction from the formal concept of 
identity and on this basis corrects the formal concept of it.  
 However, even if I am right that Hegel presupposes the laws of identity and non-
contradiction and Schelling and the intuitionists are wrong in supposing the contrary, one 
still may doubt whether dialectical necessity is capable of producing precisely those 
logical forms developed by other philosophers or those everyday concepts that appear to 
be formed with the help of empirical intuition. I take up Schelling’s final charge in Part 2, 
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where I consider a related objection to the necessity of Hegel’s Logic offered by 
Trendelenburg.  
d. A Guarantee against Arbitrariness and the Mere Appearance of Necessity 
Recall, once again, that Schelling does not believe that Hegel has any means of 
distinguishing necessity from its “mere appearance.”342 Schelling apparently assumes, 
like the intuitionists, that since Hegel insists that the Logic is presuppositionless, he is not 
in a position to appeal to any principles in distinguishing necessity from its appearance.  
 Because my interpretation of Hegelian necessity includes a definition of what 
Hegel means by logical necessity, it avoids this problem. Again, an instance of deduction 
is necessary whenever it results from an application of the principle or law of non-
contradiction to the content under consideration. This definition provides a criterion for 
distinguishing necessity from its mere appearance and is based on a careful reading of 
Hegel’s texts. 
 Recall, in addition, that, in Schelling’s view, a “real logic” that contains the same 
concepts and logical forms as Hegel’s Logic could be produced “in ten different ways.”343 
Schelling believes that, since Hegel has no way of distinguishing necessity from its mere 
appearance, one could come up with ten different accounts of the supposed genesis of the 
same concepts and logical forms and each of these accounts would be worth just as much 
(or as little) as any of the others, including Hegel’s own. 
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 Schelling evidently does not agree with Hegel that there are necessary 
contradictions and he probably believes that Hegel arbitrarily introduces the concept that 
is supposed to resolve a given instance of a contradiction. This is certainly the view 
suggested by a great many Hegel interpretations. Indeed, White and Magee hold this 
view.  
 It has of course not been possible for me to show within the confines of this study 
that every resolution of every contradiction that arises in the course of Hegel’s Logic is 
itself necessary. However, I have shown this in Chapter 3 in case of the concept of 
becoming. I showed there that the unity, namely becoming, that follows from the 
contradiction (Being is nothing and nothing is being.) is not imposed from above on the 
thoughts of being and nothing but is simply that in which the mutual transition of being 
and nothing into one another consists. There is thus only one immediate way in which the 
first contradiction in Hegel’s Logic can be resolved as well as only one way that the 
Logic can begin. 
H. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have drawn explicit attention to some of the major discrepancies 
between the interpretations of Hegel’s Logic presented by Schelling, the intuitionists and 
anti-intuitionists and Hegel’s own texts. I have also offered an explanation of some of the 
deeper reasons behind these discrepancies.  
 First, I discussed the mystification of Hegel’s Logic by the intuitionists within the 
context of a broader tendency within Hegel scholarship to interpret Hegel from the 
standpoint of the understanding. I argued that the deficiencies of each of these 
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interpretations flow from a prejudice in favor of the understanding for which, as Hegel 
indicates, dialectical and speculative thinking is mysterious. Since anything beyond the 
understanding genuinely is mysterious for the understanding, the intuitionists’ adoption 
of the standpoint of the understanding serves to explain, from a Hegelian point of view, 
why they cannot help viewing the development of Hegel’s Logic as a product of a 
mysterious power of intuition.  
 Next, I argued that there are three major areas where intuitionism shows a 
preference for the standpoint of the understanding at the expense of an accurate grasp of 
Hegelian necessity: (1) the question of intellectual intuition; (2) the question of the role of 
principles in Hegel’s Logic; and (3) the question whether Hegel’s Logic is viciously 
circular or begs the question. 
 After that, I argued that the anti-intuitionist interpretation of Hegelian necessity as 
“retrospective” or “narrational,” which is textually inaccurate, also falsely equates 
Hegelian immanent necessity with the intuitionist interpretation of the latter.  
 Finally, I showed that Schelling, like the intuitionists, criticizes Hegelian 
necessity from the standpoint of the understanding. Hegel’s Logic is mystery to him 
because he is blinded to the dialectic by his own dogmatic adherence to this standpoint. 
Consequently, he too misses the role of logical principles in the development of Hegel’s 
Logic. He is critical of Hegelian necessity because, like the intuitionists, he does not 
know what it is.  
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Part 2
Chapter 5: Trendelenburg’s Criticisms of Hegelian Logical Necessity 
A. Introduction 
In this Chapter, I introduce Trendelenburg’s criticism of Hegelian necessity, and explain 
how it is grounded in a Kantian perspective on the relationship between categories and 
intuitions. I also take note of the similarity of Trendelenburg’s criticism with some of the 
points made by Schelling. 
According to Trendelenburg, Hegel’s position on the source of the concepts and 
transitions in his Logic is fundamentally inconsistent. On the one hand, Trendelenburg 
observes, the Logic is supposed to be an absolutely necessary, logical deduction, a 
product of pure thought. On the other hand, he also observes that Hegel himself claims 
that the Logic presupposes experience in general and the empirical sciences in particular. 
Trendelenburg insists that Hegel cannot have it both ways. He must choose one or the 
other. Either the logic is a product of pure thought, independent of experience, or else it 
must be deduced from experience.  
However, Trendelenburg finds the first alternative entirely unconvincing. He 
insists that the concept of becoming is based on the empirical concept of motion. Hegel’s 
and everyone else’s concept of becoming must, in his view, come from experience 
originally. Like Schelling, Trendelenburg believes that one has to have an empirical 
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intuition of nature before one can formulate concepts that correspond to what is to be 
found there. As Schelling insists, abstractions cannot “be taken for realities, before that 
from which they are abstracted.”344 
Trendelenburg argues that because Hegel neglects Kant’s absolute distinction 
between a priori knowledge, propositions, and structures of consciousness—those that 
belong to consciousness independently of all experience—and the a posteriori 
propositions, knowledge and structures of consciousness—those that it gains only as a 
result of experience—Hegel’s attempt at a necessary, a priori deduction of the concept of 
becoming fails. 
After I present Trendelenburg’s central criticism of Hegel’s Logic, I briefly 
review Kant’s stance on the difference between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, 
propositions, and structures of consciousness in order further to elucidate the position that 
Trendelenburg defends. 
Looking forward, in Chapter 6, I present Houlgate’s attempt at a defense of 
Hegelian necessity against the criticism of it that it depends on a posteriori knowledge. 
Houlgate’s defense consists in making the case that Hegel’s Logic is indeed an a priori 
deduction of the sort that Trendelenburg thinks it cannot possibly be.  
Then, in Chapter 7, I present Hegel’s own explanation of the relationship between 
a priori and a posteriori knowledge and show that both Trendelenburg’s criticism and 
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Houlgate’s attempt at a defense of the a priori character of Hegel’s Logic are based on a 
misreading of Hegel’s Logic. 
B. Trendelenburg’s Dilemma 
Trendelenburg explains that, in Hegel’s view, divine reason is absolutely first, and 
“dialectical motion is nothing other than self-grasping reason.”345 Consequently, 
Trendelenburg insists, “the entire cycle (Kreislauf) that it describes signifies a priori 
knowledge.”346 That is, according to Trendelenburg, Hegel thinks that everything is 
intrinsically rational, including both human experience, and the divine reason 
presupposed by human experience. Consequently, Hegel simply ignores or forgets 
“whether and how” the concepts of his logic “rest on preceding experience.”347 
However, Trendelenburg points out, Hegel also “admits” that the dialectic 
“presupposes the empirical sciences.”348 But if that is the case, Trendelenburg reasons, 
then the dialectic “also presupposes their manner of justification, without which they 
themselves are nothing.”349 Consequently, a method that is “supposedly absolute” thereby 
actually “rests on a foreign foundation.”350 
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Indeed, Trendelenburg remarks, although Hegel admits that the dialectic 
“presupposes the empirical sciences,” he fails to show “where the dialectical method 
takes up into itself the material won by the empirical sciences.”351 In Trendelenburg’s 
view, it would indeed have been simply impossible for Hegel to do this because “there 
remains no entrance open to that.”352 There is simply no way for an “absolute method” to 
transform a “foreign foundation” into something of its own, Trendelenburg insists, and 
this makes it impossible for Hegel to show “how the methods of the dialectic and the 
empirical sciences merge into one another in order to constitute a unity.”353 
This whole situation creates “a serious dilemma” for the Hegelian dialectic: 
 
Either the dialectical development is independent and determined only by itself; 
then it must actually know everything from its own self. Or it presupposes the 
finite sciences and empirical knowledge; then the immanent progress and the 
seamless connection is broken by what is taken up externally; and it behaves 
uncritically toward experience at that. The dialectic may choose. We see no third 
possibility.”354  
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Indeed, in Trendelenburg’s view, the problem with the “foreign foundation” of the 
dialectic is actually even more fundamental that this. The problem is not simply that the 
dialectic cannot appropriate the discoveries of the empirical sciences and incorporate 
them in a seamless way into its own movement.  Rather, Hegel’s dialectic cannot provide 
an immanent derivation of even the most basic thought determinations of the Logic 
without relying on a representation produced by the mind from an empirical intuition.  
For example, Trendelenburg insists that because pure being is devoid of content, it 
cannot in and of itself serve as the impulse for any sort of development, and it is 
consequently incapable of producing the concept of becoming. He explains his position 
as follows: 
 
Pure being is empty being. There is nothing in it to intuit, nothing in it to think; 
and being and nothing have become equal in it. Therefore, thought determines 
itself to the concept in which the one goes over into the other. But this subsequent 
“therefore” does not follow at all.  Pure being is the empty, and the empty the 
pure. In this complete equalization, every impulse to progress or transition is 
expired. Logical reflection of the equality is realized as a real unity. Who would 
believe in becoming, if it only came from there?355  
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Therefore, Trendelenburg insists, even though Hegel wants to remain in the “simplicity” 
of “pure thought,” his thought is forced to go “beyond itself.”356 In the very “first step” 
beyond the empty being, thought “has grown together with a representation, in which one 
recognizes space and time as moments.”357 Because it combines itself in this way with a 
representation, Hegel’s thought is then no longer “pure thought, completely unchained 
from external being.”358 
In general, Trendelenburg explains, “intuition intervenes where the dialectic 
reaches its end.”359 That is, Hegel patches the holes in his dialectical logic by means of 
empirical intuition. This creates the “false appearance” (nur Schein) of immanent 
progress.360 
Once again on the question of becoming, Trendelenburg insists that Hegel’s 
derivation of it presupposes “the representation of spatial motion” because without this 
representation, “becoming could not be understood.”361 The whole progress of 
development of the dialectic though the development of “Quantity”362 is, Trendelenburg 
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maintains, only possible on account of this empirical representation of spatial motion, 
which, “like an interpreter, accompanies the subsequent development.”363   
However, Trendelenburg explains that his criticism only applies to Hegel’s false 
presentation of the way in which human knowledge is produced. He actually agrees with 
Hegel that “experience itself presupposes that creative thought out of which all things 
originate,” and that “in this way one may trace this [experience] back to that prius,” i.e., 
back to divine reason.364  
The problem, in Trendelenburg’s view, is that Hegel has drawn the wrong 
conclusions from this about the nature of human knowledge: 
 
Kant’s prudent question returns, if we want to grasp the origin and procedure of 
human knowing. It will not allow itself to be settled or silenced in this way, 
through the twisting of words. No one has denied that everything true originates 
from the prius of divine reason; however, this does not mean that it is a priori 
knowledge.365  
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Kant, unlike Hegel, “prudently separated out the knowledge that was produced 
immediately from the mind and independently of experience.”366 As a consequence, “the 
a priori received a determinate meaning” in Kant’s philosophy.367 Hegel’s dialectic, on 
the other hand, views “the question whether there is a priori knowledge” and what 
knowledge should count as a priori as “extinguished,” i.e., no longer relevant.368 
C. Kant 
I now briefly review Kant’s position on the a priori and a posteriori modes of knowing. 
According to Kant, experience presupposes certain innate structures of 
consciousness. Without these a priori structures that are the possession of consciousness 
as such prior to all experience, experience is not possible at all. Kant defines a priori 
knowledge above all as knowledge that is “absolutely independent of all experience,” not 
simply “knowledge independent of this or that experience.”369  
Nevertheless, Kant insists that our cognitions begin “with experience” and we 
have “no cognition” prior to experience.370 Our cognitive faculty is “prompted by 
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sensible impressions,” at which point it cognizes objects in terms of its own a priori 
structures.371 
However, it is not always obvious to us after the fact how we ought to distinguish 
that part of our cognitions that stems from the innate structures of consciousness “until 
long practice has made us attentive to it and skilled in separating it out.”372 Before we 
have acquired this skill, we ought not simply to assume that there is no “cognition 
independent of all experience and even all impressions of the senses.”373 
But once we have acquired this skill (with Kant’s help), we will discover that 
these structures consist in a table of categories (the most fundamental and universal 
concepts), two forms of intuition (space and time), and certain “ideas of reason,” namely 
God, freedom and the immortality of the soul.  
In addition, Kant claims that all appearances of which we have knowledge 
presuppose the idea of that which appears, namely a thing in itself that is an 
unconditioned condition of those appearances. However, Kant insists, we can have no 
knowledge of these things-in-themselves.  
The opposite of a priori knowledge is a posteriori knowledge, which is gained 
through experience. All knowledge of the objects found in experience and the 
determinate (empirical) concepts that classify and explain them relies on our particular 
syntheses of the sensuous manifold by means of the categories. This operation of 
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synthesis presupposes the original unity of self-consciousness (the transcendental unity of 
apperception), which lends thought its synthetic powers. According to Kant, the type of 
knowledge gained by means of such synthesis—a posteriori knowledge—could only have 
come about in this way and could never have been deduced only from those innate 
structures of cognition that belong to it exclusively a priori.  
However, it is important to note that Kant’s definitions of a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge do not rule out the mixing of these two types of knowledge in a single 
proposition. For instance, a proposition about bodies whose existence and features can 
only be known through familiarity with the external world could involve the a priori 
category of causation. When there is no such admixture, “a priori modes of knowledge 
are entitled pure.”374 
Pure a priori knowledge, which Kant also calls transcendental knowledge, is 
knowledge of those structures of consciousness that belong to it independently of (prior 
to) all experience. There is, moreover, an a priori mode of knowing of the objects of 
natural science, inasmuch as our reasoning about the empirical concepts does not depend 
wholly on their empirical nature, but also on the laws of reasoning itself. Such knowledge 
is not pure a priori knowledge but has an a priori component. 
Kant also explains the relationship between logical necessity and the distinction 
between the a priori and a posteriori modes of knowing. He claims that “if we have a 
proposition which in being thought is thought as necessary, it is an a priori judgment.”375 
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and if, besides, it is not derived from any proposition except one which also has the 
validity of a necessary judgment, it is an absolutely a priori judgment.”376 
Thus, Trendelenburg’s issue with Hegel is that, in Trendelenburg’s view, Hegel 
supposes it is possible to have pure a priori knowledge of becoming, a concept that, from 
a Kantian perspective, results from a synthesis of intuitions of space and time. Like 
Schelling, Trendelenburg agrees with Kant that empirical intuition is required for the 
cognition of such concepts and that thinking cannot grasp them in their entirety by itself.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined Trendelenburg’s criticism of Hegelian necessity and his 
defense of Kant’s distinction between a priori and a posteriori modes of knowing.  
Next, in Chapter 6, I present Houlgate’s attempt at a defense of Hegelian 
necessity against the criticism of it that it depends on a posteriori knowledge before 
presenting Hegel’s own explanation of the relationship between a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge in Chapter 7. Both Trendelenburg’s criticism and Houlgate’s attempt at a 
defense of the a priori character of Hegel’s Logic are, as I show there, based on a 
misreading of Hegel’s Logic. 
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Chapter 6: Houlgate’s A Priori Interpretation of Hegel’s Logic
A. Introduction 
In this chapter, I present Houlgate’s argument that Hegel’s Logic has a pure a priori 
development. Houlgate, like Trendelenburg, accepts that if the “structure” of Hegel’s 
Logic “depends upon factors outside of philosophy itself,” its development cannot be 
“purely a priori and immanent” (100). Accordingly, Houlgate is at pains to demonstrate 
that Hegel’s Logic does not depend on any such “factors.” To this end, Houlgate 
advances an interpretation of the relationship between Kant and Hegel, according to 
which these philosophers agree on the a priori character of the “categories.”  
The a priori interpretation of Hegel’s Logic is far from unique to Houlgate or even 
the intuitionists, though it is certainly shared by all of the intuitionists.377 However, in this 
chapter I once again focus on Houlgate’s stance on Hegel’s Logic. I believe this focus 
will prove instructive for several reasons.  
First, I have already addressed in Part 1 the way that intuitionism, and Houlgate in 
particular, answer Schelling’s first two criticisms of Hegelian immanent necessity, so for 
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the sake of completeness, it is worth examining what resources Houlgate’s interpretation 
has for answering Schelling’s remaining criticisms. As I showed in Part 1, Houlgate’s 
concept of Hegelian necessity is too indeterminate genuinely to count as necessity at all. 
However, given that not many interpreters take on the task of defending Hegelian 
necessity at all, it is worth completing the project of evaluating its merits.  
Second, Houlgate bases his defense of the a priori character of Hegel’s Logic on a 
comparatively careful consideration of the relevant texts. Although I think Houlgate is 
wrong, it is perhaps not immediately entirely obvious why this should be so, and it is 
therefore worth addressing his argument in detail.  
Third, as I noted in Chapter 4, the thorough dissection of the problems with 
Houlgate’s intuitionism serves the important purpose of revealing the far-reaching 
implications of distinct ways of conceiving the role of principles in the development of 
Hegel’s Logic. In the present chapter, I show that the way that one views the role of 
empirical knowledge in the development of Hegel’s Logic has similarly far-reaching 
implications.  As I showed in Part 1, Houlgate’s intuitionist interpretation of Hegel’s 
Logic proceeds from the standpoint of the understanding. Houlgate proceeds from this 
same standpoint in elaborating his defense of the a priori status of Hegel’s Logic. 
Consequently, an examination of the shortcomings of Houlgate’s a priori interpretation of 
Hegel’s Logic will reveal some additional pitfalls in attempting to defend Hegelian 
necessity within this framework.   
My presentation of Houlgate’s stance on the a priori character of Hegel’s Logic 
has three major components. 
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First, I review the textual evidence Houlgate presents for his a priori interpretation 
of Hegel’s Logic. In Houlgate’s view, the textual evidence decisively shows that, for 
Hegel, subjective self-consciousness alone, independently of experience, is capable of 
generating the dialectical development of the Logic. As I show in Chapter 7, Houlgate 
ignores the evidence that Hegel views his Logic not only as an a priori science but also, 
as Trendelenburg points out, a product of experience. 
Second, I discuss Houlgate’s presentation of the relationship between ordinary 
categories and philosophical categories, both of which, Houlgate claims, have their 
source in the human mind alone. According to Houlgate, the philosophical categories of 
Hegel’s Logic are to be distinguished from ordinary categories not by their a priori 
character, but by their relative clarity, by which he apparently means their 
presuppositionlessness. I locate the inherent vagueness of this appeal to clarity in both its 
metaphorical character and its dependence on Houlgate’s equally ill-defined position on 
the presuppositionless and necessity of Hegel’s Logic. In Chapter 7, I show that this 
vagueness is also bound up with an effort on Houlgate’s part to minimize Hegel’s 
differences with Kant. Moreover, as I show there, Hegel’s actual position on the 
relationship between ordinary representations (“categories”) and philosophical thinking 
(“categories”) both refutes Houlgate’s a priori interpretation and corrects the vagueness 
of his discussion of this question in particular.  
Third, I discuss Houlgate’s interpretation of the relationship between Hegel and 
Kant on the question of things in themselves. According to Houlgate, Hegel does not 
think that any things in themselves beyond experience are accessible to the human mind. 
I take issue with this interpretation in Chapter 7. Whereas Houlgate believes that Hegel 
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holds that there is nothing inaccessible to human mind because the human mind 
determines what can be thought at all—an essentially Kantian position—I show that, on 
the contrary, Hegel holds that the human mind can only raise itself to the heights of pure 
thought by appropriating for itself a content that is initially external to it, i.e., in itself.  
It is my position that Houlgate’s stance on each of these three questions is bound 
up with a misguided effort to defend the a priori necessity of Hegel’s Logic in Kantian 
terms. Whereas Houlgate attempts to defend Hegel by minimizing the difference between 
Kant and Hegel, my interpretation of Hegel draws explicit attention to the sharp 
differences between the positions of the two thinkers on the question of the relationship 
between logical necessity and a priori and a posteriori knowledge and on related 
questions. However, as I have already indicated, I leave the textual refutation of 
Houlgate’s position to Chapter 7. I do so as to avoid doing too many things at once. 
B. Houlgate on the A Priori Character of Hegel’s Logic 
Houlgate holds that, for Hegel, subjective self-consciousness alone is capable of 
generating the dialectical development of Hegel’s Logic independently of experience. To 
Houlgate, as well as to Trendelenburg, this seems to be an obvious consequence of fact 
that the dialectical development of the Logic is supposed to be immanently necessary. 
From a Kantian perspective, if “being” is a pure abstraction, a pure thought, then the 
immanent development of the various “categories” in the Logic from this initial 
abstraction must take place entirely on the side of thought as well. To put it another way, 
if the Logic does not presuppose any empirical content, then a posteriori knowledge must 
not play any role in its development.  
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On the other hand, Houlgate notes, those who “deny that Hegel intends his 
philosophy to be a priori at all” hold that Hegel “provid[es] a philosophical account of 
concepts that are given to it (by, for example natural science) and that changes in his 
philosophy are determined by changes in those given concepts.”378 If it were true that 
Hegel’s philosophy depended on such an externally or empirically given content, 
Houlgate explains, it would follow that it could not be “purely a priori and immanent” 
since this would imply that “its structure depends upon factors outside of philosophy 
itself” (100). In this case, the development of the content of Hegel’s philosophy would be 
simply a reflection of the development (changes or motion) of an externally or 
empirically given content. Although Houlgate does not explicitly reference 
Trendelenburg, this is substantially the same position adopted by the latter. 
Some interpreters, Houlgate observes, deny that Hegel even intended to produce 
an a priori deduction in his Logic. Houlgate disagrees with this stance on the grounds that 
it contradicts Hegel’s own presentation of the requirements of a scientific treatment of the 
subject matter of logic as well as Hegel’s claim that his Logic meets these requirements. 
As Houlgate puts it, Hegel “insists over and over again that his derivation of concepts is a 
priori, immanent, and necessary.”379 Houlgate quotes one such passage in the Science of 
Logic, in which Hegel maintains that the “content and character” of the concept “can be 
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guaranteed” in a scientific manner “solely by the immanent deduction which contains its 
genesis” (SL 582/2: 252).380 
Of course, Hegel makes no reference to an “a priori” derivation in this passage, 
only to an “immanent deduction,” but Houlgate treats the two as more or less 
synonymous, presumably because an immanent deduction that is supposed to begin with 
a pure thought must surely maintain its independence from experience throughout.  
C. Houlgate on the Relationship between Ordinary and Philosophical Categories 
However, in Houlgate’s view, it is not the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s Logic that 
above all makes it an a priori deduction. Rather, the categories of Hegel’s Logic are the 
same categories found in ordinary thinking, and both ordinary and philosophical 
categories are, in Houlgate’s view, the product of the human mind alone.381 That is, in 
Houlgate’s view, Hegel can “demand both that philosophy be presuppositionless and that 
it presuppose familiarity with all the concepts concerned” because both philosophical 
concepts or categories and ordinary concepts or categories are both a priori.382  
According to Houlgate, “in Hegel’s view,” one of Kant’s “great insight[s]” was 
his recognition that the “fundamental categories” of thought “are a priori concepts 
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generated ‘spontaneously’ and independently by pure thought.”383 Houlgate claims that 
“Hegel himself” endorsed this insight of Kant’s. He quotes Hegel: “‘the thought-
determinations have their source in the I (Ich)’ and the I alone.”384 
However, unlike Kant, Houlgate recounts, Hegel holds that the various 
“categories” were discovered in distinct historical periods. Houlgate summarizes Hegel’s 
position (as he understands it) as follows: 
 
Human thought generates the basic categories over a period of time, so they are 
not all to be found—or at least not all given the same prominence—in every 
epoch of history or in every culture. Consequently, although Hegel believes that 
all the categories discussed in the Logic will be familiar to the inhabitants of our 
post-Reformation Western world, they would not necessarily all be familiar to 
ancient Egyptians or Greeks. Yet Hegel agrees with Kant that the source of the 
categories is always and only the spontaneous activity of pure thought itself. 
Thought certainly produces its categories in response to changing situations, but 
the categories with which it responds are wholly its own and a priori385. 
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Recall Kant’s claim that our cognitive faculty is “prompted by sensible impressions” to 
cognize objects in terms of its own a priori structures, including its a priori categories.386 
According to Houlgate, Hegel too believes that our cognitive faculty responds to 
the empirical world with its own a priori categories. In Hegel’s view, Houlgate claims, 
“Kant merits particular praise” because he “not[ed] the special role categories play in 
lending objectivity to our perceptions.”387 Thus, in Houlgate presentation, both Kant and 
Hegel think that a priori categories are the source of the objectivity of our perceptions. 
Kant and Hegel differ, on Houlgate’s view, in that whereas for Kant there is a 
fixed table of categories prompted by the sensible impressions of all human beings at all 
times in history, for Hegel the number of categories has increased over time in response 
to changing historical circumstances. Moreover, on Houlgate’s account, for Hegel, many 
of the categories that Kant would claim are produced by a synthesis of intuitions and a 
much more limited table of categories are actually a priori categories. However, in both 
cases, whichever categories each philosopher takes to be pure are, in the view of that 
philosopher, a product of human subjectivity. Houlgate holds that, for Hegel, in “every 
epoch of history or in every culture,” ordinary thinking no less than philosophical 
thinking responds to various “changing situations” with its own a priori categories.388 
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According to Houlgate, Hegel’s philosophical task then consists in the 
“clarification” of these historically developed a priori categories that are initially the 
possession not only of philosophical thought but of ordinary thought as well.389 
But in what does Houlgate think this philosophical “clarification” in which Hegel 
engages consists? Houlgate claims that Hegel’s aim is to produce a “radically self-critical 
derivation and clarification” of the categories that shape “ordinary thought” (99). Since 
Houlgate adds nothing further about what this clarification is supposed to be, perhaps he 
means to say that the clarification is nothing more than the “radically self-critical 
derivation.”390 Recall that, according to Houlgate, thought is “radically self-critical” 
whenever it is presuppositionless. Thus, to clarify categories would be, on Houlgate’s 
view, to deduce them without presuppositions from the initial thought of pure being. 
According to Houlgate, for the purpose of producing his “self-critical derivation,” 
of the categories, Hegel “names each category as it arises after the one it resembles most 
in everyday language.”391 That is, he uses one and the same word for one and the same 
category that is found in ordinary thought and philosophical thought. However, the Hegel 
seeks to “clarify” what this category is by deriving it in a way that does not rely on 
presuppositions.  
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In Houlgate’s view, Hegel is able to do this because (1) like the rest of us, he 
already “understand[s] the ordinary meanings of words such as becoming, quantity, and 
concept,” and (2) he also “recognize[s] that the derived category is a purified version of, 
and so corresponds to, a category we ordinarily employ.”392 
Hegel thus “makes it clear that the task of the Logic is not merely to present a formal 
system of abstract concepts unrelated to our everyday experience.”393 Rather, Houlgate 
quotes Hegel, its task is to “know the concept of that which is otherwise a mere pictorial 
representation” (SL 708/2: 406).394 In this way, Hegel’s Logic “provides a logical 
‘reconstruction’ of our ordinary categories or ‘representations’ (SL 708/2: 406).”395  
However, Houlgate insists, the philosophical task is not simply to rearrange our 
ordinary categories “in a dialectical sequence.”396 Rather, it is to reconstruct them, which 
must be done “by deriving [their] true structure,” a structure “that is largely hidden from 
ordinary thought itself.”397 Moreover, it does so “immanently and purely a priori from the 
empty thought of pure, indeterminate being.”398 Again, according to Houlgate, a 
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philosophical reconstruction provides a presuppositionless derivation of this “true 
structure,” and the true structure is the presuppositionless structure.399 
However, Houlgate does not explain how a “‘reconstruction’ of our ordinary 
categories” is capable of removing all presuppositions any more than he explains in what 
the necessity of this reconstruction is supposed to consist.  
As I showed in Part 1, Houlgate never explains what prevents the transitions in 
the Logic from introducing presuppositions in that he never defines what it means for a 
transition to be necessary. Such a definition would provide a determinate criterion by 
which one could judge whether a transition introduced presuppositions or not. On 
Houlgate’s presentation, one simply “observes” such transitions—clearly, presumably.  
Houlgate’s concept of relative “clarity” thus suffers from the same indeterminacy 
as his concept of the alleged role of presuppositionlessness, and whether one talks about 
clarity or about presuppositionlessness, nothing definite is being said at all.  
Once again, visual analogies are inadequate for the explanation of philosophical 
concepts. No philosophical insight is gained with regard to the distinction between 
ordinary and philosophical thinking by reducing this difference to something like the 
difference between the “clear” vision a near-sighted person gains when he obtains a pair 
of glasses and the “unclear” vision he had before that. And, one might add, this is hardly 
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a way of transcending “a mere pictorial representation” of a concept, which, as Houlgate 
notes, Hegel claims a philosophical deduction is supposed to do (SL 708/2: 406).400 
This analogical procedure cannot be excused as a means of making Hegel’s 
philosophy more accessible, of introducing his philosophy to the uninitiated, because, 
again, it does not genuinely explain Hegel at all. As I show in Chapter 7, for Hegel, 
conceptual thought is not simply “clearer” than representation similarly to the way that 
we see more clearly when we did previously once we obtain a correct glasses 
prescription. Rather, Hegel insists that conceptual thought corrects a fundamental error 
common to all representational thinking. Again, if the descriptor “clearer” is to have any 
meaning at all in this context, a determinate explanation of that in which this clarity 
consists must be specified. 
In this way, Houlgate’s discussion of Hegel’s position on the relative degrees of 
clarity of ordinary and philosophical thinking suffers from the same indeterminacy as his 
explanation of the necessity of philosophical deduction and, moreover, for the same 
reasons. Because Houlgate never provides a definition of Hegelian necessity, he never 
successfully justifies his claim that the Logic is presuppositionless. Therefore, none of the 
claims he bases on this alleged presuppositionlessness are adequately justified either.  
D. Hegel and Kant on Things in Themselves 
As I explained in the introduction to this chapter, Houlgate’s effort to defend the a priori 
necessity of Hegel’s Logic in Kantian terms is evinced in his interpretation of Hegel’s 
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stance on the a priori character of his Logic and of ordinary categories as well as in his 
stance on Kantian things in themselves. I now turn to this question of things in 
themselves. 
According to Houlgate, “the great value of Hegel’s Logic” is that “it does not 
describe a putative noumenal realm ‘beyond’ everyday experience but reveals the 
ultimate structure of the very world we inhabit every day of our lives.”401 
This claim is at first somewhat perplexing. If it were true that Hegel claimed he 
was unable to “describe” anything beyond our everyday experience, his philosophy 
would not be particularly unique in this regard. Hegel would share this view, for 
example, with both Hume and Kant, so if Hegel held this position, it would not 
distinguish his philosophy in the slightest from these others. So why does Houlgate claim 
that the “great value” of Hegel’s philosophy in particular can be traced back to his 
alleged position on this question?  
In addressing Hegel’s relationship with Kant directly, Houlgate certainly admits 
that Kant does not believe we have access to some putative “noumenal realm” either. 
According to Kant, the thought of things in themselves that lie beyond all appearances 
must be presupposed by the human mind in its cognition of appearances. However, as 
Kant insists, nothing can be known about things in themselves as such. Houlgate grasps 
all of this. 
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However, Houlgate maintains that Hegel takes his rejection of the “beyond” a step 
further than Kant in that, whereas Kant thinks that nothing determinate can be known 
about things in themselves, Hegel denies that there is anything about them to be known. 
Since Kantian things in themselves are supposed to be thought “in abstraction from all 
relations,” Houlgate explains, Hegel reasons that it is therefore “too abstract to count as 
any possible or actual something.”402  
Houlgate concludes from this that, in Hegel’s view, Kant should have had a less 
abstract concept of the thing in itself. As it stands, “its degree of abstractness prevents it 
from counting as a concept of something” because, while Kant’s “concept” of a thing in 
itself “purports to open up the possibility of things, or dimensions of things, beyond what 
we experience,” it nevertheless “fails to bring to mind anything determinate.”403  In this 
way, Kant fails to recognize the abstraction as a mere abstraction. There is nothing more 
to know about it insofar as it is abstract but, according to Houlgate, there is plenty to 
know about it—and we already do know plenty about it—insofar as it is it has the various 
qualities with which we are already familiar.  
Houlgate insists, however, that it would be wrong to suppose that Hegel “argue[s] 
against Kant that we can gain access” to “a dimension of things beyond our 
experience.”404 He claims that Hegel does hold that we have access to the “in itself” of 
things, but that Hegel “rejects the idea that what a being—or being—is ‘in itself’ 
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transcends our experience and instead conceives of being ‘in itself’ as the intelligible, 
ontological structure of the very things we experience.”405 
Similarly, Houlgate assures us in another place that Hegel does not believe that 
“we can after all reach a realm of being beyond our sensuous experience that Kant deems 
to be inaccessible.”406 Instead, Houlgate insists, “Hegel rejects the idea that what is ‘in 
itself’ transcends our experience.”407 Rather, Hegel’s concept of “what a thing is in itself 
necessarily stands in relation to other things.”408  
It is important to note at this point that Houlgate presents Hegel’s position on the 
constitution of our “experience” as nearly identical to Kant’s. That is, he believes that for 
Hegel, as for Kant, human experience is constituted by the combination of sense 
perceptions and a priori categories. As Houlgate puts it, in Hegel’s view,  
 
Categories permeate our consciousness and language and give structure to all that 
we perceive. They turn the flow of our sensations into an intelligible experience of 
things that exist, that have form and content, and that enter into causal relations 
with one another.409  
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Therefore, Houlgate’s claim that for Hegel there is no “dimension of things beyond our 
experience” amounts to the claim Hegel believes that there is nothing at all, no reality, 
that is fundamentally distinct from the combination of our categories with our sensations.  
However, Hegel’s alleged stance on things in themselves in this chapter arouses 
sympathy in Houlgate for those Kantians who may take issue with Hegel’s alleged 
answer to Kant. He presents two possible criticisms that Kantians may raise. 
First, Houlgate believes that Hegel “perhaps overestimate[s] the extent to which 
Kant conceives of things in themselves in abstraction from all relations” and concedes 
that “it may well be true that Hegel misrepresents the Kantian thing in itself when he 
claims that it is utterly nonrelational.”410  
Specifically, Houlgate notes, Kant presents “things in themselves as the 
‘intelligible’ (i.e., nonempirical and nonverifiable) ‘cause of experience’ and, in that 
sense, as related to the knowing mind” (CPR 381/330 [B44]).411 Those interpreters who 
believe this way of presenting the things in themselves “represents Kant’s considered 
view” might therefore be inclined to say that Hegel’s characterization of Kant’s view on 
this question “actually miss[es] its target.”412 
Second, Houlgate suggests that Kantians might maintain that Hegel directs his 
attention to the Kantian thing in itself, while disregarding Kant’s “doctrine of sensibility” 
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and that this leads Hegel “seriously to distort Kant’s position and to indulge in a 
distinctively Hegelian form of abstraction” inasmuch as “Kant does not start from the 
concept of the thing in itself but begins, rather from a certain understanding of 
sensibility.”413 
Houlgate submits that “there is without doubt some merit to this Kantian 
rejoinder.”414 
In Houlgate’s view, Hegel has ignored the fact that, according to Kant, “we could 
only know about things in themselves from those things themselves, but “whatever has its 
source in us … cannot in principle reveal to us the nature of things themselves.”415 
For Kant, Houlgate explains, the thing in itself is “not a free-standing concept that 
[he] develops for its own sake,” but a “concept that plays a definite epistemic role.”416 Its 
role is to “remind us that the conditions under which we intuit things are merely the 
conditions under which we intuit things and may not be regarded as the ontological 
conditions of things as they truly are.”417 
According to Houlgate, Hegel’s criticism of Kantian things in themselves 
“focuses on Kant’s concept in the abstract” rather than considering them within their 
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Kantian “epistemic context.”418 In this regard, Houlgate submits, “his critique cannot but 
fail to miss its mark.”419 Nevertheless, Houlgate immediately contradicts himself and 
claims that “Hegel’s logical critique of Kant’s concept of the thing in itself is not 
invalidated simply because it does not explicitly address that concept’s epistemic role in 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy.”420 
Conclusion 
As I have shown in this chapter, Houlgate provides a textual justification for his stance 
that Hegel intends for his Logic to be a purely a priori science. However, as I show in the 
next chapter, Houlgate ignores important textual evidence that supports the contrary 
position, namely that Hegel’s Logic is not a purely a priori science in the way that this is 
traditionally conceived, above all by Kant.  
As I have also shown in this chapter, Houlgate relies heavily on comparisons of 
Hegel with Kant in his effort to present Hegel’s Logic as a purely a priori science. 
According to Houlgate, the “categories” of Hegel’s Logic, like the categories presented 
by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason, are supposed have their source in the human 
mind alone. Moreover, in Houlgate’s view, Hegel rejects Kant’s position on things in 
themselves not because Hegel thinks that they are in fact knowable, but because he thinks 
that they too empty of content to be known.  
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In the next chapter, Chapter 7, I present textual evidence that refutes Houlgate’s 
position in both of these comparisons. I show there that Houlgate’s interpretation falsely 
reduces Hegel to a Kantian subjective idealist. 
Moreover, I show that it thereby fails to provide a satisfactory answer to 
Trendelenburg’s criticism insofar as it is based on a highly selective reading of Hegel’s 
texts that ignores the evidence that, in Hegel’s view, empirical knowledge does indeed 
play an important, albeit a subordinate, role in the Logic.  
Finally, I also show there that the same textual evidence serves to refute the very 
basis of Trendelenburg’s dilemma, according to which Hegel’s logic could only claim to 
develop in accordance with immanent necessity if it originated entirely independently of 
experience.  
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Chapter 7: A Defense of Hegelian Dialectical Logical Necessity against 
Kantian Subjective Idealism
A. Introduction 
In this chapter, I present my own interpretation of the role of both the a priori and the a 
posteriori modes of knowing in Hegel’s Logic and show that Trendelenburg is correct in 
supposing that, for Hegel, the role of both modes of knowing is essential there.  
On the basis of a careful review of the relevant passages of the Encyclopedia 
Logic and the Science of Logic, I show that my interpretation of Hegel’s position on this 
question is consistent with the interpretation of Hegelian logical necessity I presented in 
Part 1. In the process of presenting my interpretation, I refute Houlgate’s reductionist 
attempt to defend the presuppositionlessness and necessity of Hegel’s Logic by 
portraying its entire development as exclusively a priori. 
Houlgate fails to grasp Hegel’s differences with Kant on the role of experience in 
the acquisition of knowledge in general and the elaboration of the Logic in particular. 
Instead of elucidating Hegel’s differences with Kant, Houlgate attempts to reach an 
accommodation between the two thinkers on (1) the a priori and a posteriori modes of 
knowing, (2) the difference between representation (ordinary categories or concepts) and 
conceptual thought (philosophical concepts or categories), and (3) knowledge of things in 
themselves. 
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The end result is the reduction of Hegel’s absolute idealism, according to which 
thought determinations are not a product of subjective self-consciousness alone, to 
Kantian subjective idealism, for which both the categories and sensory intuitions are 
supplied by the knowing subject. I show that this interpretation is false. Hegel explicitly 
disagrees with Kantian subjective idealism.  
I present my interpretation and refute Houlgate’s interpretation in the following 
steps: 
First, I show that while Kant conceives the a priori and a posteriori modes of 
knowing in absolute formal opposition to one another, that is, from the standpoint of the 
understanding, Hegel conceives them dialectically, as moments of one and the same 
development in which a posteriori knowledge becomes a priori knowledge through a 
process of purification and conceptual deduction that exhibits the necessity of the 
content. Hegel’s Logic is the a priori development of a content that is initially a 
posteriori, i.e., an immediately given content that is initially mediated by the form of its 
externality. It loses this quality of immediate givenness only when the necessity of the 
content is grasped in its own self as a content that is equally subjective and objective at 
the same time. Thus, while Houlgate thinks that Hegel holds that both ordinary and 
philosophical categories are a priori cognitions, this does not correspond with the way 
that Hegel presents his own position.     
Second, I show that Hegel presents the relationship between representation and 
conceptual thought (which Houlgate terms ordinary and philosophical categories or 
concepts) as the final stage in the transformation of a posteriori cognition into a priori, 
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i.e., self-mediated, cognition. In empirical representations, as opposed to conceptual 
thoughts, the a posteriori moment dominates. According to Hegel, representations join 
together a sensible content with a universal, while “leav[ing] out a good deal of what is 
particular” about the content.421 The task of philosophy, Hegel insists, is to “transform 
representations into thoughts,” that is, to articulate the particular content that is only 
implied in the representation, but not articulated by it.422 What Hegel has in mind when 
he refers to thoughts is, of course, logically necessary conceptual deduction in the 
medium of universal thought determinations. Thus, for Hegel, philosophy certainly 
presupposes representations because it is about our world with which we are familiar, 
but, in its effort to penetrate to the inner forms of motion and necessity of this world, it 
equally exposes what is inadequate and false in the meager content that, in the form of 
representation, is passed off for an adequate comprehension of the concept of its object.  
Thus, whereas Houlgate thinks that Hegel holds that ordinary and philosophical 
cognition of the categories or concepts are distinguished by relative clarity, i.e., relative 
presuppositionlessness, this is not at all how Hegel presents the difference between the 
two.  
Third, I show that Hegel disagrees explicitly with Kant’s subjective idealism and 
his claim that things in themselves are unknowable. 
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According to Hegel, Kantian subjective idealism, for which the knowing subject 
is the source of both the categories and the intuitions on which the subject imposes these 
categories, has its ultimate foundation in the prejudice of the understanding against 
contradiction. Kant thinks that the application of the categories necessarily leads to 
contradictions, but since Kant shares in “that usual tenderness for things, whose only care 
is that they do not contradict themselves,” he decides that it would be better to suppose 
that only the categories have their source in us so that he does not have to suppose that 
things in themselves are contradictory.423  
Hegel points out that Kant has not at all eliminated the contradiction by supposing 
this, but only shifted it to subjective consciousness. Moreover, Kant does not provide any 
proof that we ought to share with him his abhorrence of the idea of contradictory things 
in themselves.  
I show that Hegel disagrees with Kant’s claim that things in themselves are 
unknowable, not, as Houlgate supposes, because Hegel thinks that things in themselves 
are nothing more than appearances, but because Hegel thinks that, since things in 
themselves are devoid of content, they are the easiest things to know. Ultimately, 
according to Hegel, the reason that Kant denies that things in themselves are knowable is 
that, as I discussed Part 1, Kant shares in that “usual tenderness for things, whose only 
care is that they do not contradict themselves.”424 Kant, Hegel explains, holds that there 
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are necessary contradictions in the “world as it appears” to the sensibility and the 
understanding, but not in things in themselves.425  
Hegel reconstructs Kant’s reasoning as follows. There are unavoidable 
contradictions in our cognitions and these contradictions that result necessarily from our 
use of the categories through which we think. However, the source of these 
contradictions cannot be things in themselves, the unconditioned conditions of the 
appearances in our experience. Therefore, these categories (and the attendant 
contradictions) must originate from us rather than from the things in themselves. That is 
to say, our categories must be a priori. The things in themselves are thus also 
unknowable, since our knowledge is constituted solely by our a priori categories and 
forms of intuition together with our sensations.  
However, Hegel points out that, when the things in themselves are considered in 
absolute abstraction from that which they condition, they are absolutely empty and are 
therefore, as absolutely empty, not only knowable but the easiest thing to know. In this 
way, the contradiction is not eliminated, but only shifted into subjective consciousness 
but the thing in itself is shifted into subjective consciousness as well.  
Thus, whereas Houlgate claims that Hegel ignores Kant’s “doctrine of sensibility” 
in his criticism of Kant’s position on things in themselves, it is Houlgate who ignores 
those passages in which Hegel considers both together.  
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The understanding, whose principle, as Hegel explains, is formal identity, has 
only two choices when faced with an opposition (e.g., a priori versus a posteriori 
knowledge, representations versus conceptual thought, experience versus the thing in 
itself) and the need to explain the relationship between such opposed terms. It either 
emphasizes the discontinuity between the two terms at the expense of their continuity, 
turning the former into an absolute, or tries to eliminate the discontinuity altogether. 
Dialectical thinking, on the other hand, cognizes the necessary development of 
opposed—or, rather, contradictory, terms—into one another. These two choices are 
instantiated in Houlgate’s and Trendelenburg’s alternate responses to Hegel’s Logic. 
Houlgate, who does not accept Hegel’s dialectic as the genuine essence of his 
philosophy, tries to eliminate the discontinuity between the a priori and a posteriori 
moments in Hegel’s Logic and between representations and conceptual thought by 
denying that the a posteriori moment plays any role at all. Trendelenburg, on the other 
hand, accurately observes that Hegel’s Logic is supposed to be a unity of a priori and a 
posteriori moments, concludes that Hegel is irrational for supposing that it could contain 
both absolutely discontinuous elements.  
Insofar as Houlgate’s defense of the a priori character of Hegel’s Logic is based 
on a highly selective reading of Hegel’s texts that ignores the evidence that, for Hegel, 
empirical knowledge does indeed play an important, albeit a subordinate, role in the 
Logic, it thereby fails to provide a satisfactory answer to Trendelenburg’s criticism.  
On the other hand, to the end of refuting Hegel’s position, it is not sufficient to 
appeal, as Trendelenburg does, to the fact that Kant has a different view than Hegel. I 
204 
argue that rather than refuting Hegel’s position, Trendelenburg only succeeds in 
expressing a preference for Kant’s view. This does not suffice because Hegel does not 
simply ignore or disagree with Kant but offers a refutation of the position of the latter. 
B. Hegel on the A Priori and A Posteriori Moments 
Hegel addresses the question of a priori and a posteriori knowledge in the introduction to 
the Encyclopedia Logic.  
He explains there that “if mediation is one-sidedly stressed and made into a 
condition, then we can say that philosophy owes its first beginning to experience (to what 
is a posteriori).”426 That is, if we focus on one moment of the emergence of knowledge to 
the exclusion of the other moments, we might be inclined, and not without justification, 
to make the claim that “philosophy owes its first beginning to experience,” that 
philosophy originates from the experience on which it thereby depends.427   
But this is only a one-sided account of the emergence of knowledge, because it 
places its entire emphasis on the source of the knowledge, not the transformation through 
thinking of the initially external content into the possession of the knowing subject. As 
Hegel puts it, the claim that “philosophy owes its first beginning to experience” is “not 
saying very much.”428 This claim leaves out the role of thinking, which consists 
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“essentially” in “the negation of something immediately given.”429 That is, thought does 
not leave the content of immediate experience as it finds it, but transforms it into a 
universal thought content, something that belongs to thought.  
First, he introduces an analogy (though for him an analogy alone will not 
ultimately suffice). He explains that “we owe our eating to food because without it we 
could not eat,” but “eating is represented as ungrateful, since it is the digesting of that to 
which it is supposed to owe itself.”430 In the same way that thought receives the given 
content, the organism receives food, but neither leaves what is given to it the way it found 
it.  
Hegel next discusses the peculiar manner in which thinking takes up the content 
that is given to it in experience. Thinking “digests” the content of experience, so to speak, 
when immediate determinations of experience, by which it is initially mediated, are 
transformed into thought determinations that have the character of “universality, the 
overall being-at-home-with-itself of thinking.”431 At this point, Hegel explains, 
“thinking’s own immediacy (that which is a priori) is inwardly reflected and hence 
inwardly mediated.”432 
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This explanation of the a priori and a posteriori sources of philosophical 
knowledge amounts to a clear acknowledgement on Hegel’s part of the essential role of 
experience in philosophical cognition. However, it does not yet refute Houlgate’s 
interpretation or show that Hegel’s position on this question is fundamentally different 
from Kant’s. One could simply imagine that Hegel’s use of the terms “a priori” and “a 
posteriori” is slightly different from Kant’s.  
Recall that, according to the Kant, the categories and the forms of intuition (space 
and time), which are the most abstract and universal forms of this experienced content, do 
not depend on experience in order for them to be what they are, even though we are first 
prompted to think by means of these categories when we encounter the sensuous 
intuitions on which we impose them. Recall, in addition, that, for Kant, the a priori 
component of thinking not only does not at all depend on the raw material of experience, 
the sensuous manifold, but the structure of the categories and forms of intuition is also 
not at all intrinsic in the sensuous manifold. Rather, Kant holds that it is imposed on this 
manifold by the thinking subject. For Kant, a posteriori knowledge is knowledge that 
synthesizes these fundamentally heterogenous elements. 
One could thus imagine that Hegel accepts Kant’s stance on this absolute 
distinction but holds that there are no empirical concepts that result from the combination 
of these heterogenous elements, but rather that all or at any rate a large number of the 
concepts whose emergence in consciousness is prompted by the sensuous manifold are a 
priori categories. On this interpretation, Hegel would be using the term a posteriori here 
only by way of an acknowledgement that it is experience that first calls up the a priori 
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categories in us. However, when I discuss Hegel’s response to Kant’s subjective idealism 
below, it will become clear why this is not the case.  
“There is,” Hegel insists, “a correct and more fundamental sense in which the 
development of philosophy is due to experience.”433 The empirical sciences, he submits, 
“do not stop at the perception of single instances of appearance.”434 Rather, “they have 
prepared the material for philosophy by finding universal determinations, genera, and 
laws” and they have done so “through thinking.”435 Note that, in Hegel’s view, the 
sciences do not impose “universal determinations, genera, and laws” of their own on the 
material of nature, but “find” them there. These sciences, Hegel explains, 
 
contain the invitation for thinking, to advance to these concrete determinations. 
The assumption of this content, through which the immediacy that still clings to it, 
and its givenness, are sublated by thinking, is at the same time a developing of 
thinking out of itself.436 
 
For Hegel, cognition of the sublation of the immediacy of a content always entails the 
recognition that that content in not merely something immediate after all, even though it 
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at first appears that way to the thinking subject, because, as the understanding, the 
thinking subject rips an immediate content from its concrete context and holds it apart 
from the latter in the form of an abstraction. While this abstraction of the content from its 
context is an essential moment in grasping that content, to grasp the content in its truth is 
ultimately to grasp it in concretely articulated thought, that is, in this context. 
Thus, Hegel’s point is that empirical scientific knowledge itself is implicitly 
philosophical in the sense that the empirical sciences begin to carry out the task of 
discovering the universal determinations and their relations that are implicit in the 
abstract particulars of experience. In Hegel’s view, the Logic is thus the more profound 
truth that is implicit in the empirical sciences.  
In this way, “philosophy does owe its development to the empirical sciences,” 
Hegel acknowledges, “but,” he insists, it is philosophy that 
 
gives to their content the fully essential shape of the freedom of thinking (or what 
is a priori) as well as the validation of necessity (instead of the content being 
warranted because it is simply found to be present, and because it is a fact of 
experience.) In its necessity the fact becomes the presentation and imitation of the 
activity of thinking that is original and completely independent.437 
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That is, philosophy transforms a posteriori knowledge into a priori knowledge through a 
process of purification and conceptual deduction that exhibits the necessity of the 
content. The development from the origin is no longer the origin itself. Rather, it is 
precisely the living refutation of the semblance of the origin’s independence and 
immediacy. A representation that derives from an intuition is no longer the intuition. A 
thought that rises above a mere representation is no longer a mere representation.  
When knowledge becomes ours, it ceases to be something merely external. When 
it becomes that which is ours, it remains that which was external but it is no less ours on 
account of this history of its independence that remains a part of it. Likewise, when a 
presuppositionless starting point develops beyond that starting point it becomes the 
presupposition of the development. It ceases to be a state of presuppositionlessness, but 
itself becomes the presupposition. To movement beyond the starting point refutes its 
immediacy and indeterminacy.  
However, Houlgate simply ignores the passages in which Hegel explains the role 
of the a posteriori moment in philosophical thinking and insist that, in Hegel’s view, the 
categories of thought—whether it is ordinary thinking, the thinking of empirical scientists 
or his own philosophical thinking—are a priori categories.  
The textual evidence presented above shows that Houlgate’s interpretation is incorrect.  
C. Representations and Conceptual Thought 
Hegel’s discussion of the relationship between representation and thought is of 
paramount importance for grasping how in general, according to Hegel, philosophy—in 
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particular his philosophy—reworks the thought content belonging to ordinary thinking 
and the empirical sciences and transforms it into philosophical thinking. 
Hegel explains that there are two kinds of representations, or, rather, “two cases” 
of representation.438 What both cases have in common is that they join together a thought 
with something that is not a thought. In one case it is “the content” that “is something 
thought,” that is, which has “has sprung from self-conscious thinking,” whereas in the 
other case “the form” is the part of the representation that is “something thought.”439  
The part of a representation that is a thought is a thought insofar as it expresses 
the form or alternatively the content as a universal. Whereas Hegel holds that universals 
are intrinsic not only in our thinking but in nature and society as such, it is the task of 
subjective cognition, whether in the empirical sciences or in ordinary life, to find the 
universal in what appears immediately singular and the result of carrying out this task is a 
thought, a universal.  
Hegel explains the two cases in terms of several examples: 
 
If I say, e.g., “anger,” “rose,” “hope,” I am familiar with all this through feeling, 
but I express this content in a universal way, in the form of thought; I have left out 
a good deal of what is particular about it, and given only the content as universal, 
but that content remains sensible. Conversely, if I represent God to myself, then 
                                                          
438 Hegel, Encyclopedia Logic, 58. 
439 Hegel, Encyclopedia Logic, 58. 
211 
certainly the content is purely something thought, but the form is still sensible, 
just as I already find it immediately within me.440 
 
A representation is thus a hybrid of a thought content and a content that does not 
properly belong to thinking but is nevertheless joined together with the thought content. 
However, Hegel also explains that such thoughts are deficient. Thinking tends to be 
“inwardly contented” with its universals (37). Thus, when thinking leaves a part of the 
representation as a feeling or a sensible content, this is a result of its tendency of thinking 
to be “indifferen[t] towards particularization, and hence toward its development” (37). 
Nevertheless, Hegel maintains that thinking should progress beyond representation to 
thinking that includes the particular articulated within it. 
Hegel elaborates on the nature of representation when he distinguishes it from 
thought. He explains that “the content” of a representation, unlike the content of thought 
per se “stands … in isolation.”441 This is the case even when the content is itself a product 
of thought, for instance, “right, duty, [or] God,” which “do not stand in the sensible 
mutual externality of space.”442 These representations, like the representations of the 
content of the natural world “do appear somehow in time, one after the other, though 
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“their content is not itself represented as affected by time, as passing away and changing 
in it.”443 However, just like representations of the objects of physical nature,  
 
these determinations, which are in themselves spiritual, stand at the same time in 
isolation upon the broad field of the inner, abstract universality of representation 
in general. In this isolation they are simple: right, duty, God.444 
 
Simple propositions, for example “right is right,” or “God is God,” or “God is the Creator 
of the world, that he is all-wise, almighty, etc.” also count for Hegel as representations, 
and, although “several isolated and simple determinations are strung together” in these 
simple propositions, these propositions, like the simple determinations “right, duty, God,” 
“remain external to each other, in spite of the link that is allotted to them in their 
subject.”445  
 
According to Hegel, the understanding differs from representation only insofar as 
it posits relationships of universal and particular, or of cause and effect, etc., and 
therefore necessary relations between the isolated determinations of 
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representation—whereas representation leaves them side by side in its 
undetermined space, linked only by the simple “and.”446 
 
However, like representation, the understanding abstracts and separates its thoughts from 
other thoughts and takes its abstractions for truths in their isolation. This places Hegel’s 
criticism of the standpoint of the understanding in a new light as well. For Hegel, though 
the thoughts of the understanding are more complete than those of representation, they do 
not go far enough if the ultimate aim is comprehension.  
Hegel insists that this “distinction between representation and thought” (which is 
not fully grasped by the understanding) is of paramount importance, in particular because 
“philosophy does nothing but transform representations into thoughts.”447 It follows from 
this that, in Hegel’s view, his Logic, which is a part of his philosophy, transforms 
representations into thoughts. 
As I explained in Part 1, following the thought of pure being, each stage, each 
thought determination in the Logic is fundamentally a result of the prior deduction. 
However, our initial familiarity with these thoughts in the form of representation allows 
us to recognize these thoughts when they are deduced in the Logic. But in order to think 
philosophically, i.e., dialectically, we have to be willing to break with our prior habits of 
thought, since our prior habits of thought tempt us to interrupt this motion of the 
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deduction and view individual thought determinations as mere representations, or from 
the standpoint of the understanding, which goes beyond representation but not very far 
beyond it. Hegel’s frequent injunctions to leave behind our presuppositions, prejudices, 
habits, etc., all refer to this tendency. 
In one place in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel addresses this kind of difficulty in 
the way that it arises in relation to the thought of the unity of being and nothing. He 
explains that “to comprehend their unity” means nothing more than to grasp “the concept 
of both.”448 This concept is the product of the deduction that I discussed in Chapter 3. 
Nevertheless, even in the face of this deduction, some might insist that “we do not 
comprehend the unity of being and nothing.”449 In this case,  
 
what is understood by “comprehension” is often something more than the concept 
in the proper sense; what is desired is a more diversified, a richer consciousness, a 
notion such that this sort of “concept” can be presented as a concrete case of it, 
with which thinking in its ordinary practice would be more familiar. Insofar as the 
inability to comprehend only expresses the fact that one is not used to holding 
onto abstract thoughts without any sensible admixture or to the grasping of 
speculative propositions, all we can say is that philosophical knowing is indeed 
quite diverse in kind from the knowing that we are used to in everyday life, just as 
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it is diverse from what prevails in the other sciences too. But if noncomprehension 
only means that one cannot represent the unity of being and nothing, this is really 
so far from being the case, that on the contrary everyone has an infinite supply of 
notions of this unity; saying that one has none can only mean that one does not 
[re]cognise the present concept in any of those notions, and one does not know 
them to be examples of it.450 
 
As I argued in Part 1, Houlgate’s references to the allegedly presuppositionless character 
of the Logic are inadequate to explain in what the dialectical logical necessity of its 
development is supposed to consist. Likewise, in the absence of any determinate 
explanation of dialectical logical necessity, Houlgate’s references to the allegedly 
superior clarity of Hegel’s philosophical categories as opposed to ordinary categories, 
which is also supposed to result from the presuppositionless character of the 
philosophical thinking, fail to provide any determinate criterion of relative clarity, let 
alone do justice to Hegel’s distinction between representation and conceptual thought.  
What this would-be explanation leaves out is the fact that, for Hegel, the transformation 
of representations into conceptual thought by philosophy transforms an a posteriori 
sensible content into a fully conceptual a priori deduction of the intrinsically necessary 
universal determinations of a thing.  
 
                                                          
450 Hegel, Encyclopedia Logic, 143. 
216 
D. Hegel on Kant’s Subjective Idealism and Things in Themselves 
In the previous two sections, I focused on Hegel’s own texts and I only briefly mentioned 
the implications of these texts for Houlgate’s interpretation. In this section I break with 
this procedure and give equal attention to Hegel’s own texts and Houlgate’s 
interpretation. 
a. Subjective Idealism 
Recall that, according to Houlgate, Hegel approves of Kant’s “insight” that the 
“fundamental categories” of thought “are a priori concepts generated ‘spontaneously’ and 
independently by pure thought.”451 In support of this claim, Houlgate provides a quote 
from the Encyclopedia Logic: “‘the thought-determinations have their source in the I 
(Ich)’ and the I alone.”452 
Houlgate makes it sound as though, in the passage in question, Hegel not only 
explains Kant’s position, but expresses his complete agreement with it. However, if one 
reads the actual context of this quote, it becomes clear that Hegel’s position is 
fundamentally opposed to Kant’s. 
Hegel does say that Kant is correct insofar as his position “expresses the nature of 
all consciousness,” which “strive[s] to appropriate” and “to conquer” the world for 
cognition and make it “ideal.”453 However, Hegel immediately qualifies this claim by 
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insisting “it is not the subjective activity of self-consciousness that introduces absolute 
unity into the multiplicity in question.”454 In other words, Hegel is insisting that it would 
not be correct to say, as Kant does, that self-consciousness is responsible for imposing a 
category on the sensuous manifold and thereby unifying a collection of diverse 
sensations.  
Instead, Hegel insists, “it is the goodness of the Absolute, so to speak, that lets 
singular [beings] enjoy their own selves, and it is just this that drives them back into 
absolute unity.”455 Despite the semi-religious language Hegel employs here, his meaning 
is not at all mystical. In Hegel’s Logic, the final result is the developed system, the 
developed unity, of thought determinations in the form of a single necessary deduction. 
Hegel calls this result the Absolute. This Absolute is not only the rational structure of 
thinking as such, but also the inner nature of the things of this world that are initially 
beyond the grasp of subjective cognition. It is this inner nature of the world, this inner 
unity immanent in things, that thinking appropriates in the form of its own universal 
cognitions. That this is what Hegel has in mind will become clearer shortly. 
Hegel insists that while Kant is right in supposing that “the categories are not 
contained in immediate sensation,” he is wrong in supposing that the categories belong 
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“only to us.”456 Hegel illustrates the point that immediate sensation does not contain the 
categories by means of several examples: 
 
Consider, for example, a piece of sugar. It is hard, white, sweet, etc. We say that 
all these properties are united in one object, and this unity is not found in 
sensation. The situation is the same when we regard two events as standing to one 
another in the relationship of cause and effect; what is perceived here is the two 
isolated events, which succeed one another in time. But that one is the cause and 
the other the effect (the causal nexus between them) is not perceived; on the 
contrary, it is present merely for our thinking.457 
 
However, Hegel insists, these examples do not show what Kant believes they 
show. The categories of “unity, cause and effect, etc.” do “pertain to thinking as such,” 
Hegel acknowledges.458 However, he contends, “it does not at all follow from this” that 
these categories “must therefore be merely something of ours, and not also 
determinations of objects themselves.”459 Nevertheless, “according to Kant’s view,” 
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Hegel recounts, “this is what is supposed to be the case.”460 Hegel then calls Kant’s 
philosophy “subjective idealism,” by which he means that “the Ego (the knowing subject) 
furnishes both the form and also the material of knowing—the former as thinking and the 
latter as sensing subject.”461  
In another passage, Hegel once again summarizes and criticizes Kant’s position 
on the categories. According to Kant, “the categories have their source in the unity of 
self-consciousness.”462 
Hegel sides with “naïve consciousness” against Kant on this question.463 Naïve 
consciousness, Hegel explains, “has rightly taken exception to [Kant’s] subjective 
idealism, according to which the content of our consciousness is something that is only 
ours, something posited only through us.”464 Hegel explains that there is indeed 
something wrong with subjective idealism, since “the things of which we have immediate 
knowledge are mere appearances, not only for us, but also in-themselves” in that they 
“hav[e] the ground of their being not within themselves but in the universal divine 
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Idea.”465 Hegel explains that this doctrine “must also be called idealism, but, as distinct 
from the subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy, it is absolute idealism.”466 
b. Hegel on the Thing in Itself 
Recall that, according to Kant, the appearances found in our experience presuppose 
something that appears. He calls these theoretically necessary unconditioned conditions 
of our experience things in themselves. According to Kant, it is only possible to have 
knowledge of appearances, not of things in themselves.  
Houlgate’s reduction of Hegel’s absolute idealism to Kantian subjective idealism 
prompts him to misinterpret Hegel’s attitude toward these Kantian things in themselves. 
Moreover, he bases his account of Hegel’s attitude toward them on a highly selective 
reading of Hegel’s writings on this question.  
Recall that, according to Houlgate, Hegel’s Logic “does not describe a putative 
noumenal realm ‘beyond’ everyday experience but reveals the ultimate structure of the 
very world we inhabit every day of our lives.”467  This distinction is somewhat 
ambiguous in that how we interpret its meaning is dependent on how we interpret the 
phrase “the very world we inhabit every day of our lives.” However, the only meaning 
this phrase can have that is consistent with the rest of Houlgate’s interpretation is the 
following: “the very world we inhabit every day of our lives” is the very totality of our 
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experience constituted by the combination of our own categories and sensations. Thus, 
according to Houlgate, Hegel’s philosophy is even more subjectivist than Kant’s. In 
Houlgate’s view, for Hegel, there is no unconditioned condition of our experience, but 
only experience itself. 
Houlgate comes up with this interpretation on the basis of some remarks Hegel 
makes in the course of his exposition of “determinate being” in the Science of Logic. 
Hegel says there that the thing in itself  
 
is a very simple abstraction but for some while it counted as a very important 
determination, something superior, as it were, just as the proposition that we do 
not know what things are in themselves ranked as a profound piece of wisdom. 
Things are called ‘in themselves’ in so far as abstraction is made from all being-
for-other, which means simply, in so far as they are thought devoid of all 
determination, as nothings. In this sense, it is of course impossible to know what 
the thing-in-itself is. For since the things of which they are to be assigned are at 
the same time supposed to be things in-themselves, which means, in effect, to be 
without any determinations, the question is thoughtlessly made impossible to 
answer, or else only an absurd answer is given.468 
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Since the Kantian thing in itself is supposed to be thought “in abstraction from all 
relations,” Houlgate explains, Hegel reasons that it is therefore “too abstract to count as 
any possible or actual something.”469 Houlgate then concludes that Hegel therefore denies 
that there is anything about it to be known. 
But this is not what Hegel actually says in the cited passage. What he says is that 
if the question is asked what determinations belong to something that by definition is 
wholly indeterminate, then this question has no answer. There is no determinate 
knowledge to be had of something that is not at all determinate.  
However, the fact that Hegel thinks that it is nonsensical to ask what determinacy 
belongs to something indeterminate does not at all imply that he thinks that Kant’s idea 
of the thing in itself is nonsensical. Houlgate falsely takes this passage to be the whole of 
Hegel’s response to Kant’s idea of the thing in itself and he misinterprets it at that.  
Another passage, which Houlgate ignores, refutes his interpretation. In this 
passage, Hegel explains that nothing is easier to know than the thing in itself: 
 
The thing-in-itself (and here “thing” embraces God, or the spirit, as well) 
expresses the ob-ject, inasmuch as abstraction is made of all that it is for 
consciousness, of all determinations of feeling, as well as of all determinate 
thoughts about it. It is easy to see what is left, namely, what is completely 
abstract, or totally empty, and determined only as what is “beyond”; the negative 
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of representation, of feeling, of determinate thinking, etc. But it is just as simple to 
reflect that this caput mortuum is itself only the product of thinking, and precisely 
of the thinking that has gone to the extreme of pure abstraction, the product of the 
empty “I” that makes its own self-identity into its ob-ject. The negative 
determination that contains this abstract identity as [its] ob-ject is likewise entered 
among the Kantian categories, and, like that empty identity, it is something quite 
familiar. We must be quite surprised, therefore, to read so often that one does not 
know what the thing-in-itself is; for nothing is easier to know than this.470 
 
Thus, Hegel’s fundamental criticism of Kant’s idea of the thing in itself is that Kant fails 
to recognize that, in articulating an opposition between thinking that is confined to 
appearances and the unconditioned condition of these appearances, he has himself 
already overcome this opposition in thought.  
According to Hegel there is a specific reason why Kant does not recognize this, 
and it is one that I have already discussed in Part 1. As Hegel recounts, Kant discovers 
that there are unavoidable, that is, “essential and necessary,” contradictions in our 
cognitions through the categories. Again, according Hegel, this insight of Kant’s is “one 
of the most important and profound advances of the philosophy of modern times.”471 
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Interestingly, in his account of the “insights” for which Hegel supposedly admires Kant, 
Houlgate leaves this one out.  
Of course, as I also explained in Part 1, Hegel thinks that Kant is ultimately 
limited by a prejudice against contradictions. Because of this prejudice, Kant refuses to 
believe that the “ob-ject in and for itself” is contradictory and his “solution” to the 
essential and necessary contradictions in the categories is a retreat into subjectivism.472 
According to Kant, Hegel recounts, the contradiction is contained in “reason and its 
cognition of the ob-ject” instead of in the object itself, i.e., instead of in the thing in 
itself.473 Kant achieves this solution by reducing the object to something subjective, a 
mere combination of categories and intuitions, and simultaneously emptying the real 
object, the object in and for itself, of all content, reducing it to an empty thing in itself, an 
unconditioned condition that is fundamentally cut off from what it conditions. 
In Part 1, I already discussed Hegel’s assessment of Kant’s motivations as he 
presents it in the Science of Logic. Again, he says there that Kant shares in that “usual 
tenderness for things, whose only care is that they do not contradict themselves.”474 
Hegel says essentially the same thing in the Encyclopedia Logic. He claims there that 
Kant’s way of solving the problem produced by these unavoidable contradictions “is as 
trivial as the viewpoint [i.e., his insight into the necessity of the contradictions] is 
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profound.”475 Once again, Hegel insists that this would-be solution arises “merely” out of 
“a tenderness for the things of this world.”476 Hegel elaborates on this point as follows: 
 
The stain of contradiction ought not to be in the essence of what is in the world; it 
has to belong only to thinking reason, to the essence of the spirit. It is not 
considered at all objectionable that the world as it appears shows contradictions 
to the spirit that observes it; the way the world is for subjective spirit, for 
sensibility, and for the understanding, is the world as it appears. But when the 
essence of what is in the world is compared with the essence of spirit, it may 
surprise us to see how naively the humble affirmation has been advanced, and 
repeated, that what is inwardly contradictory is not the essence of the world, but 
belongs to reason, the thinking essence.477 
 
Again, Hegel does not think that this drastic solution actually resolves the contradiction 
successfully. As Hegel puts it in the Encyclopedia Logic,  
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it does not help at all to express this by saying that reason only falls into 
contradiction through the application of the categories,” because Kant also claims 
that “this application is necessary, and that, for the purpose of cognition, reason 
has no determinations other than the categories.478 
 
Or, again, as Hegel puts it in the Science of Logic, Kant “forgets” in employing this 
strategy that he has not resolved the contradiction, but only shifted it to the thinking 
subject.479 
These passages thoroughly refute Houlgate’s claim that Hegel’s criticism of the 
Kantian thing in itself “focuses on Kant’s concept in the abstract” rather than considering 
it within its Kantian “epistemic context.”480 
Recall that, according to Houlgate, that “there is without doubt some merit to [the] 
Kantian rejoinder” that, by disregarding Kant’s “doctrine of sensibility,” Hegel “seriously 
… distort[s] Kant’s position” and “indulge[s] in a distinctively Hegelian form of 
abstraction.”481 
Houlgate imagines he is correcting Hegel’s mistake by pointing out that “Kant 
does not start from the concept of the thing in itself but begins, rather from a certain 
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understanding of sensibility,” but, as I have shown, Hegel was never confused on this 
score.482  
Hegel has not failed to notice that, for Kant, as Houlgate puts it, the “concept” of 
the thing in itself “plays a definite epistemic role” in “remind[ing] us that the conditions 
under which we intuit things are merely the conditions under which we intuit things and 
may not be regarded as the ontological conditions of things as they truly are.”483 Far from 
being confused on this point, Hegel offers a refutation of the “epistemic context” of 
Kant’s claim that the thing in itself is unknowable.  
It is as though, rather than trying to refute Hegel’s position, Houlgate tries to save 
Hegel from himself by pretending these passages do not exist, while at the same time 
criticizing Hegel for ignoring what Hegel does not in fact ignore. It is indeed possible that 
Houlgate minimizes Hegel’s differences with Kant and reduces the former to a Kantian 
subjective idealist in a misguided effort to defend Hegel, though it is debatable whether a 
drastic misinterpretation is compatible with the aim of defense.  
If, on the other hand, our aim is to comprehend Hegel’s Logic, whether Hegel is 
ultimately right or wrong, textual accuracy ought to be our paramount concern.  
I have shown that the careful consideration of those passages that Houlgate either 
ignores or misinterprets as lending support to a subjective idealist interpretation of Hegel 
in fact supports a radically different interpretation than Houlgate’s.  
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In summary, on the basis of the textual evidence I have presented, my 
interpretation of Hegel’s stance on logical necessity in relation to the a priori and a 
posteriori modes of knowing is the following. 
For Hegel, thinking begins as representation in which a universal is joined with 
feeling or a sensible content. Our representations are not the product of an imposition of 
ready-made a priori categories of our own on sensation or feeling. Rather, they result 
from the work of finding these universals in their subject matter.  
Of course, in the Logic, Hegel does not elaborate the manner in which these 
universals are found, so for a more precise account of how this is supposed to take place, 
one would have to turn to his Philosophy of Mind and examine the manner in which he 
believes human intelligence transforms immediate intuition into representation before it 
transforms representation into thought. However, Hegel does indicate in the Logic what, 
in a general sense, he thinks enables the human mind, which first encounters the world as 
immediate sensation, to arrive at universal determinations. For Hegel, this is only 
possible if the world itself in itself is governed by dialectical logic, and no one, including 
Kant, has proven that it is not.  
As I discussed in Part 1, according to Hegel, “everything logically real” and 
“everything true in general” exhibits the moments of the concept.484 Hegel thinks that this 
enables thinking to appropriate a content that is initially external to it so that the thought 
determinations, the universal content, in things become thoughts as such. Thinking at first 
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appropriates the universal content in the form of a representation, which is only an 
incomplete thought joined together with a form or content that is initially heterogenous 
with thinking. The task of thinking, in particular philosophical thinking, is then to 
articulate the entirety of the form or content in the medium of thought, leaving nothing to 
feeling or the memory or imagination of sensation. Once this is accomplished, once 
thinking has taken what is external into itself so that it is no longer merely external, one 
may say that thinking is self-mediating rather than being mediated by something external. 
That is to say, once this has taken place, the a posteriori moment is subordinate to the a 
priori moment and subsumed under it. 
For Hegel, what is appropriated and subsumed under thinking is not just 
appearances, but also the thing in itself. As Kant insists, appearances presuppose 
something that appears. In Hegel’s view, there is no content and no form that is 
fundamentally ungraspable by thinking and, far from grasping only appearances, it is 
precisely thinking that grasps the idea of the thing in itself and its relationship with 
appearances. Insofar as things in themselves are responsible for appearances, these 
appearances enter into what the things in themselves are, and in this sense Houlgate is 
right in supposing that Hegel’s approach to things in themselves is more concrete than 
Kant’s. Hegel does not, like Kant, stop at the mere abstraction. But this does not at all 
imply that Houlgate is right that Hegel does not think that “we can after all reach a realm 
of being beyond our sensuous experience that Kant deems to be inaccessible.”485 This is 
precisely what Hegel thinks. The thought of the thing in itself is a thought, albeit a 
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thought of something that is not a thought. And while it is the thought of something that 
is responsible for sensuous experience, it is not merely reducible to the latter.  
Moreover, according to Hegel, the only reason that Kant thinks that there is 
something ungraspable by thinking is that Kant realizes that thinking necessarily involves 
itself in contradictions. Because Kant abhors the idea that things in themselves might 
contradict themselves, he concludes that our way of knowing is unsuitable for grasping 
things in themselves. Hegel insists that Kant fails to prove that things in themselves 
cannot be contradictory and his abhorrence for contradiction is therefore simply a 
prejudice.  
There is of course room for disagreement on the precise meaning of the passages I 
have discussed in this chapter. However, such disagreement ought to proceed from 
agreement that they must somehow be taken into account. There is also room for 
disagreement with Hegel’s absolute idealism, as I have presented it. However, one ought 
to test it on its own terms, not as though it were a version of Kantian subjective idealism.  
I now put Hegel’s absolute idealism to the test by bring my interpretation of it to 
bear on Trendelenburg’s criticisms of Hegelian necessity.  
E. Trendelenburg 
Unlike Houlgate, who tries to minimize Hegel’s differences with Kant, Trendelenburg 
disagrees with Hegel because he recognizes that Hegel has serious differences with Kant. 
However, as I showed in the previous section, Hegel does not simply disregard Kant’s 
point of view. Rather, he offers a refutation of Kant’s subjective idealism by showing that 
it rests on nothing more than a prejudice of the understanding. Trendelenburg, much like 
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Schelling, and much like Houlgate for that matter, ignores this refutation. Instead, as I 
show in this section, Trendelenburg seems to believe that the mere fact that Hegel’s 
position is different from Kant’s position constitutes a refutation.  
Recall that, according to Trendelenburg, Hegel twists words when he claims that 
what his Logic achieves a priori knowledge.486 Even though Trendelenburg agrees with 
Hegel that the world grasped by the empirical sciences is a product of “the prius of divine 
reason,” he does not think that this justifies calling knowledge that results from the 
appropriation of this knowledge by philosophy a priori knowledge.487 
In one of the passages I quoted above, Hegel does indeed claim that, when 
philosophy cognizes the “necessity” of the content first won for thinking by the empirical 
sciences, this content “becomes the presentation and imitation of the activity of thinking 
that is original and completely independent.”488 This appears to be a reference to divine 
thinking of the sort that Trendelenburg has in mind when he refers to “the prius of divine 
reason.” As I showed in parts B and C, Hegel also holds that, for human beings, a priori 
knowledge comes after a posteriori knowledge and results from the appropriation by 
philosophy of knowledge first gained in experience or else by the activity of natural 
science. From a Kantian point of view, to claim that a priori knowledge comes after and 
                                                          
486 Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, 90. 
487 Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, 90. 
488 Hegel, Encyclopedia Logic, 37. 
232 
results from a posteriori knowledge is of course a complete perversion of the meaning of 
the term “a priori” and this is why Trendelenburg says that Hegel twists words.  
Recall, however, that words are not all that are at stake here for Trendelenburg. 
Even if he thinks that Hegel justifies his position on the “origin and procedure of human 
knowing” through verbal trickery, this actual position is the problem.489  
For Kantians, on the other hand, there is always something left over that cannot be 
fully grasped by thinking, and this is the substance of Trendelenburg’s most serious 
objections to Hegel’s philosophy as well.  
Recall, once again, the dilemma that Trendelenburg poses to Hegel’s philosophy: 
 
Either the dialectical development is independent and determined only by itself; 
then it must actually know everything from its own self. Or it presupposes the 
finite sciences and empirical knowledge; then the immanent progress and the 
seamless connection is broken by what is taken up externally; and it behaves 
uncritically toward experience at that. The dialectic may choose. We see no third 
possibility.490 
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Again, according to Trendelenburg, what Hegel’s philosophy is forced to take up 
externally, insofar as it presupposes the empirical sciences, is the “manner of 
justification” of these sciences “without which they themselves are nothing.”491 For this 
reason, Trendelenburg objects to Hegel’s supposition that philosophical thinking can 
grasp a priori the content that was first won for thinking by the empirical sciences.  
Thus, in Trendelenburg’s view, Hegel’s Logic fails to provide a necessary 
deduction of any a priori content because it cannot do so. Consequently, Trendelenburg 
thinks that thinking cannot ever make the content its own full possession. However, like 
Schelling’s argument that Hegel’s Logic could not possibly have a necessary 
development because it could not possibly be presuppositionless, this is not a direct 
refutation, but an effort to dispute the very possibility of a seamless necessary connection 
in the Logic. 
Moreover, Trendelenburg’s objection to the very possibility of a seamless 
necessary connection in the Logic is ultimately based on the Kantian supposition that our 
cognitions are a combination of fundamentally heterogenous elements: a priori categories 
and forms of intuition together with sensory intuitions. If the “manner of justification” of 
the empirical sciences delivered this content to philosophy in a form that could be made 
conceptual throughout, the manner of justification would not in any way break the 
“seamless connection” of Hegel’s logical deduction. But, in Trendelenburg’s view, 
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intuitions are a part of our cognitions, and the latter are therefore not at all amenable to 
conceptual articulation.  
That this is Trendelenburg’s real concern is revealed in his specific objection to 
the deduction of the concept of becoming at the very beginning of Hegel’s Logic.  
Again, on this question, Trendelenburg argues: 
 
Pure being is the empty, and the empty the pure. In this complete equalization, 
every impulse to progress or transition is expired. Logical reflection of the 
equality is realized as a real unity. Who would believe in becoming, if it only 
came from there?492 
 
In addition, recall Trendelenburg’s claim that even though Hegel wants to remain 
in the “simplicity” of “pure thought,” his thought is forced to go “beyond itself,” since, in 
the very “first step” beyond empty being, thought “has grown together with a 
representation, in which one recognizes space and time as moments.”493 Because Hegel’s 
thought combines itself in this way with a representation, according to Trendelenburg, it 
is no longer “pure thought, completely unchained from external being.”494  
                                                          
492 Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, 39-40. 
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494 Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, 40. 
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Thus, in Trendelenburg’s view, we may have a representation of motion or even a 
representation of becoming (as motion), but this representation joins a fundamentally 
heterogenous element with thinking, namely intuitions of space and time. Hegel is 
therefore wrong, in Trendelenburg’s view, in supposing that we have a pure concept of 
becoming. 
Let us now examine these claims from a Hegelian point of view. Every concept in 
Hegel’s Logic presupposes representations in the sense that it is these representations that 
Hegel claims his Logic transforms into thoughts. To do this, Hegel must be able to 
recognize when the represented content is fully articulated in the form of thought.  
In section C of this chapter, I noted that Hegel addresses several skeptical 
objections to the deduction of the concept of becoming at the beginning of the Logic. As I 
noted there, in the face of this deduction, some people may nevertheless insist that “we 
do not comprehend the unity of being and nothing.”495 
In this case, Hegel insists, “what is understood by “comprehension” is often 
something more than the concept in the proper sense.”496 In such cases, the claim that we 
do “not comprehend the unity of being and nothing” as a result of a logical deduction of 
it amounts to the complaint that the logical deduction of it does not provide us with “a 
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concrete case of it, with which thinking in its ordinary practice would be more 
familiar.”497 
Hegel then answers this complaint by acknowledging that, in everyday life, “one 
is not used to holding onto abstract thoughts without any sensible admixture,” and that 
“philosophical knowing”—as he presents it—"is indeed quite diverse in kind from the 
knowing that we are used to in everyday life.”498 In everyday life, of course, Hegel thinks 
we tend to be contented with representations. If one still objects to the logical deduction 
of the unity of being and nothing, claiming that we do not have any representations of 
this unity, then this, Hegel insists, “can only mean that one does not [re]cognise the 
present concept in any of those notions, and one does not know them to be examples of 
it.”499 We have, he insists, “an infinite supply” of such representations of the unity of 
being and nothing in everyday life. 
Part of Trendelenburg’s objection to Hegel’s claim that he has a pure concept of 
becoming amounts to the claim that Hegel implicitly imbues his concept of the unity of 
being and nothing with just the sort of sensible admixture that Hegel insists does not 
belong in the concept proper. This follows from Trendelenburg’s claim that no one 
“would believe in becoming” if it came only from the deduction of the unity of being and 
nothing.500 The problem with this is that Hegel never claimed that anyone must “believe 
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in becoming” without having had any concrete experiences of becoming, since it is quite 
implausible in any case that one would read Hegel’s Logic prior to having any such 
experiences. But even more importantly, it does not at all follow that Hegel has failed to 
articulate the conceptual essence of those experiences.  
Of course, Trendelenburg’s objection to Hegel’s conceptual deduction of the 
concept of a pure concept of becoming is not just a general objection to abstract concepts. 
Rather, the specific problem with Hegel’s allegedly pure concept of becoming is, in 
Trendelenburg’s view, that it must involve “space and time as moments” and, in 
supposing that his concept is pure, Trendelenburg thinks that Hegel ignores this fact.501  
By way of a reply to this objection, it is in the first place worth noting that it is not 
even plausible that becoming must involve space, since one can, for example, become 
more contemplative or more virtuous, and space is not directly involved in either one of 
these instances of becoming. But, in the second place, even if one were to acknowledge 
that everything that becomes becomes in time, pointing this out still does not constitute a 
refutation of Hegel’s deduction. When Hegel deduces the concept of becoming, he has 
not yet deduced the concept of what becoming becomes. The concept of becoming is thus 
deficient even in Hegel’s own view, since the idea of becoming that does not become 
anything is self-contradictory. But the remedy, for Hegel, is not to abandon thinking and 
content oneself with representation. Rather, for Hegel, the inner deficiency, the inner 
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contradiction, in the concept of becoming is what ultimately leads to the deduction of 
more concrete concepts including ultimately the concept of time.  
Trendelenburg does not refute this deduction but criticizes Hegel for not 
presupposing, with Kant, that space and time and the content of sensory intuitions are not 
amenable to full conceptual articulation, and he therefore disputes that Hegel has 
articulated this much more abstract concept from which Hegel develops the concepts of 
space and time.   
Moreover, even though Hegel certainly does not fully accept Kant’s use of the 
terms a priori and a posteriori, Trendelenburg is also mistaken in supposing that he 
justifies his rationalist optimism through terminological trickery. Rather, as I have 
explained in Part 1, he shows that (1) the abstract thought determinations of the 
understanding are intrinsically self-contradictory, and (2) concrete thoughts result from 
the deductions of these contradictions. As I indicated there, in Hegel’s view, if one does 
not adopt the prejudice of the understanding, according to which there is nothing that is in 
itself intrinsically contradictory, a great source of mystery disappears, because then one 
does not have to suppose that whatever is beyond the understanding must remain 
mysterious. 
For Hegel, thinking that is self-mediating, that is, thinking that has appropriated 
the entirety of the conceptual content of a thing, is a priori thinking. Hegel considers such 
thinking to be an “imitation of the activity of thinking that is original and completely 
independent” because, in Hegel’s view, there is nothing fundamentally mysterious for 
thinking as such, only for the understanding.  Thus, because the human mind can grasp 
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the intrinsic nature of things, there is no knowledge that is accessible only to God and not 
to human beings. Whether one thinks that there is actually a God has no direct relevance 
to whether Hegel is right about the power of the human mind. 
Hegel’s point is that no one has provided genuinely unassailable proof that there 
is anything fundamentally unknowable, that is, conceptually inarticulable. In Hegel’s 
view, nothing must in principle remain fundamentally mysterious to the human mind so 
long as it does not adhere dogmatically to the standpoint of the understanding. Therefore, 
any truly worthy attempt at a refutation of Hegel’s position on this question should 
proceed not from a dogmatic adherence to the standpoint of the understanding but should 
attempt to show that something must remain fundamentally mysterious to the human 
mind even if one rejects this standpoint. This has not yet been done. 
F. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown that Hegel conceives the a priori and a posteriori modes of 
knowing dialectically, that is, as moments of one and the same development in which a 
posteriori knowledge becomes a priori knowledge through a process of purification and 
conceptual deduction that exhibits the necessity of the content. 
In both Part 1 and Part 2 of this study I have sought to show that Schelling and 
Trendelenburg, two of the most prominent philosophers in Germany following Hegel’s 
death, fail to refute Hegel’s claim that the development of his Logic is necessary. For 
both philosophers, this is bound up with their opposition to what they take to be the 
overly ambitious rationalist claims of his philosophy. 
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Here, in Part 2, I have shown that Trendelenburg is correct in supposing that, for 
Hegel, the role of the a priori and a posteriori modes of knowing is essential, and I have 
refuted Houlgate’s subjective idealist interpretation of Hegel, according to which Hegel 
holds that the a posteriori moment plays no role in the development of philosophy, 
because the “categories” of Hegel’s Logic are an independent product of a priori human 
subjectivity alone.  
It may be possible to raise objections to Hegel’s theoretical philosophy in general 
or his view of necessity in particular that I have not considered here.  
For instance, as I noted in Part 1, a thorough examination of the entirety of 
Hegel’s deduction as he presents it in the Encyclopedia Logic and the Science of Logic 
was beyond the scope of the present study. I only sought to show there that the general 
forms of necessity that Hegel outlines in the section of the Encyclopedia Logic entitled 
“More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic” applies to at least one part of 
Hegel’s deduction, namely the very beginning. Again, it may well be that in one or 
another place in the subsequent development of the Logic, Hegel mistakenly presents a 
non-necessary transition as necessary. 
As another example, here in Part 2, I mentioned that Hegel’s own detailed account 
of the manner in which thinking appropriates for itself a content that is initially external 
is to be found in his Philosophy of Mind. This account is rather complex and may well be 
erroneous in one or another respect. However, this may well be the case without implying 
that Hegel’s general point is false. As I have presented it in this chapter, Hegel’s general 
point is that human intelligence progresses from sensory intuition to representation, in 
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which that sensory intuition becomes the possession of human intelligence, and then on 
to conceptual cognition, in which thinking is purified of the givenness that is still a part 
of thinking in the form of representation.
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